Note: The dispute between proponents of minimalist and maximalist approaches to fiqh is an old one that has intensified after the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of fiqh-based governance in the country. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Seyyed Mehdi Alizadeh Musavi, however, believes that the disagreement stems from a lack of clarity about the actual point of contention; once the issue is precisely defined, the matter becomes clear. He holds that a major confusion has led many to embrace minimalist fiqh. The full text of the exclusive oral note by this faculty member of the University of Religions and Denominations follows:

To explain the minimalist and maximalist views of fiqh, we must address the topic in several sections. By clarifying these sections, the overall framework of the discussion becomes largely clear.

Section One: The relation between fiqh, kalām, and ethics

First, we must revisit the ancient question of the relation between fiqh, kalām (theology), and ethics. Which has priority—kalām, ethics, or fiqh? Unfortunately, throughout history there have been excesses and deficiencies in all three. For example, in the dispute between the Muʿtazila and the Ahl al-Ḥadīth, the focus was on kalām issues such as the createdness or eternity of the Qur’an. At other times the emphasis has been on fiqh, as in the conflict between the Akhbārīs and Uṣūlīs. At still other times ethics has been taken to excess, giving rise to Ṣūfism and false mysticisms.

In my view, the relation among these three disciplines resembles a tree: theological/doctrinal issues are the roots, fiqh issues are the trunk and branches, and ethical issues are the fruit. If any one is missing, the other two become meaningless and incomplete. Regrettably, throughout history there have been imbalances among them. The first problem that arose in Islamic history was the lack of harmony among these three disciplines.

Section Two: Minimalist and maximalist in the definition of fiqh

Here we must determine what we mean by the discipline of fiqh. If we regard fiqh as the science that examines the acts of responsible persons (ʿibād) with respect to the five categories of rulings (obligatory, recommended, permissible, disapproved, forbidden), then the minimalist and maximalist views concern the scope of those rulings over human acts. If we limit fiqh to people’s private affairs, we adopt minimalist fiqh; if we consider it effective also in public affairs, we adopt maximalist fiqh. From this perspective, the maximalist theory appears more correct: fiqh is not confined to individual matters but extends to social issues and addresses the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of people’s lives.

Section Three: Minimalist and maximalist fiqh with respect to followers (muqallids)

Here we examine minimalist and maximalist approaches from the viewpoint of followers. The question is whether mujtahids may, in certain cases, declare a follower’s question improper and forbid it; whether they may issue fatwās that induce scrupulosity (waswasa) in the follower; whether the fatwās of mujtahids are sufficiently practical and take real-life circumstances into account; and, given the increasing specialisation of knowledge, whether we can still speak of an “absolute mujtahid” or whether all mujtahids are now partial (mutajazzī).

Given the current situation and the ever-increasing specialisation of knowledge, it seems there no longer exists an absolute mujtahid; all are partial. Many who advocate minimalist fiqh in fact confuse the necessity of specialised ijtihād with the acceptance of minimalist fiqh—whereas the former does not entail the latter. There is no contradiction in holding that fiqh is capable of answering all contemporary human questions while maintaining that answering each branch of applied fiqh requires mujtahids specialised in that particular branch. This confusion is a major one that has unfortunately occurred.

It appears obvious and self-evident that fiqh is maximalist and has something to say on every subject—to the point that life without fiqh is impossible, which is why all religions possess fiqh.

Perhaps another reason some pursue minimalist fiqh is the failure of many fuqaha to make serious use of reason and custom. This has led some to believe that the only way to give reason and custom their proper place is to adopt minimalist fiqh and thereby shrink the domain of fiqh so that reason and custom can operate freely—whereas reason and custom must be employed within fiqh itself.

In conclusion: regarding the definition and scope of influence of the discipline of fiqh, our view is maximalist. But with respect to followers and the legally responsible, we believe fiqh must move toward minimalism in the sense of specialisation, so that every chapter of fiqh has its own specialised mujtahid.