Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hossein Bostan stated in an oral note:

Examination of the Jurisprudential Dimensions of Spousal Violence/7

Regarding a man compelling his wife to engage in intercourse: if the wife has a legitimate sharia excuse, the husband naturally has no right to force her; but if she has no sharia excuse, compulsion is not conceivable—rather, this act is counted among the husband’s rights. Of course, feminists consider this act rape and condemn it, but the reality is that from a jurisprudential viewpoint, the ruling of rape cannot be applied to it, because normal sexual enjoyment in non-excused situations is the husband’s right and is one of the implied conditions of the marriage contract. We may, of course, consider such compulsion a form of bad character, but it is not rape.

Note: As soon as “violence against a spouse” is mentioned, minds immediately turn to violence by the husband against the wife; but is this because violence by the wife against the husband is essentially inconceivable or simply rarer? Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hossein Bostan, professor of advanced fiqh of gender, attributes the automatic association of spousal violence with violence against the wife to feminist propaganda; otherwise, violence against the husband is both conceivable and not uncommon—especially if violence is understood to include both physical and verbal forms. The academic member of the Scientific Council of the Women and Family Fiqh Group at the Research Institute for Studies in Contemporary Jurisprudence also has an interesting opinion on “marital rape.” The full text of the oral note by the faculty member of the Research Institute of Hawza and University on violence against husbands follows:

The discussion of violence by wife against husband is neither conceptually nor instanially outside the discussion of violence; that is, the discussion of violence encompasses violence by wife against husband just as it encompasses violence by husband against wife—both conceptually and in actual cases. In this regard, various points have been made in the social sciences such as sociology and in empirical research, and comparison of statistics shows that violence exists against both women and men; however, the reason why the second type—violence by wife against husband—appears to receive less attention or mention is mainly due to propaganda, media campaigns, atmosphere-building, cultural engineering, and agenda-setting, and has very little scientific or epistemological basis.

Violence against wives has been more highlighted because feminists advocate for women’s rights and have conducted more media activity around it; but this does not mean that violence from the other side does not exist or that anyone denies that form of violence.

In relation to the discussion of violence against a spouse, there exist certain general titles that cover both types (violence against husband and violence against wife) and certain specific titles that are exclusive to each. Just as we discuss issues of men’s violence against women under both general and specific titles and then state their rulings, the same applies here.

Among the general titles is the prohibition of causing harm (ḥarām al-iḍrār); if someone causes harm to another, the rulings of the rule of la ḍarar apply to him. The majority view la ḍarar as negating a harmful ruling, but some authorities such as the late Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Sistani consider la ḍarar to mean the obligation of the ruler to intervene to prevent harm, and according to this basis the la ḍarar rule acquires a very important practical consequence: if violence occurs in a family—whether against the man or the woman—one can, based on this rule, prevent it, stop the harm, and order compensation for the damage.

As for specific titles, some apply to both women’s violence against men and men’s violence against women, while others apply only to one side. One such title is the use of obscene language. Another is reviling (shatm). These can also be placed under the title “disrespect.”
The evidences for these titles differ from one another. Some of them establish prohibition (ḥurmah), while others indicate nothing more than dislike (karāhah). For example, mere harshness or sharpness may not carry the ruling of prohibition, but if it leads to uttering obscene insults it becomes prohibited.

These were examples of verbal violence. In addition, there is physical violence, which naturally carries a more severe ruling than verbal violence.

These are titles in which violence is conceivable both from men against women and from women against men. But there are also cases conceivable only from men against women, such as intercourse by compulsion. Regarding a man compelling his wife to engage in intercourse:

if the wife has a legitimate sharia excuse, the husband naturally has no right to force her; but if she has no sharia excuse, compulsion is not conceivable—rather, this act is counted among the husband’s rights. Feminists, of course, consider this act rape and condemn it, but the reality is that from a jurisprudential viewpoint the ruling of rape cannot be applied to it, because normal sexual enjoyment in non-excused situations is the husband’s right and is one of the implied conditions of the marriage contract. We may consider such compulsion a form of bad character, but it is not rape. Perhaps a similar act from the wife’s side can be imagined in another form called “intimidation” (ikhāfah), which can also carry the ruling of prohibition. This issue is, of course, conceivable from the man as well: a man can also intimidate his wife and thereby force her to do something.

One of the cases of verbal violence is qadhf (slanderous accusation of adultery), for which the ruling is stated in the Quran: “And those who accuse chaste women and then do not produce four witnesses—lash them eighty lashes and do not accept their testimony ever; and those are the defiantly disobedient.” (Surah an-Nūr, verse 4)

Boycotting (hajr) is also mentioned in the Quran. Both qadhf and hajr are forms of violence against a spouse and have different rulings; sometimes they may reach the level of prohibition and sometimes only the level of dislike.

[1] For qadhf to be established, it must be in explicit or reliably apparent words, such as the accuser saying: “You committed zinā,” or “You committed liwāṭ,” or “You are a fornicator,” or “You are one who commits liwāṭ,” or “You have been subjected to liwāṭ,” or “Penetration has occurred in your anus,” or “O fornicator,” or “O sodomite,” and similar expressions that explicitly or with reliable apparent meaning convey this sense. It is required that the speaker knows the meaning for which the word was coined in the language in which he speaks; thus, if a non-Arab utters one of these words (in Arabic) without knowing its meaning, he is not considered a qādhif and no ḥadd punishment applies to him even if the addressee knows the meaning. Conversely, if someone who knows the meaning of the word says it to someone who does not know it, he is a qādhif and the ḥadd applies.

Source: External Source