Note: Martyr Ayatollah Khamenei, despite having held the longest tenure of governance by a Shi’i jurist, was never able to articulate his views on Wilayat al-Faqih in a dedicated jurisprudential book due to the occupations and responsibilities he held during the last 50 years of his life. Nevertheless, through his speeches, he revealed various dimensions of his reading of Wilayat al-Faqih. Dr. Abdul-Wahhab Forati, who has studied various political and seminary trends for many years, seeks to uncover the martyred Ayatollah’s reading of Wilayat al-Faqih in this article. According to this faculty member of the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought, the reading of this martyred jurist answers four major challenges facing this theory. The detailed text of the exclusive article by this member of the Scientific Council of the “Jurisprudence of Politics and International Relations” Group at the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies follows:

Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) over the past four decades, rather than being a mere jurisprudential theory, has been an arena for the conflict of interpretations. However, among all readings, the reading of Martyr Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei of this theory possesses unique characteristics that distinguish it from others. This article seeks to discover those very novel points that have received less attention and demonstrates why this reading should be termed “The Theory of Guardianship in Practice.”

Rupture from “Wilayat al-Hasbiyyah” and Moving Beyond the “Supervisory Jurist”

The first novel point in his reading is the decisive departure from two classical and later approaches. The classical approach, which dominated the seminaries prior to the Revolution, restricted Wilayat al-Faqih to non-litigious affairs (al-umur al-hasbiyyah)—that is, the guardianship of orphans, the mentally impaired, and absent persons—and never envisioned the jurist as possessing the right to establish a state and exercise comprehensive political sovereignty. The later approach, which today is manifested in the Najaf model, also reduces the jurist to the role of a “moral supervisor and spiritual guide” and cautions him against directly grasping power. However, Ayatollah Khamenei explicitly deems both approaches insufficient and emphasizes: “Wilayat al-Faqih is among the indisputable tenets of Shi’i jurisprudence, and Imam Khomeini was the first person who brought it from the realm of theory into the arena of practice.”[1] In this view, the jurist is neither a limited guardian nor a peripheral guide, but rather the “executive manager of the country” and the “commander-in-chief of the armed forces.” This represents a paradigmatic leap in Shi’i political jurisprudence that shatters the traditional boundaries of jurisprudence.

The Enigma of “Absolute Guardianship”: Flexibility, Not Despotism

Perhaps the most important and novel part of his reading is the articulation of the concept of “Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” (Wilayat-e Mutlaqah-ye Faqih). A superficial and biased reading of this concept equates it with the “dictatorship of the jurist” or the “leader being above the law.” The enemies of the Revolution constantly repeat the accusation that the system of the Islamic Republic suffers from a form of religious totalitarianism. However, Ayatollah Khamenei completely dismantles this reading with philosophical-jurisprudential subtlety. He states: “Absolute guardianship of the jurist means the flexibility of the apparatus of guardianship. The meaning of this issue is that the set of decision-making and decision-shaping bodies, at the head of which stands the leadership, must continuously transform themselves by constantly choosing that which is more correct and more complete.”[2] In other words, “absoluteness” (itlaq) here does not mean “unlimited and autocratic power,” but rather “non-adherence to fixed and predetermined molds.” This is the subtle distinction between “absolute authority” and “personal tyranny” that is rooted in the depths of governmental jurisprudence (fiqh-e hukumati). He warns: “A dangerous reading that must be avoided is confusing flexibility with deviation and yielding to external pressures.”[2] Thus, flexibility does not mean weakness or compromise; rather, it is the art of altering course while remaining faithful to principles. In another instance, with biting humor, he responds to the accusation of dictatorship as follows: “During the time of the Imam [Khomeini] as well, they used to speak of the dictatorship of the na’layn [clerical sandals]! Na’layn is fundamentally incapable of dictatorship; it is the nature of the boot that is the nature of dictatorship. The Imam stated that Wilayat al-Faqih prevents dictatorship.”[3]

Religious Democracy: The Missing Link of the Theory

One of the striking points in his reading is the simultaneous emphasis on “divine guardianship” and “popular will.” This dichotomy remains unresolved in many political theories: How can one advocate both the absolute sovereignty of God and His representatives and assign a decisive role to the people? Citing the logic of “legitimate guardianship” (wilayat-e haqqah), Ayatollah Khamenei demonstrates that the popular vote is defined not alongside Wilayat al-Faqih, but in line with it and as “the channel for the realization of divine guardianship.” He states: “If there were no elections, this would no longer be an accusation, but a reality.”[3] That is, it is the elections themselves and the presence of the people that prevent despotism and impart a divine-popular character to Wilayat al-Faqih. In articulating the relationship between the Guardian (Wali) and the people, he points to the depth of this bond: “In an Islamic society, the managerial apparatus and sovereignty are all reliant on the people, part of the people, and alongside the people, not separate from them. We, the officials, have a duty not to separate our path from the people and not to forget that these very people, the barefooted, the underprivileged classes, are the primary owners of the country.”[4] This perspective neither endorses Western democracy—in which absolute sovereignty belongs to the nation—nor dictatorship, in which the people have no role; rather, it presents a novel model of “Religious Democracy” in which dual legitimacy (divine and popular) is interwoven and inseparable.

Guardianship as a “Passageway” from Sharia to Action

The deepest philosophical-jurisprudential analysis in his reading occurs where Wilayat al-Faqih is defined as a “passageway” from fixed Sharia rulings to the variable domain of implementation. He emphasizes that Sharia rulings and the primary principles of Islam are not subject to change or annulment by the Guardian Jurist. However, changing circumstances and the conflict of public interests (tazahum-e masalih) may temporarily obstruct the implementation of certain rulings. This is where “absolute guardianship,” as a flexible principle, enables the management of these conflicts. He states: “Law and execution must be based on divine criteria and divine regulations; that is, they must conform to Islamic rulings… The guardianship that you possess today—legislation is guardianship—is a divine guardianship; it has its roots in divine guardianship; it arises and emerges from divine guardianship.”[5] That is, any law passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and any execution carried out by the three branches of government, if within the framework of the generalities and principles of Islam, is itself “divine guardianship” flowing through the channel of the fully qualified jurist (faqih-e jami’ al-shara’it). This is a “delegated” theory of sovereignty that possesses high philosophical complexity and delineates the boundary between “fixed Sharia” and “changing times” in the most elegant manner possible.

Implicit Critique of the Quietist Najaf Model

Without mentioning names, Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly criticized the quietist Najaf model. In the Najaf model, the jurist does not assume governance and merely guides society from the margins of power. In this view, the jurist, like an external observer, issues fatwas and engages in moral supervision, but never enters the arena of executive and political management. In Ayatollah Khamenei’s reading, however, “abandoning governance in the Era of Occultation” is not only impermissible, but contrary to the most imperative of duties (awjab al-wajibat). He considers “Imamate to be the reins of religion and the system of Muslims” and believes that “state-building based on Islamic jurisprudence” is a religious obligation, not a ceremonial choice. This fundamental difference separates two political civilizations: one in which the jurist engages in worship and issuing fatwas in isolation, and another in which the jurist assumes responsibility for the worldly and otherworldly affairs of the people at the center of power. Referring to the fact that enemies of the system accuse the Islamic Republic of dictatorship, he states: “The region’s dictators are their own friends and partners at the feast of plundering nations, yet they accuse the Islamic Republic.”[3] This trans-regional and revolutionary outlook is an indispensable requirement of accepting absolute guardianship during the Era of Occultation.

The Meaning of “Melting in Guardianship”: A Response to a Common Misconception

Some critics sometimes use the concept of “melting in guardianship” (zhob dar wilayat) as an accusation against the system, claiming that the system demands the erasure of individual personality before the leader. Ayatollah Khamenei himself explicitly rejects this reading and, with decisive expression, clarifies the boundaries: “I do not understand the meaning of ‘melting in guardianship.’ What does ‘melting in guardianship’ mean? One must melt in Islam. Guardianship itself is melted in Islam. Melting in leadership is melting in a person; this makes no sense at all. Who is the leadership anyway? The leadership must also be melted in Islam to have respect. The respect for leadership exists in the shadow of him being melted in Islam and melted in these very goals; if he takes one misstep, he falls. No one melts in a person or in a direction; one must melt in those goals; one must melt in Islam.”[6] This statement represents the height of philosophical and jurisprudential precision in defining the limits of power in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The leadership is not a person in whom individuals melt; rather, the leadership is an agent who himself must be melted in Islam and divine goals. If he deviates from this path, not only does he have no right to obedience, but he falls from his position. This is the strongest executive guarantee against any form of despotism and autocracy.

Conclusion: The Solved Enigma and the Theory of Guardianship in Practice

In conclusion, it must be stated that Ayatollah Khamenei’s reading of Wilayat al-Faqih is not an eclectic or simple political theory; rather, it is a “coherent intellectual system” that has solved four great enigmas:

1. The enigma of absoluteness and qualification: It demonstrated that “absoluteness” means flexibility to correct the course, not personal despotism and being above the law.

2. The enigma of the divine and the popular: It demonstrated that the popular vote is the channel for realizing divine guardianship, not its rival or impediment.

3. The enigma of stability and change: It demonstrated that the Sharia is fixed and unalterable, but Wilayat al-Faqih possesses the necessary flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and competing interests.

This theory, contrary to static and restricting classical readings, contrary to the Najaf model, and contrary to radical interpretations of absolute guardianship, is a model that is “alive,” “dynamic,” and “reliant on practical experience,” wherein “managerial rationality” and “political stability” are defined alongside “justice, piety,” and “scholarly qualifications.” This is the very “Theory of Guardianship in Practice”—an efficient model of political theorizing in contemporary Islam that was formed in the context of domestic and regional challenges and has maintained its dynamism throughout more than three decades of governing the system of the Islamic Republic.

References

1. Statements of the Supreme Leader, June 4, 1999 (Ganjineh-ye Ma’arif)

2. Statements of the Supreme Leader, September 8, 2011 (Ganjineh-ye Ma’arif)

3. Statements of the Supreme Leader, January 4, 2016 (Ganjineh-ye Ma’arif)

4. Statements of the Supreme Leader, July 11, 1990 (Ganjineh-ye Ma’arif)

5. Statements of the Supreme Leader, June 10, 2008 (Ganjineh-ye Ma’arif)

6. Statements of the Supreme Leader, June 16, 2004 (Ganjineh-ye Ma’arif)