Head of the Research Center for Ethics and Spirituality, in an Exclusive Interview with Contemporary Jurisprudence:

Principles of the Jurisprudence of Education/10

The difference between these two meanings is that in the first meaning, jurisprudence performs a posterior role; that is, jurisprudence waits for educators to raise their questions, and then the jurist answers them. In this meaning, jurisprudence is passive; it responds to the questions of those who need to know the jurisprudential ruling for their educational actions. However, in the second meaning, deep understanding (tafaqquh) is itself innovative and pioneering, not waiting for anyone's question, and extracts from the sources of religion what is appropriate to be done for education to take place.

Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hassan Boosaliki has, for years, alongside seminary lessons, entered the field of education and engaged in research and teaching in this area. He, who for years managed the Educational Jurisprudence Group at the Research Center for Ethics and Spirituality of the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture, in this interview discusses the essence, dimensions, and requisites of educational jurisprudence. By enumerating three meanings of educational jurisprudence, he considers the prevalent meaning in seminaries to be responding to prescriptive questions regarding education. He, of course, postpones a detailed discussion on the other two meanings to another opportunity. The full text of the exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with the President of the Research Center for Ethics and Spirituality at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture is presented for your review:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is meant by “educational jurisprudence”? Please explain it precisely.

Boosaliki: Before anything else, we must pay attention to this compound term: what is meant by jurisprudence, and what is meant by education? In summary, in the general understanding, jurisprudence is the discipline responsible for extracting and deducing the fivefold religious rulings. Education, in its initial connotation, refers to ethical, religious, and spiritual education. Of course, it has other domains as well, such as intellectual, artistic, political education, and other fields; but typically, what comes to mind from the term education is ethical and religious education.

Regarding jurisprudence, we have a formed and historical discipline of jurisprudence with specified paths, sources, chapters, and theorists; but sometimes, what is meant by jurisprudence is its literal meaning of deep understanding and comprehension, in which case educational jurisprudence may face duality. Some use the term “jurisprudence of education” rather than “educational jurisprudence.” In my opinion, the precise expression is “educational jurisprudence,” not “jurisprudence of education,” which is an incorrect compound. Educational jurisprudence, considering the two meanings of jurisprudence, can have two meanings.

One meaning of educational jurisprudence is to answer all educational activities, topics, and questions from a jurisprudential perspective; that is, as a jurist proficient in the discipline of jurisprudence, we receive questions and inquiries from educators—from parents and teachers to governments—and respond to them. Of course, jurisprudential discussions are mostly focused on the permissible and the prohibited, with recommendation and disapproval having less prominence in the discussions of this discipline. In fact, when a question is asked of a jurist, it is as if they are expecting one of three answers: “It is permissible,” “It is prohibited,” or “It is allowed.”

The second meaning of educational jurisprudence is deep understanding in education; that is, we want to extract the educational system and the religious views on education from valid religious sources; in the sense that if the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) were present now, how would he educate children and the young generation? What would his goals and foundations be? What would his principles, methods, and techniques be? What would the obstacles be? In other words, extract an educational system from religion.

The difference between these two meanings is that in the first meaning, jurisprudence performs a posterior role; that is, jurisprudence waits for educators to raise their questions, and then the jurist answers them. In this meaning, jurisprudence is passive; it responds to the questions of those who need to know the jurisprudential ruling for their educational actions. However, in the second meaning, deep understanding (tafaqquh) is itself innovative and pioneering, not waiting for anyone’s question, and extracts from the sources of religion what is appropriate to be done for education to take place.

Of course, the use of the compound term “jurisprudence of education” (not educational jurisprudence) introduces a third meaning, which is to infuse the discipline of jurisprudence with educational considerations; that is, a jurist, in his scholarly work, brings in educational considerations, and it may even change his fatwa or the manner of expressing it. This is the third meaning of jurisprudence that has an educational hue. The subject of this jurisprudence is the same common chapters, but from the stage of deduction to the conveyance of the ruling, it observes educational considerations.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the discipline of jurisprudence fundamentally undertake the education of human beings, or is this the responsibility of other disciplines such as the discipline of ethics and the discipline of Islamic education?

Boosaliki: If we consider jurisprudence as this formed and historical discipline, one of whose prominent products is practical treatises, the answer is negative; that is, the jurist qua jurist has a specific duty to extract the obligatory and the prohibited, and the jurist’s work ends there. Other disciplines are the same; for example, the discipline of ethics is responsible for expressing and deducing ethical dos and don’ts. Now, a discipline emerges called education, whose task is to elevate human beings from their current state to the desired state. This is depicted as educational goals in other disciplines; that is, part of it is depicted by jurisprudence, part by ethics, part by philosophy, and other sciences. In fact, the ends that education pursues are depicted in other sciences, and education wants to elevate human beings from the current state to the desired state; for example, in devotional education, the goals are specified by jurisprudence; that is, we know from what age, what duties must be performed under what conditions. Now it is education’s turn; for example, education says, allow me to interact with the child in such a way that when he reaches puberty, he performs those devotional duties. Therefore, jurisprudence as a formed discipline is not responsible for education, although educational considerations may intervene in deducing jurisprudential rulings, which was the third meaning of jurisprudence of education, a separate discussion.

Of course, if we use jurisprudence in its literal meaning, it is not a specific formed discipline and is, in a way, the theology of education; because the theology of any discipline differs from that discipline itself; for example, we can have theology of ethics while also having the discipline of ethics. In the same vein, the discipline of education differs from the theology of education. We can act in educational jurisprudence like the theology of education, that is, go to the sources and extract the educational system. Yes, such a discipline, which has a theological nature, extracts the system and also deals with education. Of course, even there, we will not be independent of the discipline of education, meaning that after bringing the theology of education to fruition, we also need a discipline of education that has an Islamic nature.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the requisites for establishing a jurisprudential chapter? Is educational jurisprudence recognized as a jurisprudential chapter, or is it a general approach to all jurisprudential chapters and, in fact, posterior to the jurisprudential chapters?

Boosaliki: According to the duality mentioned, if we consider the first meaning, which was responding by jurists to educational questions, in that meaning, it is a new chapter. Not a general view of all areas of jurisprudence. But if we want to have a view of all areas of jurisprudence, it means infusing jurisprudence with education and giving jurisprudence and jurists an educational perspective, which is not currently our topic of discussion. What is now meant, prevalent, and common from educational jurisprudence is this jurisprudential work, that is, deducing the fivefold rulings on educational topics; for example, when we want to discipline a child, under what conditions, how much, and for whom is this discipline permitted? Where is blood money or retribution established, and where is it not? What are the goals of education? What should we focus on in education? That is, in what areas is the child supposed to grow? Should belief in the hereafter be part of our educational goals or not? Is reciting and understanding the Qur’an part of educational goals or not?

These are lengthy discussions addressed in educational jurisprudence; therefore, not only methods and techniques of education are the subject of jurisprudential questions, but the goals of education themselves are discussed; because common jurisprudence mostly takes limb-related behaviors as its subject, but educational jurisprudence discusses the goals of education as well; therefore, jurisprudence here has a posterior function, not that educational topics are such. Of course, the view of jurisprudence of education, meaning spreading the educational perspective to all areas of jurisprudence, is different; but in educational jurisprudence, the function of jurisprudence is posterior, meaning first the question and inquiry is presented to it, and then jurists issue the jurisprudential ruling on it. This is what is currently happening.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is educational jurisprudence the jurisprudential examination of educational propositions, or the necessity of conforming jurisprudential propositions to educational propositions, or something else?

Boosaliki: The answer to this question was previously stated: educational jurisprudence has two meanings. Its prevalent meaning is what lessons and classes have been formed for, which is jurisprudential response to educational questions. Jurisprudential questions are not merely educational propositions, such as whether disciplining a seven-year-old child is effective or not; because jurisprudence is not responsible for answering such questions but speaks of permissibility and impermissibility; for example, can we secretly monitor children’s behavior and are we permitted to violate their privacy? From a jurisprudential perspective, is this level of monitoring permitted or not?

In educational jurisprudence, we do not concern ourselves with the effects of the ruling; rather, we only examine the permissibility and impermissibility of actions based on religious evidences; but we do not examine educational propositions. Educational propositions are similar to recommendations for educational goals; for example, it says if you want your child to have self-esteem, reduce monitoring in the second seven years. This is an educational proposition, whose validity I do not concern myself with. Educational propositions have a prescriptive recommendatory nature and oversee goals; goals like self-esteem, for achieving which recommendations are made. Jurisprudence does not want to say anything about this proposition at all. Jurisprudence only wants to say whether monitoring a child is permissible or not and does not concern itself at all with whether it leads to self-esteem or not; therefore, existing educational jurisprudence has nothing to do with such propositions.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Among disciplines, is educational jurisprudence recognized as an independent discipline, or a field of study, or a theory like the theory of justice and dignity?

Boosaliki: A theory becomes a theory when what we mean by jurisprudence is jurisprudence of education; as if we ask jurists to necessarily infuse jurisprudential rulings with educational considerations and convey them with educational considerations, in which case it will be similar to the rule of dignity and the like; but when today we speak of educational jurisprudence in the first meaning—that is, religious response to educational questions (educational actions and goals)—this discipline is not at all independent but merely a new jurisprudential chapter; but if we consider it in the second meaning, that is, jurisprudence in education, it can be an independent discipline, and its main nature is theological; that is, we ourselves initially extract an educational system from religious sources. This can be an independent discipline. Of course, whether it has been formed or not is a separate discussion.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Establishing the discipline of “educational jurisprudence” depends on accepting which foundations and principles?

Boosaliki: This discussion is very lengthy and itself the topic of an independent interview; but in summary, I must say: educational jurisprudence in the first meaning does not require special principles and foundations; rather, a new chapter is simply added to the existing jurisprudence, like banking jurisprudence, which is a new jurisprudential chapter. But if what is meant is jurisprudence in education, it requires an extensive arena for discussion. We must raise epistemological questions to see whether its foundations are provided or not, and if not, from where they should be provided; therefore, if educational jurisprudence is in the second meaning, I am currently excused from answering it; because it itself requires a detailed interview.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the relationship between educational jurisprudence and disciplines such as “child education, schooling, and…”?

Boosaliki: This question is a continuation of the previous question; that is, if we take educational jurisprudence in the first meaning, it does not need to establish special relations; that is, jurisprudence states its own view, just as it is with other sciences, like medical jurisprudence, which only needs medicine to the extent of clarifying the subject. Here too, the role of these disciplines is to the extent that the educational question’s subject is fully known, but after that, the jurist specifies the ruling.

But if the meaning of educational jurisprudence is deep understanding in education, it is a very extensive arena that, like the previous question, I cannot enter, and a detailed discussion on its epistemological issues must be raised, and therefore, even in summary, I offer nothing; because it is a very extensive arena.

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