Note: Perhaps it can be stated that the terms “minimal jurisprudence” and “maximal jurisprudence” are among the most ambiguous terms in the science of jurisprudence. Over recent decades, although this term, alongside terms such as “minimal religion” and “maximal religion,” has been frequently used, their meaning has never been precisely and scientifically determined. This very factor has made discovering the prevailing view of jurists regarding this dispute difficult. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Yaser Aminian, a professor of advanced levels in the Qom Seminary, believes that the majority of Shi’i jurists throughout history subscribed to a maximal approach to jurisprudence. Continuing, he explains that despite this, what factors give rise to the dispute over attributing one of these two approaches to jurists? The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this professor and researcher of the Qom Seminary follows:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the minimal and maximal approaches to jurisprudence, and what requisites does each entail?

Aminian: The terms maximal and minimal jurisprudence pertain to the degree of jurisprudence’s intervention and entry into various spheres of life, such as politics, education, economics, etc. It is obvious that the attributes “minimal” and “maximal,” like “less and more” or “small and large,” lack fixed determination and are relative; meaning approach A, for example, is minimal relative to approach B, but maximal relative to approach C. For instance, an approach stating that jurisprudence possesses a school of thought regarding economics is maximal relative to an approach stating that jurisprudence lacks an economic school of thought, but is considered minimal relative to an approach stating that jurisprudence, in addition to a school of thought, also possesses an economic system. Or that very approach stating that jurisprudence holds no opinion on economics, possessing neither a school nor a system, may hold regarding health and medicine that jurisprudence has much to say in this sphere, advocating an Islamic medical system encompassing prevention, treatment, and hygiene; while that approach advocating maximal jurisprudential intervention in economics might advocate non-intervention in health and medicine. Thus, one approach becomes maximal in economics and minimal in medicine, and another approach vice versa. Therefore, when we speak of a maximal or minimal approach, we must at least specify the sphere of intervention; for example, stating a maximal approach in politics, economics, or the like.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Which viewpoint does the prevailing opinion (mashhur) among jurists support? From which of their fatwas can this be deduced?

Aminian: From the answer to the first question, it was understood that the maximal and minimal approaches lack fixed determination and specificity for us to see which outlook and approach the prevailing opinion among jurists supports; hence it is better to report jurisprudential intervention across various spheres. We can divide jurisprudential intervention into the intervention of ruling (hukm) and ruler (hakim). We define jurisprudence as declarative/status-setting rulings (ahkam-e wad’i) and obligatory/binding rulings (ahkam-e mawlawi-ye ilzami); hence we exclude advisory rulings (ahkam-e irshadi), such as those in food discussions, hygiene, and treatment. Accordingly, the spheres of jurisprudential rulings can be classified as follows:

• Acts of worship (‘ibadat), such as prayer, fasting, and Hajj;

• Financial obligations, namely Khums and Zakat;

• Family relations, namely marriage, divorce, lineage, and inheritance;

• Interpersonal relations, whether financial like debt and gifts, and various commercial contracts like sale and lease, or non-financial like agency and testament;

• Moral affairs, such as backbiting and slander;

• Macro-level political and social affairs, such as war, peace, and enjoining good and forbidding wrong.

However, the spheres of the ruler’s (hakim) intervention:

• Dispute resolution: whether in financial and commercial matters or otherwise, such as marriage and divorce;

• Execution of prescribed punishments (hudud) and discretionary punishments (ta’zirat): in moral prohibitions such as drinking wine, adultery, false accusation (qazf), etc., or financial prohibitions such as hoarding, or even highly private matters such as intercourse with a menstruating wife;

• Execution of rulings: whether in public, macro-level affairs like jihad, peace, and treaties with disbelievers and People of the Book, or collecting and spending Zakat, or in private matters such as forced circumcision of someone who refuses to perform this Sharia ruling;

• Non-litigious/necessary affairs (al-umur al-hasbiyyah): meaning affairs the Lawgiver does not permit to be neglected or left unaddressed, such as guardianship over an unmanaged endowment (waqf).

Looking at the above spheres, it becomes clear that Islam is a comprehensive set of individual, social, and political rulings, and jurisprudence can be termed maximal in the sense that it holds rulings and intervenes across individual, social, moral, and political spheres. Of course, this does not mean intervention at the utmost degree; rather, certain matters such as the economic system or preferring industry over agriculture or vice versa may not exist within this set, but the degree of intervention in life is definitely to an extent that can easily be deemed maximal.

So where does this dispute over maximal and minimal arise? In my view, this divergence of opinions arises from three points and three questions:

1. During the Era of Occultation of the Infallibles (a), do all these rulings remain, and are all these authorities and duties established for the jurist (faqih) as Islamic ruler and deputy of the Infallibles?

2. In human civilization’s current era and conditions, do these rulings and this style of governance secure human salvation, or do many of these rulings require change due to transformations in human lifestyle?

3. Under current conditions, do enemies’ hostility and dissidents’ dissatisfaction permit the implementation of rulings?

In answering the above questions, various approaches emerge. Now, if I wish to examine the prevailing opinion of jurists regarding the above questions, I must state that regarding the first question, the prevailing opinion—indeed perhaps all jurists—holds that Islamic rulings remain during the occultation of the Infallible Imam (a).

Regarding the ruler’s authorities as well, it can be stated that the prevailing opinion among jurists holds that dispute resolution, executing prescribed punishments, etc., are entrusted to the jurist. But are assuming governance, forming an army, and launching jihad also entrusted to the jurist? I must state that this matter is silent (maskutun ‘anh) in most jurists’ writings; meaning they spoke neither in negation nor affirmation regarding it. Yes, in the discussion of jihad, a significant number stated that launching jihad is among the authorities of the Imam or someone appointed by the Imam; but did these jurists mean the general appointment (nasb-e ‘amm) of jurists during the Era of Occultation as well? It is unclear. In other words, it can be stated that the prevailing opinion among jurists did not speak regarding this extent of juristic authority; however, this silence and gap does not mean attributing to them that they did not believe it. One must approach the answer to this question to some extent by examining contextual evidence, which this interview does not permit.

The second and third questions fundamentally arise in the contemporary era, and asking about past jurists’ opinions regarding these two questions is meaningless.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is the proposition that Qom jurists favor maximal jurisprudence and Najaf jurists favor minimal jurisprudence correct?

Aminian: If we lump together the jurists of either city, no; meaning it cannot be stated that all Qom jurists or most Qom jurists differ in opinion on this issue with all or most Najaf jurists. In my view, even the emergence of a jurist like the late Imam [Khomeini] in Qom, who maintained a maximal approach and acted to establish an Islamic government, cannot serve as the differentiator between Qom and Najaf; because in Najaf, Shahid Sadr was similarly situated, even though the Imam’s action met with success while Shahid Sadr’s efforts culminated in his martyrdom.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Did the efforts of Qom jurists to create a jurisprudence of governance result from Tehran’s influence on Qom, or did the Qom Seminary maintain such an approach prior to the Revolution?

Aminian: Prior to the Revolution, the Qom Seminary demonstrated specific attention and sensitivity to social issues that was not observed in Najaf. Note that the overall Qom Seminary did not possess a maximal view—I mean political and governmental jurisprudence—but possessed a stronger social outlook compared to Najaf; meaning it demonstrated greater sensitivity to those very social rulings that the Najaf Seminary also accepted. This issue had specific causes: First, the presence of an absolute Shi’i majority, which elevated both the influence of Shi’i authority of emulation (marja’iyyah) and clergy expectations. In Iraq, we face a tripartite population of Shi’is, Sunnis, and Kurds. Second, the rise of Reza Khan; a figure who fiercely clashed with the clerical institution and religious symbols and rites. With his fall, the clergy and religious class developed a doubled activity and thirst in religious affairs, appearing intent on compensating for the past and reforming severe damages he inflicted on religion. Third, unchaste and immodest behaviors and norms of the ruling body, and even their efforts to promote these anomalies in deeply religious Iranian society; for example, the Shah of the country and the Queen appearing naked on beaches alongside the US President and his wife. It is clear how much such actions caused society to abhor the ruling body. Fourth, the ambitious spirit of Iranians. Historical developments in Iran demonstrate that the people of this land possess a greater desire for change, transformation, and transcendence compared to neighbors. The narration attributed to the Prophet stating that if knowledge were in the Pleiades, men from Persia would attain it, can be analyzed from this angle. In the contemporary era as well, the Constitutional Revolution represents an unprecedented, pioneering movement in the East and the Middle East.

All these factors caused an unprecedented figure like the late Imam, with his maximal jurisprudential outlook, to mobilize the country and overthrow the Pahlavi regime.

However, following the formation of Islamic government, political jurisprudence activities in Qom can be considered resulting from Tehran’s influence. Prior to government formation, the Qom Seminary was not a seminary whose jurists believed in Wilayat al-Faqih and maximal jurisprudential intervention in politics; for neither the type and subjects of advanced lectures and jurisprudential research nor the political stances of most Qom jurists were such that the Qom Seminary could be attributed to maximal jurisprudence. Even during Reza Khan’s era with all his displayed anti-Islamism, the Qom Seminary displayed no prominent political approach. Likewise regarding the nationalization of the oil industry; hence scientific developments in Qom in recent decades were shaped completely under the influence of Islamic government formation, rather than arising from an inherent approach of the Qom Seminary; rather, it represents the Qom Seminary’s response and reaction to the transformations and requirements of the era.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can it be stated that Shi’i seminaries such as Qom, Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, Mashhad, Isfahan, Tehran, etc., each held a different opinion regarding minimal and maximal jurisprudence? In other words, can each seminary be considered the origin of one of these theories?

Aminian: No. The seminaries of Najaf, Qom, Samarra, etc., may possess differences in the manner of study and research or the degree of principles (Usul) or Hadith intervention in the deduction process, but in the output—meaning derived jurisprudential opinions—they possess no clear distinction. In other words, if the first page of a manual of practical rulings (resalah ‘amaliyyah) bearing the author’s name is removed, we cannot discern from the type of fatwas whether this manual belongs to a Qom, Najaf, or Isfahan authority (marja’). In Qom itself, alongside a jurist like the late Imam, we had numerous other jurists who lacked a maximal approach in jurisprudence—whether in politics or other spheres like economics—or at least we can state that if some Qom jurists maintained a maximal jurisprudential approach in politics, they were not active jurists; meaning perhaps believing in Wilayat al-Faqih to the extent of assuming governance, but viewing conditions as unpropitious to become active on this path. In the Najaf Seminary as well, alongside jurists occupied with prevailing jurisprudential-foundational topics, we had a jurist like the late Shahid Sadr, who was both a pioneer in Islamic economic discussions and maintained a maximal foundation in politics, operating actively in practice.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can the efforts of jurists contemporary with the Safavid and Qajar dynasties, such as Sheikh Baha’i and Muhaqqiq Karaki, to influence governance be analyzed in line with maximal jurisprudence theory, or do they stem from other reasons?

Aminian: When a jurist like Sheikh Baha’i or the late Majlisi cooperates with governance and assumes an office like Sheikh al-Islam, it can be stated that this person does not maintain a minimal foundation in politics—meaning that foundation stating that during the Era of Occultation politics is suspended, governments are entirely tyrannical and illegitimate, and the jurist must restrict himself to issuing fatwas in worship or commerce. But can Sheikh Baha’i be considered believing in maximal jurisprudence, meaning a jurisprudence considering governance formation and assuming military and civil affairs as the jurist’s right? No. These jurists’ interventions were to the extent of advising in religious affairs, executing prescribed punishments (hudud), establishing Friday prayers, and combating manifestations of disbelief and vice such as idol temples and taverns. From this extent of intervention, one cannot deduce that they possessed maximal jurisprudence. Or, for example, from Mirza Shirazi’s intervention in the Tobacco Protest, one cannot count him among believers in maximal jurisprudence in economics or even politics. The tobacco issue pertained to disbelievers’ dominance over the land and wealth of Muslims; indeed even less than that, meaning the aspect of the British being disbelievers may not have intervened, and due to severe economic pressure on merchants and tradesmen, a jurist based on the Rule of No Harm (Qa’idah La Darar) ruled the tobacco contract void. Yes, when Shah Tahmasp places the royal crown on his head with the permission of Muhaqqiq Karaki, this intervention differs, perhaps demonstrating Muhaqqiq Karaki’s maximal view. Thus, mere cooperation with governance and intervention in political affairs cannot be considered demonstrating a maximal jurisprudential foundation; rather, the instance of intervention must be examined.