Mabani-ye Fiqhi-ye Ravabet-e Beyn al-Melal, Seyyed Mahmud Alavi, Amirkabir Publications, 1402 Sh./2023 CE, 234 pages.

This book is one of the earliest attempts to produce textual material specifically devoted to the jurisprudence of international relations.

At the beginning, in a short preface-like introduction, after referring to the role of relations in human life and offering a definition of international relations and foreign policy, the Islamic viewpoint on the subject is presented, followed by a brief survey of well-known schools of thought in the field of foreign policy.

In the next section, a review of the Qur’anic context of the topic is provided; however, the author deliberately avoids detailed elaboration in light of the verses cited, lest—as he himself states—the book stray from its main subject (jurisprudential discussions of international relations) and turn into a broad Qur’anic study, even though such a study would be highly valuable in its own right. Here, the author contents himself with interpretive explanations and seeks to offer a picture of the Divine Word’s perspective on relations among Muslims and between Muslims and others, thereby preparing the mental ground for the subsequent discussion.

The Qur’anic approach to covenants and treaties forms another foundational topic that is examined from a general perspective. The emphasis placed by the sacred religion of Islam on covenants and treaties and its insistence on the obligation to honor them is clearly stated, thereby paving the way for discussion of the rule of “the original binding force of contracts” (aṣālat al-luzūm fi’l-‘uqūd).

In treating this rule, attention is first paid to its place in the development of jurisprudence and fiqh, and to the reliance placed upon it by jurists in various areas of fiqh, with several examples being traced. Then the scope of the rule is examined. In this connection, reflection is offered on whether the rule extends to unwritten and unspoken transactions that take place merely through exchange, relevant evidence and the opinions of authorities—especially those of Imam Khomeini—are explained, and ultimately his view is adopted, thereby granting the rule in question a considerably broader scope.

In proving the rule with the intended scope, recourse is had to demonstrative arguments—including the Qur’an, hadith reports, the principle of continuity (istishāb), and especially the established practice of rational people (bunyān al-‘uqalā’). Following Imam Khomeini’s approach, the practice of rational people is deemed the most acceptable proof, while the other arguments are regarded as confirmatory and endorsing.

In reasoning from verses—both for this rule and for others—attention is given to lexicology, the opinions of exegetes, and the use made of the verses by renowned jurists. With respect to hadith reports, the manner of transmission in Shi‘i and Sunni collections is first examined, followed by evaluation of the chain of transmission, identification of narrators, assessment of the report’s reliability, and finally lexicological analysis. At the end, several examples of treaties concluded by the Prophet (s) are presented as illustrative cases.

After discussing this rule and establishing its validity, Islam’s view of international contracts is examined. In a general discussion, the criterion for the validity of international contracts in Islam is set forth, and the authority competent to approve and formalize international treaties from the Islamic perspective is clarified. Then the process, approving authority, manner of announcement, and exchange of such treaties in the Islamic Republic of Iran are discussed with reference to the relevant articles of the Constitution.

The next section delineates the political geography of the world from an Islamic viewpoint and treats the most important international treaties in the sight of fiqh—namely contracts of safe-conduct (amān), contracts of protection (dhimma), and truce agreements (hudna).
The jurisprudential rules of “the original binding force of contracts” and “negation of domination” (nafy-e sabil) are two further rules examined in the book. Their validity is first established through verses, hadith reports, and other proofs such as the consensus of the Companions and the proportion between ruling and subject-matter; then their scope, instances of application by jurists, and their uses in governmental fiqh and their influence in that domain are discussed. Their manifestation in the fatwas of jurists—especially Imam Khomeini—and their role in shaping the principles that guarantee the country’s independence in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran are highlighted, and several examples of their application in the past century are outlined.

In the following section, the rule of “negation of hardship and constriction” (nafy-e ‘usr wa ḥaraj) is treated in the same manner as the two preceding rules, and its scope and its effect on primary rulings are discussed. Finally, the discussions of the book are summarized, and an overall outline of foreign policy and international relations in the Islamic system, based on the contents of the work, is presented.

This book, as the first step toward addressing the foundations of an emerging branch of jurisprudence, must be regarded as a valuable work; nevertheless, certain shortcomings can be pointed out, such as the conflation between “foundation” and “rule,” the relatively few jurisprudential rules actually discussed, the failure to mention the presuppositions of this branch of jurisprudence, and the lack of separate treatment of theological, philosophical, Qur’anic, hadith-based, and other foundations.