Note: When the right to human equality enters the domain of jurisprudence, it encounters challenges before it. These challenges are sometimes crystallized in differing rulings for men and women regarding blood money (diyah), inheritance, and testimony, and at other times in distinct rulings for non-Muslims compared to Muslims regarding marriage, blood money, and enjoyment of citizenship rights. Now, what should be done to resolve these challenges? Should these challenges be accepted, or should jurisprudential rulings be altered in accordance with this rational right? Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mohammad Jalili Shah-Mansouri believes that these distinct rulings bear no inherent conflict with the right to human equality. A professor of advanced levels in the Qom Seminary and member of the Seminary’s Center for Elite Affairs, he considers these rulings subject to change only upon the occurrence of secondary titles (‘anawin thanawiyyah). The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with him follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the right to human equality, and what dimensions does it possess?
Jalili: The right to human equality in our jurisprudential thought constellation and the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a fundamental principle emphasizing the equality of all individuals in inherent dignity, fundamental rights, and equitable access to opportunities, while rejecting any undue discrimination or privileges lacking religious (shar’i) and rational justification. This right, on the one hand, possesses an inherent-ontological basis, according to which the Sacred Lawgiver has ordained an ontological dignity for “man as man”; as the Holy Quran explicitly states: “And We have certainly honored the Children of Adam” (Al-Isra: 70), and Imam Ali (a) expresses in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar: “For they are of two types: either your brother in religion or your equal in creation,” which, as a jurisprudential and moral rule, indicates the negation of any privilege based on race, gender, or social class. On the other hand, this right possesses a conventional-contractual aspect, manifested in the form of enacted rules and laws to regulate citizens’ relations and guarantee social justice. In the Constitution, Articles 3(9), 19, and 20 emphasize the elimination of undue discrimination, equality of citizens’ rights, and the equality of men and women under the protection of the law (observing Islamic criteria), which themselves are documented in Quranic and jurisprudential foundations and the conduct of rational beings (sirat al-‘uqala’).
The dimensions of the right to human equality can be analyzed across four distinct axes: First, dignified equality, which is an inalienable attribute explained in jurisprudence through concepts such as respect for the honored soul (nafs-e muhtarama) and prohibition of insulting the life and dignity of persons. Second, legal equality, meaning the equality of all before the law and the judicial system, in accordance with the rule “People are equal like the teeth of a comb” (Al-nasu sawa’un ka-asnan al-misht) and Islamic principles of procedure. Third, equality of opportunity, indicating the creation of fair conditions for access to social, economic, and educational resources and amenities, inspired by the verse “So that it will not be a perpetual distribution among the rich from among you” (Al-Hashr: 7). Fourth, protective equality, meaning the equal enjoyment by all individuals of state and societal protection in safeguarding life, property, and dignity, derived from the Rule of Negation of Domination (Qa’idah Nafy al-Sabil) and the obligation to defend every honored soul. Nevertheless, Islamic jurisprudence distinguishes between equality in dignity, which is absolute and universal, and differences in certain Sharia rulings grounded in legislative wisdom and interest (such as rulings on inheritance or blood money). Therefore, the right to human equality in our jurisprudential-legal system is a two-dimensional, complex concept whose boundaries must be redefined and implementation guaranteed in light of authentic Islamic sources and contemporary social requirements.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: In general, which Sharia rulings are considered contrary to the right to human equality and ought to be set aside?
Jalili: Critics consider rulings such as differences in inheritance or blood money between men and women, differences in blood money between Muslims and non-Muslims, or stipulations regarding testimony (such as requiring the testimony of two women equal to one man) to be contrary to the right to human equality. Nevertheless, these rulings are enacted based on general interests (masalih-e naw’iyyah) and legislative wisdom, and do not negate inherent human dignity. Only in the event that secondary titles (‘anawin thanawiyyah) such as necessity (zarurat), hardship (haraj), or actual transformation of the subject matter are realized can these rulings be set aside. Otherwise, the aforementioned rulings remain valid and enforceable within the framework of Sharia, and human equality in its correct meaning coexists with them.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can differences in rulings between men and women in matters such as blood money (diyah), inheritance, and testimony be considered contrary to the right to human equality?
Jalili: As I stated, existing differences in rulings between men and women in areas such as blood money (diyah), inheritance, and testimony cannot be considered inherently contrary to the right to human equality; because these rulings are enacted on the basis of general interests, legislative wisdom, and the structure of distributive justice in Sharia, addressing differences in roles, responsibilities, and social conditions, rather than existential evaluations of human beings. The right to human equality in jurisprudence means equality in inherent dignity and legitimate fundamental rights, and it can coexist with wise differences in rulings. Only upon the realization of secondary titles (‘anawin thanawiyyah) does the possibility of adjusting or modifying these rulings exist within the framework of valid ijtihad.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can differences in rulings between non-Muslims (kafir) and Muslims in matters such as blood money (diyah), testimony, the requirement to pay jizyah, etc., be considered contrary to the right to human equality?
Jalili: This question is in reality a repetition of the previous discussion, and its answer is identical to what I stated; differences in rulings between Muslims and non-Muslims, such as blood money, testimony, and jizyah, are not inherently contrary to the right to human equality in its jurisprudential meaning, and only under the assumption of the realization of secondary titles (‘anawin thanawiyyah) is the possibility of their adjustment provided within the framework and prevailing scope of valid and dynamic ijtihad.