Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Alireza Mohammadi has been a prominent figure in the Dars-e Kharij (Advanced Research Studies) of Jurisprudence and Legal Principles at the Qom Seminary for many years and serves as a professor of high-level seminary curricula. Born in 1976 in Mashhad, he is a distinguished disciple of such masters as Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shahidi-pour and Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani. In this interview, we explore the status of “Practical Principles” (Usul al-Amaliyyah) within the framework of jurisprudence and civil law. Mohammadi argues that the core inquiry is broader than the utility of practical principles; rather, it concerns whether “Apparent Rulings” can effectively organize a civil legal system that aligns with Islamic ideals. He cautions against presenting juristic deductions as the absolute divine will for social administration, noting that since these are often inferred through speculative evidence or procedural principles, their correspondence with God’s “Actual Rulings” remains uncertain. The full text of this exclusive interview follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does civil jurisprudence possess its own unique set of “Practical Principles” that distinguish it from other branches such as criminal, international, or constitutional law?

Mohammadi: There exists a common misconception regarding religious rulings and practical principles that has obscured their role for legal scholars. If this premise is corrected, the focus of the debate shifts. Instead of asking whether practical principles apply to civil law, we should ask: “Is it viable to regulate civil society based on Apparent Rulings?” Whether an apparent ruling stems from a practical principle or a speculative indicator (Amara) is secondary. The fundamental question is whether civil laws can be effectively structured using apparent rulings at all. We can even extend this further: Can Sharia-based jurisprudence provide a civil law system that satisfies the exact secular objectives of modern legal science?

Conventional legal science aims primarily at optimizing the quality of worldly life. Secular jurists do not claim a mandate beyond this, as they possess no empirical data on how human interactions affect an eternal life post-mortem. Consequently, one cannot guarantee that even a civil law based on Islam’s “Actual Rulings” would satisfy the specific worldly metrics sought by secular legal scientists.

This leads to another question: Can we implement the totality of divine rulings in society? If we do so and challenges persist, some might argue that “True Islam” was not applied. However, even under the governance of Amir al-Mu’minin (as), despite his rigorous efforts, not every divine ruling was fully realized in the social fabric. Our contemporary predicament is even more complex; while the Imam had access to “Actual Rulings,” we are limited to “Apparent Rulings.” We cannot be certain if our inferences align with the divine reality or if we have erred in our scholarship. Thus, it is not guaranteed that these predominantly speculative rulings will fulfill Islam’s ultimate societal goals—let alone practical principles, which do not even claim to uncover reality but merely provide a procedural path.

However, a paramount feature of “Apparent Rulings” is that adhering to them grants “epistemic excuse” (Ma’dhuriyyah) before God, ensuring immunity from divine punishment. For those who view human existence through the lens of eternity, this is of supreme importance. If we are certain that following these apparent rulings secures our salvation and God’s pleasure, then reason dictates we must organize our social relations accordingly—even if we cannot prove that Islamic civil law outperforms secular alternatives in purely worldly terms. The rationale is clear: we prioritize humanity’s eternal welfare over a finite, seventy-year worldly span.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Which practical principles are most specific to, or frequently utilized in, civil jurisprudence?

Mohammadi: In my humble estimation, there is no practical principle exclusive to civil jurisprudence. However, certain principles are more prevalent in civil law than in criminal law. For instance, the “Rule of Completion” (Qa’ida al-Faragh)—applicable to transactions in the broadest sense, including marriage and divorce—is more functional in civil law. Conversely, the “Principle of Innocence” (Asl al-Bara’at) is a cornerstone of criminal law but is less central to civil disputes. Beyond such differences in frequency of use, I do not find a practical principle that belongs uniquely to the domain of civil law.