Note: It may be said that many individuals discussing simulation and its jurisprudential rulings lack a complete understanding of its nature, types, and applications. Many consider simulation to mean the creation of a complete human being, and regard stem cells as limited to those from the umbilical cord. Dr. Mohadeseh Mo’inifar, a faculty member at Imam Khomeini International University in Qazvin, has conducted extensive studies on the jurisprudential and legal dimensions of simulation, one outcome of which is the book Simulation in Religious Perspectives and Legal Thought. We spoke with her about stem cells and their role in simulation. By enumerating the types of simulation, she analyzed their jurisprudential dimensions and implications. The full text of this exclusive interview by Contemporary Jurisprudence with this researcher in the jurisprudence of simulation is as follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What precisely is meant by human simulation? Is it possible to create a human being without the fertilization of an egg and sperm?

Mo’inifar: In linguistic terms, simulation means a sprout or twig, and technically, it refers to the cultivation of the nucleus of a non-sexual human or animal cell—which possesses a complete set of chromosomes—in a nucleus-free egg cell from a female, and fertilizing this egg through special methods in a natural or artificial womb, with the aim of forming a living being that is exactly identical in outward appearance to the owner of the original cell nucleus. Additionally, simulation or cloning technically means: “The process of asexual production of a group of cells, molecules, or living organisms that are all genetically identical to a common ancestor; in other words, the replication of a cell or generally a living organism without any alteration in its genotype.” Simulation has types: 1- Reproductive simulation 2- Non-reproductive simulation. Reproductive simulation itself is divided into two types: embryonic simulation and DNA simulation.

Regarding the second part of your question, I must acknowledge that according to the above definitions, yes; this is possible, and ultimately in this method, only an egg is needed to serve as a medium for the 46 chromosomes of the non-sexual cell. Simulation in nature is not a new or novel matter and occurs in many organisms. Some types of animals mostly reproduce through simulation, but these animals also reproduce sexually every few generations to preserve their genetic adaptability to the environment; because in nature, the only way to improve the genetic reserves of various species is through sexual reproduction. Most species that reproduce asexually become extinct, and in exceptional cases, their numbers remain limited.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the ruling on human simulation using stem cells? Can it be deemed prohibited through titles such as “altering the creation of Allah,” “mixing of waters,” and the like?

Mo’inifar: First, I prefer to reformulate this question as follows: stem cells are relevant in therapeutic simulation, whereas the evidences you mentioned for prohibition apply to reproductive human simulation; because mixing of waters pertains to issues of lineage in humans. Of course, altering “the creation of Allah” could also apply to therapeutic simulation, although Imami jurists have not referred to it.

In general, in response to this question, I prefer to review the ruling on therapeutic and reproductive simulation and their evidences among Imami jurists:

Among Imami scholars, there is no consensus on the ruling regarding human simulation, and various opinions have been presented:

Absolute permissibility: Some jurists and experts, due to the absence of a clear text indicating the prohibition of human simulation, and also based on the principle of permissibility and the rule “Everything is permissible for you until you know it is prohibited in itself, then you abandon it,” have deemed human simulation permissible; including Grand Ayatollahs Sistani, Mousavi Ardebili, Nouri Hamadani, Rouhani, Allamah Fadlallah, Mohammad Saeed Hakim, Mousavi Sabzevari, Mousavi Tabrizi, Syed Mohsen Tabrizi, Abbai Khorasani, Jenati, Mo’men, and the martyr Motahhari.

Conditional permissibility: Some, based on existing texts and the primary principle in this regard, have deemed human simulation permissible, but hold that widespread performance of human simulation creates problems, such as the existence of identical individuals and the difficulty of distinguishing them from one another; consequently, they have ruled permissibility on a case-by-case and individual basis, and deemed it impermissible on a large scale. Among these is Ayatollah Javadi.

Secondary prohibition: Some Imami scholars and jurists hold that human simulation in itself and primarily has no issue and is permissible based on the principle of permissibility; however, performing it will inevitably lead to corruptions; therefore, to prevent these corruptions, human simulation is considered secondarily prohibited. Among these jurists are Grand Ayatollahs Syed Kazem Ha’eri, Sadeq Shirazi, Makarem Shirazi, San’ei, Bayat, and Fazel Lankarani.

Absolute prohibition: In contrast to the three aforementioned views, a fourth view has also been proposed, whose proponents are very few. This view is very close to the opinion of Ahl al-Sunnah and states that simulation is primarily prohibited. Allamah Mohammad Taqi Ja’fari, Allamah Mohammad Mehdi Shams al-Din, and Grand Ayatollahs Tabrizi, Bahjat, Safi Golpaygani, and Shahroudi hold this view. Proponents of absolute prohibition of simulation present the following evidences in defense of their opinion:

1- Altering the creation of Allah 2- Principle of prohibition 3- Lack of ownership over the body 4- Causing discord between husband and wife

Imami jurists have adopted three opinions regarding therapeutic simulation and have not referred to evidences in this field:

1- Absolute permissibility 2- Conditional permissibility 3- Absolute impermissibility.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is creating a body organ, such as a hand or eye, through simulation permissible? In this case, does the new organ have the same rulings as the previous one in terms of mahramiyyah (prohibited degrees for marriage), ownership, and so forth?

Mo’inifar: Imami jurists have adopted three opinions regarding therapeutic simulation and have not referred to evidences in this field:

1- Absolute permissibility 2- Conditional permissibility 3- Absolute impermissibility.

In the theory of permissibility, some jurists believe that therapeutic simulation and organ production for transplantation pose no issue. The theory of conditional permissibility is also based on the prohibition of abortion or killing, from which one can derive the permissibility of organ transplantation from the correct statements of the jurists in the second group as well as their incorrect statements. For example, I refer to a few opinions from them:

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi: “Simulation for organ transplantation has no religious issue.” He also stated: “Using these cells, provided it does not cause the death of the fetus, poses no issue.”

Ayatollah Bahjat: “Provided there is no abortion or killing, it poses no issue.”

Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi: “If it is simulation of human organs for the purpose of treatment, it poses no issue.”

Ayatollah Tabrizi: “Provided it is before the ensoulment, there is no obstacle.”

The theory of impermissibility belongs to Ayatollah Safi Golpaygani, who in response to questions 1 and 2 of the istifta’, gave one answer and apparently considered both types of simulation as of the same kind and ruled as follows: “Simulation of non-human animals poses no issue, but simulation of humans is not permissible.” From his statements, it can be inferred that the criterion for prohibition is the same for both types of simulation and has no connection to organ transplantation. Therefore, in summary, it can be concluded that creating an organ from stem cells that have the potential to transform into human body organs is permissible, and other related rulings on organ transplantation apply to it; with the difference that in organ transplantation, it is from another person, whether living or brain-dead; whereas the source of transfer in the therapeutic simulation method is divided into the following groups:

A- Embryonic stem cells: These cells can be obtained from the cell mass that forms 5 to 7 days after fertilization. There are four potential sources for obtaining embryonic cells: tissues from dead fetuses, embryos resulting from in vitro fertilization between sperm and egg, embryos resulting from simulation via somatic cell nuclear transfer, and tissues from aborted fetuses.

B- Embryonic germ cells: These cells, obtained from the gonads of a developing embryo, are cells that will eventually become sperm and eggs (depending on the embryo’s sex).

C- Embryonic carcinoma cells: Cell lineages obtained from tumors originating from embryonic germ cells.

D- Umbilical cord blood stem cells: Blood cells in the umbilical cord can be a reliable source for the future therapeutic needs of the individual or close relatives.

E- Adult or non-embryonic stem cells: These cells are more differentiated than embryonic and germ embryonic stem cells, but their differentiation is not complete, and they can transform into certain more specialized cell lineages. These cells can be isolated from embryos, fetuses, children, and adults; therefore, regarding stem cells, it can be acknowledged that the possibility of obtaining cells from the individual himself has increased, and many issues arising from organ transplantation from others will not exist in this case.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In the ruling on simulation of body organs, do titles such as the gender and religion of the cell owner and the recipient play a role?

Mo’inifar: As answered in the previous question, based on the opinion of jurists who deem organ transplantation permissible, variables such as gender and religion have no place, because the transplanted organ is considered part of the recipient’s body, and his blood flows through it. For a better understanding of the topic, I deem it necessary to detail the opinions of Imami jurists regarding the transplantation of human reproductive organs:

A- Transplantation from a living human, where the discussion is divided into two parts:

1- Uterus transplantation: Uterus transplantation can be from a single or married woman. In the first case, assuming no harm is inflicted, it seems that the permission of the woman herself and her guardian is required; but in the case of a married woman, the permission of the uterus owner and her husband (since the husband has exclusive or priority right over it) is also needed, and if it is not needed (in cases and times when it is not considered a principal organ, such as when the couple have children, or the woman is a widow, or her ovaries are destroyed and no benefit accrues to her uterus), performing it is not subject to prohibition or interdiction.

2- Ovary and testis transplantation: According to some, transplantation of these two organs is not permissible due to possessing the eggs and sperm of their owners, even though conventionally after transplantation, they are considered part of the recipient’s body. However, transplantation of these two organs differs from transplantation of other organs. Accordingly, some consider a child born through this method illegitimate; as some Imami jurists have considered such transplantation subject to contemplation and issue, but then say: “If after the surgery the ovary is considered part of the second body, the child is affiliated to her.” However, Grand Ayatollahs Khamenei, Mousavi Golpaygani, and Mousavi Ardebili have ruled permissibility of testis transplantation and affiliation of the child to the recipient. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi has also ruled permissibility of ovary transplantation and considers the child affiliated to the recipient.

Of course, if this ovary transplantation (for example, in cancer treatment) is from the individual herself to herself, it is no longer subject to the ruling of prohibition; because it is specifically outside the subject of the prohibition ruling.

B- Transplantation from a brain-dead human

Uterus transplantation: Like transplantation of other organs, it requires the permission of the next of kin.

Ovary and testis transplantation: According to the theory of impermissibility, it is not permissible for the aforementioned reasons, and the permission of the next of kin has no relevance. But according to the theory of permissibility, with the permission of the next of kin, it poses no issue.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the jurisprudential rulings for a simulated human in terms of mahramiyyah (prohibited degrees for marriage), inheritance, blood money, marriage, and so forth?

Mo’inifar: In examining the views of Imami scholars, after stating the conceivable scenarios in reproductive human simulation, we proceed to the views of Imami scholars:

• The case where the active cell nucleus and the nucleus-free egg (passive) both belong to the woman who owns the womb.
• The case where the active cell nucleus belongs to one woman and the nucleus-free egg (passive) belongs to another woman, and the original cell is implanted in the womb of the first woman; this situation particularly occurs in the rare case where a woman lacks sexual reproductive ability but has a healthy womb and desires to have a child without affiliation to a non-mahram.
• The case where a man’s non-sexual active cell nucleus is implanted in a woman’s passive egg, and a marital relationship exists between them, with the husband lacking sexual reproductive ability.
• The case where the active nucleus and nucleus-free egg belong to one woman, but the child is placed in a surrogate womb. Of course, there are other probabilities in this field, but only these four cases seem medically possible.

The views of Shiite jurists on the affiliation of the simulated child to the father are divided into two categories: A- No affiliation to the father B- Affiliation to the father.

The views of Shiite jurists on the affiliation of the simulated child to the mother are also divided into two categories: A- Affiliation to the mother, which is divided into two theories: the theory of non-multiplicity of the maternal title and the theory of multiplicity of the maternal title. The theory of non-multiplicity of the maternal title itself includes several views: affiliation to the womb owner, affiliation to the egg owner, and affiliation to the cell owner. The theory of multiplicity of the maternal title also includes the following: affiliation to both the cell owner and womb owner, affiliation to both the egg owner and womb owner, affiliation to both the egg owner and cell owner, affiliation to both the nucleus and cytoplasm owners.

B- No affiliation to the mother.

An important point is that the relationship of identicality between the simulated individual and the DNA donor is rejected according to Muslim scholars; whereas this relationship has proponents in Western countries.

Regarding other rights, including maintenance, custody, and other rulings such as mahramiyyah, it must be acknowledged that these are all dependent on lineage, which will be enforceable wherever lineage is proven, and will not be raised wherever lineage cannot be proven.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: If body rejuvenation and possibly its renewal become possible, what will be the ruling on punishments such as retaliation for life and limb amputation? Should the new organ created through simulation also be amputated again?

Mo’inifar: Perhaps in response, one can refer to a general rule in criminal jurisprudence. That general rule, as expressed by the late Ayatollah Shahroudi, is as follows:

1- If someone amputates an organ from another person—an organ among those subject to retaliation—and is retaliated against in turn, then one of them wishes to transplant the amputated organ and restore it to its original state, the other, whose organ remains impaired, has the right to prevent him and separate it again. Yes, if he transplants an organ other than the exact same amputated organ to his body, he no longer has the right to prevent him; for example, if someone blinds another’s eye and he implants a living or dead eye in its place, or if the softness of someone’s ear is cut and he places a piece of flesh from his own or another’s body through plastic surgery in its place.

2- If someone amputates an organ subject to retaliation from another’s body, and before retaliation occurs, the victim transplants the amputated organ and restores it to its place; the right of retaliation is dropped, and proving blood money for it is also problematic; rather, compensation should be determined by the government. This is in the case where the exact same amputated organ is transplanted, but if he obtains an organ from outside his body and transplants it to his body, the right of retaliation or blood money remains preserved for him.

From this statement, it can be concluded that organs created through simulation are different from those separated from the individual’s own body; therefore, they are no longer subject to separation, and the victim or the perpetrator have no right to demand re-amputation of the organs.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: If the use of stem cells leads to permanent rejuvenation and human immortality, what is its ruling?

Mo’inifar: Although Imami jurists have not expressed matters on this issue; however, it seems that considering their opinions on human simulation, in general, the above opinions can also be applied here. The range of opinions includes the following:

1- Absolute permissibility 2- Conditional permissibility 3- Secondary prohibition 4- Absolute prohibition

It seems that based on the principle of original permissibility, this can be deemed primarily permissible; but by examining the effects and various aspects of this topic, especially its corruptions, perhaps a ruling of prohibition can also be considered, or one can move toward a moderate view and, while observing the theory of permissibility, exclude some cases that involve corruptions from the ruling of permissibility.