Note: The minimalist approach to jurisprudence is in the minority among the great scholars of the seminary and is contrary to the official interpretation of religion in the country. This has caused it to always remain on the margins and its dimensions to be less discussed and analyzed. In other words, the minimalist approach to jurisprudence has always been in the position of critic and has rarely had the opportunity to be criticized and placed in the position of responder. On this occasion, we spoke with Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hossein Adabi, a professor at the Islamic Seminary of Mashhad, about the dimensions and challenges of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence. As one of the critics of this approach, in this exclusive interview, he addressed the challenges and weaknesses facing this approach.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is meant by the minimalist approach to jurisprudence in terms of the intervention of jurisprudence in which arenas of human life?

Adabi: It seems that this question should be posed differently. Proponents of minimalist jurisprudence consider jurisprudence to be a duty-oriented science, not rights-oriented and justice-centered. The meaning of this statement is that wherever there is a direct relationship of duty and the relationship of servants with God, jurisprudence expresses opinions within the scope of the fivefold rulings; but in legal matters related to rights and where justice must be the axis of social actions, the science of jurisprudence cannot play a role.

Proponents of minimalist jurisprudence fundamentally do not define social, cultural, and political matters within the scope of jurisprudence and do not establish a relationship between jurisprudence and these matters; in other words, social and cultural foundations cannot be reformed, developed, and grown with jurisprudential rulings; rather, they require another source besides jurisprudence to undertake these matters. The non-entry of jurisprudence into social, political, cultural domains and the human livelihood system provides the ground for separating religion from politics and society and leads to entrusting governance and policy-making to non-jurists. This thinking only considers issues related to eschatological happiness and has nothing to do with the rest of life’s affairs.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence mean maximal recourse to reason and the practice of the rational, and reducing recourse to texts?

Adabi: Proponents of minimalist jurisprudence consider the scope of the vacuum zone (manatiq al-firagh) so vast that nothing remains for jurisprudence except expressing opinions on personal devotional rulings and individual behavior. In this definition, system-building, institution-building, policy-making, and all matters related to policies and transactions have no obligatory jurisprudential ruling, and it is the rational who establish foundations in this field. The natural meaning of this statement is reducing recourse to texts, but perhaps the issue can be viewed differently. Opponents of the minimalist approach say that religion means a system of rulings, ethics, and beliefs; therefore, when we speak of minimalist jurisprudence, we are not talking about the entire religion but about the science of jurisprudence, and religion is not equivalent to jurisprudence. But this statement is not a suitable justification; because what is taken as the basis in minimalist jurisprudence fundamentally encompasses sections of ethics and beliefs as well and excludes anything related to non-individual domains from the scope of religion. The important point in this approach is that essentially, in the minimalist approach to jurisprudence, no position, mission, or capacity is envisioned for responding to issues related to system-building, institution-building, policy-making, and the like; therefore, jurisprudence is specifically removed from the path of responding to major social issues.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: In this case, given that understanding the ruling of reason and the practice of the rational is possible by ordinary and non-jurist people, does any reason remain for people to refer to jurists for understanding the Sharia?

Adabi: Well, first consider that when we speak of reason and rational rulings, we must consider the scope of understanding reason broader than the understanding of the general public; that is, reason, whether theoretical or practical, sometimes faces concepts and phenomena whose perception is self-evident and sometimes not. In the domain of non-self-evident matters, ordinary and non-jurist people do not have the possibility of accessing the ruling and answer and need to refer to the jurist. In addition, there are subtleties in the manner of rational reasoning that cannot be delegated to the general public. Sometimes neglecting the difference in levels of rational rulings and extending the rulings and effects of one level to another, or proving the capability of reason in accessing a series of knowledge and rulings through its capability in another level, automatically provides the ground for lack of precision and deviation in the result. Many rational arguments that are outside the scope of validity are due to confusion between levels and using the capacities of one level in another; therefore, we are still not independent of the presence of the jurist in the arena of understanding Sharia, and the understanding of ordinary people in this regard is not sufficient. Also, understanding the ruling of reason is different from the process of inferring the ruling of reason, and in understanding and using the process of inferring the ruling of reason, referral to the expert, who is the jurist, is again necessary. But the fundamental point, as mentioned, is that in the minimalist approach to jurisprudence, the scope of religion’s authority in human life is so limited to individual matters that this amount of entry and intervention in life has no significant impact on the destiny intended for humanity, which should be accompanied by happiness, growth, and perfection in all dimensions; therefore, although referral to jurists may still remain in a limited manner, it will not have much effect.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that proponents of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence interpret almost all issues of Sharia based on the practice and ruling of the rational, and the general public also has the possibility of referring to this ruling and practice, what essentially was the philosophy of the mission of the prophets?

Adabi: The question about the purpose of the mission of the prophets is fundamentally a theological question, but insofar as it expresses the purpose and domain of religion, it is important. Perhaps it is better to pose the question as follows: Is the invitation of the prophets limited to eschatological goals and spiritual happiness, or does it also encompass worldly interests and this-worldly happiness? Are the prophets merely guides of humanity toward God and the hereafter, or do they also have a program for bringing people to worldly welfare? In what domain do the prophets consider their mission, and what does human society expect from them? Proponents of minimalist jurisprudence depict a mission for the prophets that is eschatological and far from worldly goals. On this basis, a religion is formed whose concerns in no way align with the concerns of the human race that must follow it; therefore, religion steps onto a path where humans do not seek their needs in it.

In contrast to this thinking is the comprehensive view that considers religion as the charter of life in this world and the next. In the sense that this world and the hereafter, as a single unit, form human life, and this intermingling is such that the two parts cannot be separated from each other. This world and the hereafter are two sides of the coin of life, and there is no worldly religion and eschatological religion. Worldly religion is the same as eschatological religion and vice versa. These two together reveal the true meaning of religion. The contradiction of proponents of minimalist jurisprudence is that they divide religion into two parts: worldly and eschatological. Essentially, there is no meaning to worldly and eschatological religion, and this world and the hereafter together and side by side complete a puzzle, and it is not possible to place these two as opposing sections and separate them; hence, the philosophy of the mission of the prophets, as those responsible for guiding humanity toward happiness, is related to both aspects of worldly and eschatological life, and these two aspects cannot be separated from each other. The prophets, by creating order and coherence in worldly life based on divine instructions, provide the ground for worldly and eschatological happiness and welfare of humanity; therefore, they are responsible for human life both in its material and welfare aspect and in its eschatological aspect, and these two cannot be assumed separate.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the minimalist approach to religion not lead to the secularization of religion?

Adabi: If by secularization we mean the separation of religion from political, social, and cultural arenas, the minimalist thinking toward jurisprudence naturally leads to secularization. That is, it provides a ground where religion and jurisprudence are confined and isolated in a small scope and deprived of influencing social, political, cultural trends and human livelihood. Minimalist religious thinking will lead to the emergence of secularism and will negate the divine origin of religion and its epistemological and social values; therefore, this cannot be denied.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Proponents of the minimalist approach to religion, while considering response to many issues outside the duty of jurisprudence, nevertheless assume positions such as religious authority (marja’iyyah), which entail maximal response to people’s questions. How is this contradiction resolvable?

Adabi: If we consider religious authority a matter unique to eschatological happiness, it is compatible with minimalist jurisprudence and religion thinking. That is, one can consider that these individuals limit religion to eschatological happiness and matters related to it and have nothing to do with the material life of humans, and as a result, they are the authority and reference for people in that scope; therefore, responding to people’s questions in this field is compatible with such thinking. In such a case, naturally, maximal response to people’s questions may also be possible, provided that they do not necessarily attribute everything to religion and Sharia and derivations from it; because the divine base of religion has been destroyed, and epistemological and social values will become reason-centered. A jurist with minimalist thinking may have the capability and knowledge necessary to accept religious authority in human domains, but certainly does not consider the origin of these thoughts to be divine religion.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What has been the experience of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence in Islamic and Christian countries?

Adabi: The separation of religion from politics has caused the isolation of religion and its retreat into seclusion in Christian and Muslim societies that have yielded to this thinking. In addition, the lack of connection between this world and the hereafter has removed from access the social deterrents that religion provides for healthy society management, and macro and micro society management has become trapped in the vicious circle of imperfect human reason. As a result, what we see is an immoral society based on laws without ethical attachment, dry and harsh, and full of discrimination. The Christian experience in this regard is very eloquent and instructive. The lack of care for religion’s intervention in various life arenas and withdrawing religion from people’s lives has caused secular Islamic countries to have nothing but the shell of Islam.

Individualism and personalization of religion have caused problems such as homosexuality and adultery and the like, which even human reason acknowledges as incorrect, but it lacks the ability to manage society in facing these crises. Secular Muslim thinkers believe that God has considered the Prophet as “a conveyor from Allah and a caller to Allah,” not a ruler and administrator of Islamic Sharia who regulates relations between people. With this thinking, the principle of earthly sovereignty and society management, statecraft, and undertaking social, political, cultural, economic, educational, training affairs and the like are all removed from the duties of religion and prophets, and for religion, nothing remains except some personal devotional matters. As a result, religiosity establishes no relationship with society management, policy-making, and macro social planning.