Note: Imam Khomeini, in addition to leading the great Islamic Revolution, established various institutions and structures in Iran. A portion of these institutions and structures were in the economic domain. For instance, in the very early years of the Revolution, institutions such as the Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled (Bonyad-e Mostaz’afan va Janbazan), the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the 15th of Khordad Foundation (Bonyad-e 15 Khordad), and others were formed. Now the question is: Was the establishment of these institutions aimed at the popularization of the economy, or did it pursue another objective? And the second question: Were these institutions successful in achieving the popularization of the economy? In this regard, we interviewed Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Sa’id Farahani-Fard, Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences at the University of Qom. Having taught and conducted research in Islamic economics for several decades, he believes that revolutionary economic institutions, although initially formed with the goal of popularizing the economy, subsequently became entangled in governmental structures. He also discussed the experiences of other countries in economic popularization. The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this scholar and researcher of Islamic economics follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: How do you evaluate the role of revolutionary economic institutions in the popularization of the economy?

Farahani: Most revolutionary institutions at the beginning of the Revolution were formed spontaneously and driven by non-material motivations. Given that existing state apparatuses and ministries lacked the necessary structure to keep pace with the revolutionary movement of the people, initiatives were launched under the guidance of Imam Khomeini so that the people themselves, voluntarily and with jihadist motives, could realize the goals of the Islamic Revolution—the most important of which were assisting the underprivileged and establishing justice among all strata of society. In fact, these institutions were intended to serve as a model for state apparatuses. For example, Construction Jihad (Jihad-e Sazandegi) in its early stages possessed committees, each supplementing one of the existing ministries, engaging in agricultural, construction, water supply, and road-building activities, operating with a jihadist spirit particularly for remote villages and their deprived populations.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the specific function (kar-visheh) of the Islamic government in popularizing the economy?

Farahani: The specific function of the Islamic government in this matter can be enumerated along several axes:

A) Macro-level Policy-Making and Direction:

• Formulating public policies aimed at popularizing economic ownership and management, such as Article 44 of the Constitution and top-tier laws like the Vision Document and the Resistance Economy;

• Designing and approving supportive laws for the participation of all members of society in economic activities (cooperatives, endowments [waqf], interest-free loans [qard al-hasan]);

• Policy-making regarding justice in the distribution of natural, financial, and credit resources.

B) Regulation and Supervision:

• Preventing monopolies, rent-seeking, and corruption in the exploitation of public wealth (anfal) and public resources;

• Supervising public and private institutions to ensure they operate within the framework of societal interests.

C) Facilitation and Empowerment:

• Providing a platform for public participation in the economy (supporting cooperatives, micro-enterprises, and local businesses);

• Empowering underprivileged and middle-income strata for active market presence through training, financial facilities, and infrastructure.

In summary, the primary function of the Islamic government in popularizing the economy is creating a mechanism in which the people play a real role in ownership, management, and the exploitation of public resources, while the state fulfills the role of trustee, regulator, and facilitator. It appears that the most crucial function designed by the system for economic popularization is the realization of the Resistance Economy, which simultaneously brings economic independence and the strengthening of national production.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can the creation of nearly eight popular economic institutions by the founder of the Revolution—such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the 15th of Khordad Foundation, the Executive Headquarters of Imam’s Directive, and the Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled—be interpreted as a jurist’s endeavor toward economic popularization, or did it stem from other reasons?

Farahani: As raised in the first question, in addition to the goal of popularizing the economy, establishing a revolutionary structure and a new model for state apparatuses, eradicating poverty from society—especially rural areas—providing deprived strata with access to economic resources and opportunities, establishing justice, and fostering solidarity among various strata of society were also among the objectives of founding these institutions. In fact, all of these laid the groundwork for realizing an Islamic society grounded in religious values and principles.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is governmentalizing popular economic institutions—such as “the requirement to pay Khums to the Guardian Jurist (Wali-ye Faqih),” “efforts to centralize alms (sadaqat) in the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee,” and establishing various state headquarters to collect votive offerings (nuzurat), Fitriyyah, Zakat, etc.—in line with economic popularization or in direct opposition to it?

Farahani: State management (tasaddi) in these matters possesses strengths and weaknesses:

Its strengths include:

• Centralizing religious dues (wujuhat) and alms (sadaqat) in official institutions can prevent fragmentation, abuse, and parallel efforts, leading to transparency and justice in distribution;

• Resources derived from religious dues and similar sources can be consumed equitably and in public interest;

• When people feel their religious dues and alms are spent in the correct path and for the benefit of the public, public trust and participation increase.

Additionally, the following points can be enumerated as weaknesses of this approach:

• If state institutions completely replace public initiative, the spirit of popular participation is weakened;

• With the formalization and governmentalization of these affairs, the risk of bureaucracy, inefficiency, and administrative corruption increases;

• This process leads to the weakening of traditional popular institutions, such as mosques, religious associations (hey’ats), and indigenous networks that have borne the responsibility of collecting and distributing alms and votive offerings for centuries.

In total, if the government merely fulfills the role of regulator and supervisor (that is, aggregating and directing resources while granting the arena of action to the people), this action fully serves popularization; however, if the government directly replaces the people and diminishes their active social role, this process will turn into the anti-thesis of popularization.

Unfortunately, institutions formed at the beginning of the Revolution with the aim of popularization and creating a revolutionary, jihadist model subsequently became entangled in governmental structures—an example of which was Construction Jihad (Jihad-e Sazandegi), which lost its revolutionary nature upon merging into the Ministry of Agriculture.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What has been the experience of other countries and economic systems regarding the popularization of the economy? Institution-building and direct agency, or fulfilling a headquarters/coordinating role?

Farahani: Globally, both approaches have been experienced. Socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, and nations in Latin America, created institutions like cooperatives, rural communes, and social funds to popularize the economy.

European countries, however, under a regulatory and supportive model, attempted to provide the framework and environment while leaving the actual work to the people, cooperatives, and civil organizations. In this model, the state plays the role of “supporter and regulator” rather than direct executor.

Asian countries, such as South Korea and Malaysia, utilized a participation-based model; for instance, strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with low-interest loans and supportive policies, such as involving the impoverished minority in corporate ownership through public share ownership schemes.