Note: The emergence of humanistic schools of thought, including Humanism, stemmed from an absolutist view regarding human beings and human requisites, which, under the slogan of defending human dignity, deemed themselves the sole ideology defending human rights in the world. Of course, no doubt exists regarding the necessity of defending human dignity, and not only do the definitive teachings of divine religions, particularly Islam, indicate such a matter, but sound reason also judges it. However, the fundamental question that arises in this context is: in ontological explanations of human beings, is the primary objective achieving human truth, or is the objective something else? In other words, if the results derived from anthropological studies and inclinations lead to a dark, ambiguous, or inconsistent and conflicting point with the existential truth of human beings, must one necessarily commit to such results and requisites? Or should another path be sought to explain human beings and human dignity in a realistic manner, rather than an ambiguous one conflicting with human truth?
To become acquainted with the nature of the right to human dignity and conduct a comparative examination of its standing in Islamic thought versus Humanism, as well as a realistic explanation of human dignity, we interviewed Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Hasan Rezaei-Mehr. The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this professor and researcher of the Qom Seminary follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given the topic of conversation, which is examining the right to human dignity in Humanism and Islam, allow us to focus the first question on what the right to human dignity is and its types. That is, when the right to human dignity is raised, what meaning is intended, and can this right to dignity possess various forms?
Rezaei-Mehr: If we define a right as a special privilege ordained by God for His creatures, this right in the domain of human dignity can certainly possess at least two forms, and understanding this requires our understanding of the concept of human dignity. Usually, dignity, in the sense relevant to this discussion, consists of preciousness and majesty of stature, whose primary agent is the Holy Station of the Necessary Being per se (Wajib bi-al-Dhat). Therefore, the right to dignity means the right to hold man in high esteem, and that honoring man and considering his worthiness is his right enacted by God for man and other creatures. On this basis, just as man as a creature among creatures is honored with the right to dignity, other creatures, including animals, also enjoy the right to dignity and are included in such grace. Of course, every creature receives this grace according to its existential capacity.
However, regarding the types of human dignity, it must be stated that with attention to religious sources, two types of dignity are established for man: one is inherent or ontological dignity (karamat-e zati va takwini), and the other is acquired dignity (karamat-e iktisabi). Inherent dignity means that human essence as essence, independent of existential designations, is clothed in this dignity, and this is a general divine gift bestowed upon the human species.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is this type of dignity mentioned in religious sources?
Rezaei-Mehr: Yes; inherent human dignity has been addressed in both Quranic verses and traditions (hadiths). For example, Verse 70 of Surah Al-Isra: “And We have certainly honored the Children of Adam and carried them on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred them over much of what We have created, with [definite] preference” (Wa laqad karramna bani Adama…) indicates inherent human dignity; because it discusses the dignity of the Children of Adam and prefers the Children of Adam over “much of what We have created.” Aside from proving inherent human dignity through this verse, another important deduction derived from it is that when the Lord of Lords ordained the right to inherent dignity for man, it is obligatory upon all human beings to recognize this virtue for one another as a right and observe it. Among other relevant verses is the holy verse “And I breathed into him of My spirit” (Wa nafakhtu fihi min ruhi), wherein God, by attributing man to Himself, performed and declared the greatest honoring of the Children of Adam. Regarding traditions, mentioning one instance suffices, which is the statement of the Commander of the Faithful Ali (peace be upon him) to Malik al-Ashtar: “Infuse your heart with mercy for the subjects, and be not over them a ravenous beast seizing their consumption. For they are of two types: either your brother in religion or your equal in creation,” which indicates the inherent dignity of the Children of Adam; because he states that people are of two classes: either your brother in religion or your equal in creation. That is: O Malik! All people possess dignity and must be treated with dignity, even if they are not your brothers in religion, for you are equal in creation and of one species. That is, non-religious subjects also possess the right to dignity, and the right to dignity must be observed regarding them. As is evident, this passage pertains to inherent human dignity.
However, acquired dignity is a type of dignity that human beings must attain, and if they do not act toward attaining it, they will not reach it; unlike inherent dignity, which is embedded in human genesis. This dignity arises from being clothed in virtuous traits and abandoning vices, and in this realm, human beings differ in worthiness and honoring. Obviously, someone who has taken no action along the path of self-purification is deprived of the honoring that God and His purified servants accord to a purified human being, possessing no dignity in this respect. One proof indicating acquired dignity is Verse 13 of Surah Al-Hujurat: “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you” (Inna akramakum ‘indallahi atqakum).
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that in certain instances, alongside inherent dignity, natural dignity is used, please explain whether natural dignity shares semantic affinity with inherent dignity or is an independent concept from it?
Rezaei-Mehr: Given that natural dignity pertains to dignity arising from the nature and reality of human beings, it possesses no concept separate from inherent and ontological dignity; because what is meant by natural dignity is dignity pertaining to the nature of the human species, which is the very same inherent dignity.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: One of the discussions raised regarding the right to dignity is: under what category of rights does this right fall? Is it among human rights, citizenship rights, or otherwise? Before entering the comparative examination of human dignity in Islam and Humanism, please state your view in this regard as well.
Rezaei-Mehr: If we wish to state the answer to this question in one sentence, it is that the right to dignity is neither among citizenship rights nor within the realm of human rights; rather, the right to dignity is the foundation of these rights. That is, rights such as the right to non-discrimination and the right to life—which are counted among human rights (meaning primary rights enjoyed by human beings by virtue of being human)—as well as rights such as the right to enjoy public amenities and services, the right to vote and participate in destiny-determining affairs, and the right to education—which are considered citizenship rights (meaning rights enacted by governments, ruling systems, or society for individuals of that society)—are all realizable upon the foundation of the right to human dignity. In reality, the documentation and credential of validity for human rights and citizenship rights is the right to human dignity; and for this reason, for someone who does not believe in the right to human dignity, other human rights derived from the right to dignity will be meaningless.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: One of the issues raised in anthropology is why, in divine and human schools of thought, man has been the center of attention and study?
Rezaei-Mehr: The virtue of perfection is something concealed from no person, school of thought, or religion. In this case, it is natural that man, by virtue of his specific existential perfection, has been the center of attention for various schools of thought, and different views and opinions have been raised regarding his position and existential virtue. Even at times, some of these views have taken an extreme path, asserting stations for man beyond his stature and position.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: How is man’s standing in Islamic thought? And from what does his specific position stem?
Rezaei-Mehr: In Islamic thought, God is absolute perfection (kamal ‘ala al-itlaq). All creatures, including man, are adorned with the beautiful robe of existence and perfection through divine effusion (ifadah-ye ilahiyyah). Therefore, the attention of Almighty God to creatures reflects their position in the divine view, and it is through this very channel that belief in existential degrees (maratib-e wujudi) of the contingent realm is explainable. And since in Islamic thought, His Oneness accords a specific attention to man distinct from other creatures, he possesses extraordinary value and greatness. The loftiness of man’s station and greatness compared to other creatures can be observed in various Quranic verses reflecting Islam’s anthropological perspective.
For example, the verse on the teaching of the names (‘allama al-asmar) and God’s command to the angels to prostrate before man, as well as the verse on dignity proving man’s virtue over all creatures, even angels—these all reveal man’s specific existential position in the realm of creation. Of course, this distinguished existential position stems from his distinguished creation. For example, regarding inner faculties, man possesses a station higher than all creatures; because within human existence, diverse and conflicting faculties are gathered, which has caused his distinction from other creatures. Scholars have spoken of the existence of four primary faculties in man: the rational (‘aqilah), concupiscible (shahwiyyah), irascible (ghadabiyyah), and imaginative (wahmiyyah) faculties, each operating with its specific function conflicting with the others, and in no creature other than man are all these faculties gathered. For angels possess only the rational faculty, and animals possess the concupiscible and irascible faculties; and none of the angels experience impediments in their conduct and action, because angels are pure intellect, lacking the faculties of lust, anger, and their appurtenances that might impede them in fulfilling their duties. Animals are also void of the rational faculty, possessing no impediment to their animal affairs.
However, all these faculties are active in man, each seeking to conquer the human soul, and naturally impeding and obstructing the others. Precisely here, the human soul is exposed to fierce struggle among inner faculties; and if the rational faculty emerges victorious in this struggle, man’s station will rise higher than even the angels; whereas if, despite possessing the rational faculty and knowledge, he follows lust and animality, he will fall lower than animals. Therefore, as man calls upon God along the path of spiritual struggle (mujahadah-ye nafsani) and combating inner adversaries, advancing toward salvation, his station becomes far superior and higher than creatures that are single-dimensional and experience no impediment in performing their actions.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that human dignity, and more precisely the right to human dignity, has been continuously attended to by anthropological schools and currents such that each felt committed to explaining this truth and offered ideas, please explain Humanism and its anthropocentric origin, which perhaps stems from human right-centeredness.
Rezaei-Mehr: Humanism, or the religion of humanity in its broader sense, is any philosophical or moral system whose central core is human freedom and dignity. Humanism can be defined as “anthropocentrism,” “humanism,” or “belief in the primariness of man versus God.” Humanism in this sense can be considered the hallmark of the modern era; therefore, in a very brief yet realistic view, Humanism can be considered an extreme attitude toward the human realm stemming from Humanism’s epistemological view of man.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the origin of this epistemological view of man?
Rezaei-Mehr: This view in reality traces back to the knowledge-granting source in the intellectual foundations of Humanism; because in Humanism, the sole knowledge-granting source is nature, and the knowing subject (fa’il-e shenasayi) and criterion of knowledge is man. Man is the measure and criterion of all things, and only that can exist which is confirmed by pragmatic, practical reason. Hence, matters such as revelation and religious teachings, because they are not confirmable by natural and empirical reason, are not considered knowledge-granting sources, and man, in discovering truth, must rely upon his own understanding.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is this view confirmed from the perspective of Islamic thought?
Rezaei-Mehr: No; because the knowledge-granting source in Islamic thought differs from that in Humanism. Elaborating on this: in the epistemological view of Islam, while preserving human values and existing cognitive tools in man—such as sense and reason, and not merely reason operating in the realm of logical composition and synthesis of sensory particulars, but more importantly, universal reason capable of issuing judgments regarding beyond sense and nature—it emphasizes a higher knowledge-granting source named revelation and celestial teachings, viewing previous tools as insufficient for comprehending truth; because their outcome is attaining meager knowledge: “And you have not been given of knowledge except a little” (Wa ma utitum min al-‘ilmi illa qalila). Therefore, attaining the main body of knowledge is possible not under the shadow of sensory and rational perception, but purely under the light of celestial teachings through the revelation of books and sending of messengers.
Traditions in this chapter are also abundant, of which one example is mentioned. Imam Sadiq (a) states: “There is no matter over which two people disagree except that it possesses a root and foundation in the Book of God, but human intellects cannot reach it (do not comprehend it).” Obviously, such a luminous hadith serves as clear proof and decisive argument that in acquiring knowledge and truths, the true path lies in returning to revelation and avoiding reliance on human intellect that is incapable of comprehending revelatory knowledge.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: In Humanism, what is considered the origin of moral values?
Rezaei-Mehr: In humanistic thought, the origin of morality and moral values is man; meaning that what constructs moral behaviors are human desires and wants, and if a behavior aligns with human desires and soul, it is deemed good, whereas if it opposes them, it is deemed bad moral behavior, ultimately involving no non-human origin in this matter.
Now the question is: Can man, possessing numerous points of weakness and defect, construct the foundations of morality and moral values based on his own desires and wants without seeking aid from revelatory teachings (as humanists believe)? And in that case, will something named moral value—reliable and citable for all human beings—exist?!
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does Islamic thought tolerate such an approach regarding the origin of moral values?
Rezaei-Mehr: No; man and human desires cannot serve as the basis of morality and moral values; rather, the origin of moral and human values is exclusively Almighty God, conveyed to man through prophets in the legislative domain. Although primordial nature (fitrah) and reason also possess perception of certain moral values, the rational requirement of verses and traditions dictates that man, at the stage of behavior and action, submit to divine morality and moral values issuing from Him; because “Perhaps you dislike a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah knows, while you know not” (Wa ‘asa an takrahu shay’an wa huwa khayrun lakum…).
In reality, the essential and fundamental difference between the religion of Islam and material schools, including Humanism, lies in human cultivation and leading him to salvation. Elaborating on this: the origin of moral values in Islam is the Absolute Origin and Lord of Lords, where man’s moral perfection depends on following principles established by the Supreme Origin in the legislative domain for human guidance. However, material schools, considering nothing other than matter or man as the origin of moral values, distance man from the realm of light and non-material truth, pulling him toward matter and thereby misleading him. Monotheistic schools, particularly Islam, by removing the veil of matter from man, seek to elevate him to the realm of spiritualities. In the words of the late Imam Khomeini:
“All schools of thought that are non-monotheistic are material schools, and these material schools either turn people away from the realm of light toward the realm of darkness, inviting them to materialism and matter, diverting and deflecting them from the realm of light… however, monotheistic schools—at the head of which stands Islam—while dealing with and being concerned with material affairs, maintain the objective of cultivating people in such a manner that material affairs do not become a veil for spiritualities.”
And in another passage he states: “Man is fundamentally not considered by them; human rights are fundamentally not considered; in these societies advocating human rights, human rights are never considered.”
In Islamic vision, man, while enjoying noble human dignities, also possesses points of weakness, as noted in cases in the Holy Quran; including “Indeed, man is ungrateful to his Lord” (Inna al-insana li-rabbihi la-kanud) and “Indeed, man was created anxious” (Inna al-insana khuliqa halu’a); when evil touches him, he is impatient, and when good touches him, he withhelds it, except the worshippers; as well as “Indeed, man is unjust and ungrateful” (Inna al-insana la-zalumun kaffar) and “Indeed, We guided him to the way, be he grateful or ungrateful” (Inna hadaynahu al-sabila imma shakiran wa imma kafura). There is no compulsion in his being grateful or ungrateful, because man possesses free will.
Therefore, from the perspective of Islamic thought, the origin of moral values is revelation, which must be learned from the blessed tongue of the great prophets, and on this basis, Islamic thought, while emphasizing the deviation of Humanism regarding the materiality of the world and man and the non-existence of man’s spiritual aspect—which itself conflicts with human dignity—considers this ideology criticized and emphasizes its deviational nature.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: In light of what has been stated, can it be claimed that one of the critiques based on Humanism’s anthropocentrism is the decline of the right to human dignity?
Rezaei-Mehr: Precisely so. Human dignity in human-centered man-made schools has been trampled upon, and these schools pursue man’s worldly objectives rather than reforming his true affair and soul, and this very matter causes man’s estrangement from human dignity. However, what has come in divine religions and the instructions of the prophets operates toward man’s eternal salvation and existential ascension.