Note: At first glance, discussing the challenges of the fiqh of international relations may seem pointless, because this branch of fiqh is overflowing with difficulties; scarcely any issue lacks conflict between fiqh rulings and international conventions. Dr. Seyyed Sadiq Haqiqat, however, believes these challenges have nothing to do with the discipline of fiqh itself, but stem exclusively from the traditional approach to it. The author of The Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy, and International Relations maintains that by adopting a minimalist fiqh and a reformist (novin-andishāneh) approach to the discipline, most of these difficulties can be resolved. The full text of Contemporary Jurisprudence’s exclusive interview with the member of the “Fiqh of Politics and International Relations” group at the Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies Research Institute follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the most important challenges facing research in the fiqh of international relations?

Haqiqat: The fiqh of international relations is based on a maximalist approach to religion, according to which fiqh addresses every issue, including international relations. Since I have a problem with the maximalist approach to religion, I do not agree with the very term. The most we can say is that fiqh contains certain propositions concerning international relations, but to speak of a “fiqh of international relations,” a “fiqh of physics,” a “fiqh of chemistry,” or a “fiqh of nuclear issues” is fundamentally problematic from a theoretical standpoint. Therefore, instead of the phrase “fiqh of international relations,” we should say: “the views of fiqh regarding international relations”—that is, fiqh possesses certain propositions about international relations.

Second, there is a difference between foreign policy and international relations. International relations refers to relations between states (in Arabic more accurately al-ʿalāqāt al-dawliyya, not “international”). In reality, relations are between governments, not between peoples. In any case, we have international relations on the one hand and foreign policy on the other. Foreign policy consists of the totality of one country’s actions toward other countries. Once this distinction is made, fiqh propositions concerning foreign policy become different from fiqh propositions concerning international relations. In other words: sometimes we are talking about the stance of an Islamic government toward other countries—here fiqh has propositions that may be called “fiqh propositions regarding foreign policy.” At other times we want to see how fiqh views relations between states in general, whether Islamic or non-Islamic—here the fiqh propositions are specific to international relations. We must therefore distinguish between fiqh’s relation to foreign policy and fiqh’s relation to international relations.

The real problem arises when the question concerns fiqh propositions about international relations in the sense of relations among states (both Islamic and non-Islamic). We must then ask what rulings the Sacred Lawgiver has laid down for relations among these states. Of course, non-Islamic states are not the addressees of this discussion; the discussion concerns states that are Islamic and for which fiqh is authoritative.

Given this, we must employ propositions in the fiqh of international relations that also cover relations between Islamic and non-Islamic states—for example, the statement of Imam ʿAlī (ʿa) in Nahj al-Balāgha: “Either your brother in religion or your equal in creation.”

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given rules such as “negation of domination” (nafy-e sabil) and rulings such as offensive jihad, the permissibility of violating the sanctity of, backbiting, or harming a kāfir, etc.—all of which imply Muslim superiority over non-Muslims and Shiʿa superiority over Sunnis—can we construct a fiqh of international relations based on reciprocal rights and interests of states and nations?

Haqiqat: On the basis of the traditional discourse—the one currently dominant among jurists—this indeed creates numerous problems, as you pointed out. For example, Āyatullāh Muṭahharī in his book Slavery in Islam (printed in 1393 Sh./2014) explicitly states: “It is possible that a country does not want to fight us, yet we must fight it in defense of monotheism”—that is, the classic discussion of offensive jihad. This offensive jihad, as understood in the traditional reading, becomes highly problematic in international relations. We are members of the United Nations and committed not to wage war against other countries and to defend any member state that is attacked. Can membership in the United Nations even be accepted if the theory of offensive jihad is upheld?

But on the basis of a reformist discourse of fiqh, an approach grounded in peace and coexistence emerges in international relations. For example, in this approach there is fundamentally no offensive jihad during the Occultation; commitment to international laws and regulations becomes obligatory; an Islamic government is therefore bound by its borders and international obligations. Thus a fundamental difference appears between the traditional religious discourse and the reformist religious discourse on this issue.

The other topics you mentioned are also correct and are consequences of the traditional approach to fiqh.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that traditional fiqh does not recognize geographical borders and divides the world into Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Ḥarb, can contemporary international relations even be conceived within the discipline of fiqh?

Haqiqat: The terms Dār al-Islām, Dār al-Kufr, and Dār al-Ḥarb are jurisprudential terminology, but do not exist in the hadith corpus. We only have rulings that differ in application between the two domains. For instance, the ruling on a found object or on the ritual purity of a foundling differs between Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr. This terminology appears far more in Sunni fiqh books than in Shiʿi ones.

Therefore, if you mean that the Sacred Lawgiver has drawn a border such that a permanent state of war exists until the Day of Resurrection between Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr/Dār al-Ḥarb—no such thing exists. But if you mean that the term exists in the writings of the jurists, you are right. That difficulty is real, because in traditional fiqh, by virtue of the ruling of offensive jihad, an Islamic state must declare war on Dār al-Kufr until its inhabitants either become Muslim or are attacked. Yet according to contemporary international relations and the acceptance of conventional borders, every state is only obligated to defend its own borders; declaring war on another country merely because of religious difference has no meaning.

As I said, however, this difficulty belongs exclusively to the traditional approach to fiqh and does not exist in the reformist approach, because in the latter, the ruling of offensive jihad during the Occultation is not accepted, and peaceful relations between an Islamic state and other states—whether Islamic or non-Islamic—are accepted.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: To what extent may an Islamic government set aside fiqh rulings in order to play an active role in the international arena—one of whose requirements is joining international conventions?

Haqiqat: An Islamic government may choose not to bind itself to a treaty, but once it does bind itself, it must abide by it. As I mentioned, if an Islamic government joins the United Nations, it must abide by its rules; if it joins a convention, it must accept the consequences—this all falls under the Qur’anic command “Fulfil your contracts” (ūfū bi’l-ʿuqūd). Thus an Islamic government may from the outset refrain from entering a convention or international organization, but once it does, it must accept the consequences under the same command.

Here, as I discussed in detail in my book Foundations and Aims of the Policy-Making of an Islamic Government, a practical conflict may arise between the rule of “negation of domination” and “fulfil your contracts,” taking various forms that I have examined at length in that book.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that Muslims—and especially Shiʿa—are a global minority, can the rulings of the fiqh of international relations be derived on the basis of the circumstances of taqiyya (dissimulation)?

Haqiqat: Taqiyya has nothing to do with these issues. Taqiyya is a concealment of one’s positions for higher religious and Islamic purposes. If by “fiqh of international relations” we mean the relation of fiqh propositions to international relations, the addressees are those who are committed to Islam or to Shiʿism. Therefore, secular or non-Islamic states are not the addressees, and the discussion of taqiyya simply does not apply, because the audience of the fiqh of international relations consists of Muslims and Shiʿa who are bound by fiqh propositions, and taqiyya obviously has no meaning for them.