Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Majid Dehqan Benadaki has long concentrated his scholarly efforts on matters pertaining to women and family. He has produced numerous books and articles in this domain, among them Gender and the Language of the Qur’an. A faculty member at the Women and Family Research Institute, in this oral commentary he examines the jurisprudential dimensions and challenges surrounding gender reassignment. In his opinion, although gender reassignment may be permissible according to the primary ruling (al-hukm al-awwali), pronouncing it permissible under the secondary ruling (al-hukm al-thanawi) encounters significant obstacles. This exclusive oral note, prepared by a member of the Scientific Council of the Women and Family Jurisprudence Group at the Contemporary Jurisprudence Research Institute, is presented as follows:
The issue of gender reassignment can be divided into several parts: The first part concerns the very essence of the subject—what precisely does the subject entail? To properly comprehend the subject, attention must be paid to its diverse dimensions. The primary dimension is to determine the true intention of the person requesting gender reassignment. Is this request rooted in psychological factors, or does it stem from biological or physiological conditions? Furthermore, what exactly transpires during the surgical operation? Without precise subject identification (mawdu‘-shinasi), any derivation of a jurisprudential ruling will remain deficient. It should be noted that the majority of existing fatwas in this area have presumed the feasibility of gender reassignment and, proceeding on that assumption, have issued rulings permitting the procedure; nevertheless, it is essential first to rigorously establish and identify the very possibility of such an intervention as a subject.
The significance of accurate subject identification lies in the reality that the recipient of a fatwa is not necessarily versed in jurisprudential terminology. A fatwa might state: “Assuming the possibility of gender reassignment, permissibility is granted”—yet “gender reassignment” may carry one connotation within jurisprudential discourse and an entirely different one within medical science; consequently, such a fatwa is vulnerable to misinterpretation and misuse.
Gender constitutes a subject addressed across multiple scientific disciplines, including genetics, biology, physiology, psychology, and psychiatry. The viewpoints of specialists in these fields often diverge and occasionally intersect. However, for the purpose of deducing shari‘ah rulings, it is the understanding of the general convention (‘urf ‘amm)—not the specialized convention, but the broader convention capable of discerning fine distinctions—that serves as the standard.
Another issue arises here: Is gender among the deduced subjects (mawdu‘at mustanbatah) that require determination by the jurist, or is it an ordinary subject whose identification belongs to convention (‘urf)? It appears that gender does not belong to the category of shari‘ah-deducible subjects, since it predated the Lawgiver and is not a construct of the shari‘ah; hence, it falls under conventional subjects. Proof of this can be found in the fact that, both in the era of the Lawgiver and prior to it, individuals existed who were neither male nor female. The Lawgiver Himself established specific rulings for the hermaphrodite (khantha).
What the shari‘ah affirms is that no third gender is recognized; that is, the Lawgiver consistently assigns the hermaphrodite to one of the two established genders—male or female—and does not acknowledge a third gender as legitimate. This represents an instance of the Lawgiver intervening in conventional matters, a pattern with precedents elsewhere in fiqh.
The term “hermaphrodite” refers here to an individual whose gender identity contradicts their external sexual anatomy—for instance, possessing female genitalia yet experiencing male inclinations, or vice versa. Presently, after completing the requisite legal procedures, such individuals may undergo surgical intervention and gender reassignment. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the event is not a “change of gender” but an “alignment of gender.” The precise English counterpart is likewise not “gender change” but “gender affirmation”; as the person adjusts their sexual anatomy to correspond with their gender identity, rather than altering their fundamental gender. The result is the individual’s satisfaction stemming from this congruence between physical sexual characteristics and their gender identity and inclinations.
Regarding the jurisprudential ruling of permissibility: although no intrinsic prohibition may exist from the primary ruling standpoint, the critical question remains whether, under secondary considerations—particularly the application of titles such as hardship (haraj)—the act is deemed permissible.
One might respond that the person undergoing the procedure experiences not only an absence of hardship but profound satisfaction. Yet this satisfaction must be verified over subsequent years to ascertain its endurance. For instance, if a person assigned female at birth undergoes reassignment, acquires male anatomy, and enters marriage with a woman—considering the probable impossibility of erection and sexual intercourse—does satisfaction and freedom from hardship persist? Is the spouse content with marital life and relationship, incurring no hardship? Thus, issuing a ruling of permissibility for gender reassignment is far from straightforward.