Note: Dr. Abdulwahhab Forati is an associate professor at the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought who has authored numerous books and articles in the field of political thought. His recent research efforts have shifted toward understanding intellectual and religious currents in Iran and especially beyond its borders. We spoke with him about the nature of the jurisprudence of international relations and its differences from similar concepts such as international law. He, however, highlighted a more fundamental point: the very image of “international fiqh” is based on accepting the old geometry of power; otherwise, in the new geometry of power, talk of religion and fiqh has no place. The full text of Contemporary Jurisprudence’s exclusive interview with the member of the academic council of the “Jurisprudence of Politics and International Relations” group at the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies is as follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the jurisprudence of international relations? How does it differ from similar concepts such as “jurisprudence of politics,” “jurisprudence of international law,” and “the international approach to fiqh”?

Forati: Undoubtedly, international fiqh is a concept entirely different from international law and has a completely distinct function. The “international” sphere is a vast domain that encompasses many areas, including understanding the global structure of power, recognizing the Western and Eastern blocs, and international institutions; in a sense, it covers all international developments. International law also defines a set of norms to regulate relations within this domain so that these structures and institutions do not become unregulated—for example, international treaties and customary international law, compliance with which is obligatory from the perspective of international law.

However, international fiqh seeks to define rules for the relations of Muslims—with two qualifications: first, outside the city-state of Medina, and second, with those who are outside the Islamic faith. This means that international fiqh essentially has nothing to do with the behavior of the other party in international relations; rather, it primarily aims to outline the rules and principles that we must observe toward those who are ideologically at odds with us.

Consequently, the rules of international fiqh pertain to our actions, not the actions of other actors in the international arena; whereas international law speaks of rules and norms that apply to the actions of everyone, which everyone has accepted and committed to follow. In reality, international fiqh addresses the conduct of Muslims in the international sphere, while international law addresses the conduct of all. But understanding how this conduct is to be grasped is not the task of fiqh, because the very nature of this conduct changes in every era. In the past, the nature of this conduct was based on faith (īmān) versus polytheism (shirk), and Islamic fiqh drew its international rules within that framework. Today, however, the nature of international conduct has changed, and fiqh must comprehend the texture of this new conduct—this is precisely what is referred to in international relations literature as the change in the geometry of power in the modern era.

Those who speak of international fiqh habitually remain within the old geometry; whereas the new geometry, while respecting religion, has nothing to do with religion and, of course, prohibits individuals and states from infringing upon the religion of others. Under such conditions, fiqh can no longer draw international rules based on ideological boundaries and must redefine itself in accordance with the new geometry. This shows that the previous image of the context of power has transformed, and the geometry of power is fundamentally no longer based on the binary division of faith and disbelief within which fiqh once lived.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given the transcendent approach of Muslims toward non-Muslims and of Shiʿa toward Sunnis that exists in fiqh, is it possible to construct an effective jurisprudence of international relations based on the equality of the parties to the relationship?

Forati: Careful attention to the previous answer reveals that these very presuppositions have collapsed in the modern era and within the current structure of international relations, and Islamic fiqh cannot discuss them based on the dual transcendent approaches mentioned in the question. The reason is that the presuppositions of the international system have changed, and fiqh must study these new presuppositions and norms. For example, the currently accepted norms of the international system fall into several categories:

• One category falls under treaties such as human rights conventions.
• Another category pertains to the common interests of countries.
• A further set of norms is embedded in new alliances and power blocs.

Therefore, the jurisprudence of international relations is obliged, first, to analyze these norms and not remain confined to the former norm of faith versus disbelief; and second, to articulate general principles—for instance, which of these norms in the three aforementioned categories do not lead to domination (istīlāʾ). Of course, identifying specific cases is not the task of fiqh and should be left to the authorities of the Islamic state. This demonstrates that in the current network of power in the international arena, nothing called faith and disbelief exists, and the promotion of liberalism and the like is not considered a religion.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Please explain a little more about the change in the geometry of international power.

Forati: Throughout history there have been multiple periods of domination (istīlāʾ), which can be divided into three major eras:

1. The era of domination of body over body, when slavery was prevalent; part of Islamic fiqh was also born within this era of domination and offers precise judgments about it.
2. The era of domination of labor and skill, belonging to the industrial period in the West, to which Islamic fiqh paid less attention.
3. The era of domination of information and technology, which today constitutes the nature of the geometry of power.

It seems that fiqh as a whole has not yet analyzed this change in the global texture of power, or has paid only scant attention to it. The previous international fiqh is useless for understanding this era and has no practical efficacy.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Based on this analysis, what new topics does the jurisprudence of international relations need to address in order to connect itself to the third stage?

Forati: This is an excellent question that prevents us from returning once again to the traditional topics of fiqh in international relations. It appears that the new geometry of power places the following new topics before Islamic fiqh, about which it must render judgment—provided, first, that it comprehends this geometry. These topics include:

• Clarifying its position on the issue of migration.
• Addressing the recognition of geographical borders in modern states.
• Giving importance to the environment.
• Paying attention to the exchange of wealth and technology on the global stage.
• Giving importance to domestic corruption that transfers wealth beyond borders.
• Addressing war and peace based on their new texture, and understanding that today states wage war or make peace within defined frameworks, and war is not like unregulated, lawless terrorism.

Of course, fiqh can offer opinions on international crimes, but what exists is that international crimes are a subject of international law and have no relation to the jurisprudence of international relations.