In the 291st scientific session of the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, jurisprudential examinations regarding the ruling on attacking enemy bases in Muslim countries were conducted. Ayatollah Qazizadeh emphasized the importance of attending to religious sources and conformity with Quranic verses and traditions in determining the scope of war legitimacy, examining principles such as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in this regard.
According to the information center of the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence Studies, the 291st scientific session of this research institute was dedicated to the jurisprudential examination of the ruling on attacking Muslim countries hosting enemy bases.
In this scientific session, Ayatollah Kazem Qazizadeh, professor of advanced seminary lectures (dars-e kharij), stated: This topic is not specifically addressed in our jurisprudential heritage and sources; hence we can utilize two avenues for this jurisprudential discussion: First, generalities existing regarding the manner of confronting the enemy and etiquette of war, which can perhaps be applied. Second, utilizing certain similar cases; where it can perhaps be stated that two or three matters have been raised in our traditional and jurisprudential heritage that can assist us; one of these matters is using “poison” (samm) in the enemy’s drinking water, another is the permissibility of killing human shields (tatarrus), and the third case is killing non-combatants in war.
Citing Verse 60 of Surah Al-Anfal “And prepare against them whatever you can of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy…”, he added: It appears from the expression “And prepare against them whatever you can of power” in this verse that every capability can be utilized to achieve victory over the enemy.
He further pointed to other verses of the Holy Quran expressing war limitations, adding: One of these verses appears in Surah Al-Baqarah stating: “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress,” meaning fight those who fight you and do not commit aggression, and your fighting must be proportionate. Furthermore, God states in Verse 194 of Surah Al-Baqarah: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you,” which manifests a form of equality in confronting those fighting Muslims.
He also pointed to traditions in this regard, continuing: In Al-Kafi Volume 5, there is a chapter titled “Chapter on the Testament of the Messenger of Allah (s) and the Commander of the Faithful (a) Regarding Military Expeditions,” from which it is derived that one etiquette of war is that it must not be expanded, and effort must be made within limited confrontation. One narration from Abu Hamzah al-Thumali states: Do not use deception, do not commit mutilation (muthlah), do not kill an old man, woman, or child, and do not cut trees except in times of emergency.
The professor of advanced seminary lectures pointed to another narration in this regard, adding: “This is the authentic tradition of al-Sukuni (mu’tabarah-e Sukuni), whose chain of transmission is repeated approximately 500 times in the book Al-Kafi, and many individuals have utilized this narration to prohibit the use of chemical and nuclear weapons, holding the belief that this narration forbids using these weapons even if it were the sole path to victory for the Islamic army.”
Citing other traditions, he stated: In other traditions it is recorded that the Commander of the Faithful (a) never conducted night raids (shabikhun), and during the day waited until noon before initiating battle to minimize casualties, because in those times fighting ceased at sunset.
Ayatollah Qazizadeh pointed to war principles derived from jurisprudence, stating: The first principle is that a distinction must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants in war. Second, the prohibition of killing non-combatants except in times of emergency (zarurat). Third, proportionality between weapons and target; one should not reach the target with any weapon or confrontation. Fourth, the principle and limit of necessity must be observed in war, avoiding excessive destruction. Fifth, in hybrid warfare, attention must be paid to higher-tier public interests in the type of confrontation.
He pointed to pouring poison into the enemy’s water, stating: “As stated, regarding this matter there exist both absolute traditions and it has received attention from jurists since the past; seemingly some considered a specific attribute for pouring poison while others expanded it to mass killings. In brief, it can perhaps be stated that three different viewpoints exist in this regard; specifically, our early jurists (qudama’) prohibited pouring poison altogether, even if Muslims were to suffer defeat. For example, Sheikh Tusi in the book Al-Iqtisad al-Hadi ila Tariq al-Rashad refers to this prohibition. Qutb al-Din Kidari in Isbah al-Shi’ah bi-Misbah al-Shari’ah and Ibn Idris in Al-Sara’ir refer to this prohibition, but state that if victory is probable through this action, it is permissible.”
Pointing to jurists who do not believe in the prohibition of pouring poison, he noted: This opinion has existed since medieval centuries; in Tahrir al-Ahkam permission to pour poison is granted, and in Riyad there is absolute permission regarding pouring poison. Ayatollah Ruhani in the book Fiqh al-Sadiq holds this same opinion.
Ayatollah Qazizadeh specified: From these viewpoints emerge absolute prohibition, absolute permissibility, and necessity of victory (zarurat al-fath); meaning using poison is permissible only if victory depends on this action, otherwise it is forbidden. The late author of Jawahir also states that pouring poison is forbidden unless victory depends on it. The late Ayatollah Khoei in Minhaj al-Salihin states that if victory in war depends on pouring poison, it is permissible, but poison cannot be used in disbelievers’ lands (bilad al-mushrikin).
He stated: If victory is achieved without resorting to poison, it is objectionable. Those who prohibited it and stated war must not be expanded relied on the prohibition of killing the honored soul (nafs-e muhtarama), stating that when you expand war in the Persian Gulf, ordinary citizens not participating in war are present, and non-combatants are killed. They relied on the Rule of No Harm (Qa’idah La Darar) that harm and loss are forbidden in Islam, but in attacking a third country, damage is inflicted on Muslim people, and expanding war plunges the region into chaos. They derived the prohibition of killing non-belligerents (ghayr-e muhariban) from hadiths. They consider attacking host countries as exceeding “whoever commits aggression” (man ‘taqda) because the target is the United States, not host countries.
According to the professor of advanced seminary lectures: The rule “Whoever aids the oppressor” (Man A’an al-Zalim) encompasses countries placing their territory at the disposal of the United States to construct military bases; hence their infrastructure becomes legitimate targets, and attacking these is a form of preserving national security, whereas failing to attack them causes the defeat of the Islamic system. Thus a distinction must be drawn between military infrastructure and hotels.
He stated: The United States maintains military bases in several regional countries, commanding against us from there; hence targeting them is legitimate. Enemy military bases constitute military combat between two countries, particularly if our victory depends on attacking these bases, regarding which no one disputes striking these targets. Where debate and ambiguity exist is regarding hotels. Hotels can perhaps be divided into three categories: hotels exclusively at the disposal of military personnel, and hotels where US commanders reside making decisions to attack us—striking these is subject to consensus. However, if it is a tourist hotel and they wish to attack to create constraint for that country to deter the US, here is a matter for reflection. If someone wishes to consider this permissible, it must be stated that they have considered a hybrid war. And if this attack is effective, one must rule on permissibility; otherwise, considering the principle of reciprocity and limiting war, it must be so considered.
The Qom Seminary professor stated regarding targeting infrastructure: Ports and airports, if used militarily, attacking them is unobjectionable. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz as well, if our sole path to victory is weakening the US economy through closing this strait, it is permissible from the perspective of our jurists.
Regarding jurists’ views on selling weapons, he stated: We can directly sell weapons to an enemy fighting us, weakening them economically and strengthening our own economy. Hence what is important in hybrid wars is the totality of the outcome of our confrontation with enemies and our victory in this confrontation.
Critics’ Viewpoints
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyfollah Sarami, as the first critic, stated: In these discussions, subject identification must first be conducted precisely; meaning discussing what the war situation is now and what occurred in the 12-day war and recent war. Because jurisprudential discussion without subject identification becomes a purely abstract, academic discussion.
He stated: Discussions such as hotels, military presence there, and similar items referred to in the final minutes were in reality subject identification that should have occurred first. The discussion of pouring poison is something raised in humanitarian law and is not our necessary topic of discussion; rather the central axis is that regional countries claim we are Muslim and take no part in war, but the US has long maintained bases in our country and used them to attack; therefore Iran’s attacks are attacks on our country; hence it appears these issues must be scrutinized.
He expressed: A tradition was raised that to some extent runs contrary to humanitarian law, permitting the killing of old women, old men, merchants, and Muslim captives, which appears contrary to the rule and its conflict must first be resolved; another point is exaggeration (ghuluw) in chain of transmission, which has received insufficient attention.
Dr. Sayyid Sadeq Haqiqat, as the second critic of the session, stated: Jurisprudential discussion regarding Iran’s recent military operation against the US and Israel lacks precedent and hopefully serves as an introduction for future sessions.
Assuming the phenomenon of the nation-state, he expressed: This issue is absent in our verses and traditions; for this reason Mr. Qazizadeh stated this topic is not specifically titled in our sources to utilize directly from verses and traditions for our issue.
He continued: As Professor Sarami stated, we must first conduct subject identification, then formulate sub-cases, and then state regarding each of these branches what opinions can be held, and finally maintain Professor Qazizadeh’s personal opinion regarding them.
The faculty member at the Imam Khomeini and Islamic Revolution Research Institute stated regarding formulating sub-cases: It appears eight issues can be discussed separately; the first issue is that an enemy country’s base exists in an Islamic country, regarding which Mr. Qazizadeh spoke, and jurisprudentially it can be targeted, although legally that base resembles an embassy.
He continued: The second issue or title is “human shields” (tatarrus), meaning a group of military personnel reside in a hotel basement commanding war from there and killing many innocent people, and we have no alternative but to kill them. This also poses no problem.
He expressed: The third issue is if the combatant is among the host country’s people; in this assumption, can the hotel be targeted? Mr. Qazizadeh stated it cannot be targeted. But it is expected that the rationale be discussed. The fourth assumption is if non-combatants of the enemy country reside in a Muslim country; can they be targeted? The fifth assumption is targeting host country infrastructure in retaliation for attacks launched by the enemy country from these countries’ soil. The sixth assumption is striking host country residential areas in retaliation. The seventh assumption is attacking combatant and non-combatant countries in a region under our ownership or not; meaning in the Strait of Hormuz can we strike their ships? Here international law discussions arise. The eighth assumption is primary jihad. The ninth assumption is nuclear and chemical weapons.
Dr. Haqiqat noted: If we consider the first, second, eighth, and ninth branches as possessing clear rulings, 5 other branches remain that must be discussed specifically; but items that can serve as the basis of discussion include the discussion of public interest (maslahat), where we must see what its criterion is? One criterion can be possessing power. One criterion is reciprocity. Another criterion is victory depending thereon (tawaqquf al-fath ‘alayh).
He stated: Muhaqqiq Isfahani’s understanding of reason is nothing other than the conduct of rational beings (bina’ al-‘uqala’). If we work on this foundation, many issues become simple; meaning seeing whether the conduct of rational beings accepts burning the enemy, particularly since the conduct of rational beings is a relative matter.
He summarized: Professor Qazizadeh’s remarks are important and interesting. The first discussion had a general form; the recent discussion articulating instances must be raised more precisely, and proofs regarding each of these branches stated separately.
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Mohajernia stated in remarks: In subject identification, hosting must be discussed extensively, because mere hosting is not tenancy, but transferring bases is deeper and broader than this. Particularly as Dr. Haqiqat raised the nation-state discussion, meaning hosting in this space must be analyzed.
He stated: Discussions such as pouring poison were conditions where war instruments were swords, and pouring poison was considered a form of unchivalrous conduct; but in current wars does pouring poison exert influence? Can it be adapted to nuclear energy? Can their generalities and implications be utilized? Or in the past they ruled that women and children must not be targeted, but in today’s conditions where women are considered combatants, should they still not be targeted? This must undergo subject identification, and subject identification must also undergo capacity assessment.
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Sarami stated in his second part of remarks: The poison tradition is extensible to burning as well, but these traditions are oriented toward context and where victory is achieved without pouring poison.
He noted: A point that must be attended to is our discussion is defense. In self-defense, jurists stated you can do whatever is necessary. Now if we know that if we target the hotel, the war stops, there is no objection to attacking it; hence in the Sacred Defense as well, stopping the war was tied to launching missiles, meaning Saddam launched missiles and we continuously suffered martyrs, as soon as we launched a few missiles, the war stopped.
Ayatollah Qazizadeh stated in response: I raised three discussions that are broadly related; one pouring poison, second killing human shields, and third killing non-combatants. My point is not that now pouring poison is sought to occur; rather the intent is that in instances that were severe, citing jurists’ views it was accepted to occur, but purely out of necessity.
He continued: I wished to derive this utility that firstly war must be limited, and apparently it is derived from traditions that in necessity, an action by which the Islamic front does not suffer defeat can be performed.
At the conclusion of this scientific session, it was emphasized that from the perspective of Islam, war is not an unregulated phenomenon, and even under harsh conditions of confronting the enemy, observing morality, justice, proportionality between means and end, and the principle of necessity constitute inviolable principles. The outcome of the raised discussions demonstrated that distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, observing the limit of necessity, and attending to higher-tier public interests are among the most important jurisprudential foundations in confronting the complex issues of contemporary warfare.