In the history of Shia jurisprudence, numerous texts (nusus) remained unheeded for decades and centuries, until suddenly a jurist’s discerning eye brought them into focus, whereupon they were transformed into a famous jurisprudential rule and principle. The development that occurred regarding the texts of presumption of continuity (istishab) nearly a thousand years after the issuance of those narrations is among these instances. Exactly the same occurrence transpired for human dignity and human equality. Prior to the recent century, few jurists paid jurisprudential attention to the famous verse “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (Wa laqad karramna bani Adam) or examined it as a jurisprudential rule. Multiple texts regarding human equality in rights tell the exact same story.
Indeed, the novelty of these two rules or human rights, alongside the fact that jurisprudential rulings were formulated for over a thousand years without the presence of these two rights and rules, has caused the acceptance of both as undeniable rights or jurisprudential rules to face difficulty and resistance among jurisprudence scholars. The resistance of many jurisprudence scholars toward these two rules stems from two directions: some fundamentally do not recognize these two rights, while others, despite accepting them, are unwilling to alter jurisprudential rulings that appear outwardly contradictory to these two rights. Meanwhile, certain improper uses—or more precisely, abuses—made of these two rules and misplaced applications executed for them have fueled this concern.
This resistance and scientific tension are of course not exclusive to the discipline of jurisprudence; rather, any novel rule and proposition in any discipline—especially if that discipline is ancient and long-standing, and even more so if it carries a sacred dimension—faces these very challenges and difficulties.
The above points, however, do not signify the necessity of jurisprudence scholars accepting these two human rights as undeniable rights of human beings in Shia jurisprudence; for it makes no sense in scientific dialogue to compel one side through ridicule and accusations to accept a scientific proposition. Rather, the objective is scholarly examination—free from bias and without prior presuppositions and judgments—surrounding these two newly articulated rights among human rights.
The journal issue “The Right to Human Dignity and Equality from the Perspective of Jurisprudence” represents an effort to engage in dialogue and precisely examine the nature, dimensions, challenges, and requirements of accepting these two human rights in Shia jurisprudence.
Chapters One and Two of this issue are devoted to analyzing the nature of these two human rights and examining their dimensions. The reality is that these two rights belong to the category of deceptively simple yet deeply complex; hence, although at first glance they appear easy and clear, when we set out to examine them precisely, we notice numerous points of ambiguity and inquiry surrounding them.
If we consider human equality the contribution of Western human rights and “justice” the contribution of Islamic human rights, then speaking of the relationship between justice and human equality is in truth speaking of the differences between two expositions of one of the most important human rights across two legal schools. Chapter Three analyzes the difference between these two seemingly similar yet genuinely distinct concepts.
Speaking of accepting or rejecting the right to human dignity and equality in the discipline of jurisprudence is in truth speaking of how to interact with jurisprudential rulings that are presumed to contradict these two rights. Serious acceptance of these two rights must yield changes in jurisprudential rulings that stand in conflict with them. Chapter Four of this issue examines jurisprudential rulings that bear apparent conflict with the right to human dignity, and Chapter Five sits in judgment of this conflict between jurisprudential rulings and the right to human equality.
Accepting these two rights in the discipline of jurisprudence, however, is accompanied by challenges as well. These challenges are not necessarily confined merely to the nature and manner of resolving conflicts between them and certain jurisprudential rulings; rather, they surround other implications of accepting these rights. For instance, are instances of human dignity and equality divine-revelatory bounds (tawqifi), or is their application entrusted to custom (‘urf)? In the second case, does this not lead to secularizing/customizing the Sharia? What is the primary reason or reasons for Imami jurists’ lack of engagement with these two rights in jurisprudential science? Were these two rights as important and impactful in the eyes of the Infallible Imams (a) as they are in our time? And so forth… Dialogue surrounding the jurisprudential challenges of accepting the right to human dignity occurs in Chapter Six, and discussion of the jurisprudential challenges of accepting the right to human equality takes place in Chapter Seven of this issue.
Chapter Eight analyzes these two rights within Quranic verses and narrations. In other words, this chapter maintains an intra-religious and text-centered perspective toward these two rights, searching for their indications within the Shia textual heritage (turath mansus).
The final chapter of this issue, like other electronic journal issues of the Research Institute of Contemporary Jurisprudence, is devoted to stating the background of these two rights within Shia jurisprudential heritage. An index of jurisprudential articles, a bibliography, and reports on two major books in this field constitute the contents of this section.
It is hoped that this effort serves as a modest step toward developing and deepening Contemporary Jurisprudence, advancing along the path of scholarly analysis of emerging jurisprudential subjects, and meeting the favorable reception of Imam al-Mahdi (may Allah hasten his reappearance). Amen.