Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Mehdi Alizadeh is among those who have exerted the most significant efforts—both intellectually and administratively—to systematize and intellectualize ethics and education within the Islamic seminary. Born in 1971 in Tehran, his scholarly contributions include teaching at seminaries and universities, alongside authoring numerous books and articles on Islamic ethics and education. Notable among these are Sources and Texts of Islamic Ethics, Bibliography of Islamic Ethics, Applied Ethics, and Islamic Ethics: Foundations and Concepts, which serve as textbooks at various seminary and university levels. He is also the founder of the Research Institute for Ethics and Spirituality at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture. As head of the Pole of Ethics, Spirituality, and Family at the Islamic Propagation Office, Dr. Alizadeh addressed the jurisprudential principles of educational jurisprudence in this exclusive interview. Prior to delving into these principles, he offered an introductory discussion on the interrelation of ethics with other disciplines and on two major approaches to education. The complete text of Contemporary Jurisprudence’s exclusive interview with this faculty member of the Research Institute for Ethics and Spirituality at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture is presented below:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Among jurisprudential principles, which are most widely applied in deriving rulings for the jurisprudence of education?

Alizadeh: The first matter to consider is the nature of religion itself. Religion comprises a set of beliefs, ethical teachings, and rulings—collectively forming jurisprudence. These elements together constitute religion in its entirety. Beliefs are self-evident. Ethics pertain to education: the cultivation of moral virtues and the eradication of moral vices. Rulings and jurisprudence represent the practical dimension of religion—the actions that a devout Muslim must perform. When these three components are fully realized, the purpose of religion is fulfilled, and the individual can be deemed truly religious.

As for the ultimate purpose of religion, religious sources—either explicitly or implicitly—allow us to infer that it is the establishment of justice and equity, as stated: “That people may uphold justice.” It also encompasses guiding humanity toward happiness, salvation, dignity, spirituality, monotheism, and emulation of divine attributes—for instance, embodying mercy as God is merciful, justice as God is just, or beauty as God is beautiful. In the noble verse, “So direct your face toward the religion, inclining to truth, [according to] the fitrah of Allah upon which He has created [all] people. No change should there be in the creation of Allah. That is the correct religion,” religion is equated with innate disposition (fitrah). These objectives are harmonious: some are intermediate, others ultimate, with fitrah representing the final end.

Among the three branches of religious knowledge, beliefs serve to nurture monotheistic orientation in individuals. Ethics enjoins moral observance to foster monotheistic humanity. Jurisprudence delineates rulings that cultivate monotheistic character. Compliance with these rulings yields no direct benefit to God but shapes monotheistic individuals. Thus, religion in its entirety possesses an educational dimension. It is not limited to jurisprudence alone, nor to a single chapter therein. Even the governmental aspects of religion aim to nurture this monotheistic fitrah—removing barriers to such education and facilitating its conditions. Narrations indicate that upon the advent of the sacred Imam al-Zaman (peace be upon him), this ideal will materialize: humans so perfectly educated that societal institutions like judges or law enforcement become unnecessary, as they naturally embody divine nurture.

Following this introduction, on the principles of educational jurisprudence: Two are particularly prominent—the principle of enjoining good and the principle of forbidding evil—which may even be regarded as its foundational pillars. Other jurisprudential rulings have contextual applications, yet these two exhibit the broadest scope and utility.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the jurisprudence of education possess principles exclusive to it? Please enumerate them.

Alizadeh: Within the discipline of education, a debate exists as to whether instruction constitutes a subset of education or stands apart. In my view, instruction is inherently an aspect of education. This is reflected globally in the pairing of “education and training,” where instruction inherently involves nurturing and cadre development. Universities similarly combine teaching with cadre formation. Thus, education encompasses instruction and learning more broadly. University students, for instance, are educated for roles in ministries, institutions, factories, companies, or elsewhere—again centering on education.

This is one consideration. Another is the distinction between two primary approaches: non-religious (secular) education, prevalent today, which nurtures individuals toward secular maturity in alignment with liberal-secular ideology and worldview—prioritizing economic and technological advancement for corporate profitability and worldly provision; and religious education.

Religious education shares concepts with the secular—work ethic, discipline, legal adherence, expertise—but differs fundamentally in objectives. It seeks to instantiate human and moral values toward religious aims: justice and equity, happiness, and salvation. Worldly prosperity occurs but subordinately, for eternal felicity and paradise. Individuals are thus monotheistically nurtured for these ends.

In response to the question: Yes, educational jurisprudence has its own specific principles, including benevolence (ihsan), piety and kindness (birr), sincere counsel (nush), obligation to guide the ignorant, obligation to disseminate knowledge, obligation to learn, and others. These complement general principles like no harm (la darar) and no hardship (la haraj), applicable across all jurisprudential domains, including education.