Note: Shia jurists maintain near-consensus (ijma’) that a woman requires her husband’s permission to leave the house; but is this requirement of seeking permission (istidhan) absolute, or solely in cases that conflict with the husband’s marital rights? If a woman was employed at the time of marriage or lived in a region where women easily leave the house to fulfill needs or visit kin (silat al-rahim) without seeing a need to seek permission from their husbands, does this function as an implicit condition (shart irtikazi) in the marriage contract obviating the need for the husband’s permission to leave the house? Must a woman who is an athlete or who must leave the country for job-related reasons still seek her husband’s permission to leave the country? We posed these issues to Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Naseroddin Ansari Qomi, professor and researcher in the Islamic Seminary of Qom. The member of the Fatwa Council of the late Ayatollah Alavi Gorgani believes that a wife leaving the house requires the husband’s permission, and there is no doubt about this matter; however, this applies firstly where it conflicts with the husband’s status (shu’un), and secondly where an implicit condition at the time of contract does not dictate otherwise. The detailed exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this professor and researcher in the Islamic Seminary of Qom is presented below:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Generally speaking, in what matters does the husband possess guardianship (wilayah) over the wife?
Ansari Qomi: With marriage, a bond and connection arises between husband and wife; therefore, in marriage, all affairs should occur by mutual agreement. To say the husband possesses guardianship like a master’s guardianship over a slave or a father’s guardianship over a son is not correct. The husband’s guardianship does not mean priority in disposal (awlawiyyah fi al-tasarruf); rather, it means consulting one another in affairs. Of course, in certain aspects of life, the man’s word takes precedence over the woman’s word; however, this does not mean the man may exercise bullying or arbitrariness; rather, he must advance affairs with the woman’s consent as far as possible; yet in cases of conflict between the husband’s and wife’s words, the man’s word takes precedence.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given explicit narrations requiring the husband’s permission for the wife to leave the house and the definitive practice of religious people (sirah qat’iyyah-ye mutasharri’ah) upon it, can this be considered a customary matter arising from temporal and spatial requirements?
Ansari Qomi: A wife leaving the house, if it conflicts with the status of life (shu’un al-hayat), requires the husband’s permission; however, if it does not conflict with the status of life, we must see for what intention she leaves the house. If she goes for a task whose execution leaves the husband’s affairs disrupted, then leaving the house requires the husband’s permission; but if she goes for a task that is either brief or structured such that her leaving the house does not conflict with the husband’s status, then her leaving the house is permissible and does not require the husband’s permission. In any case, this is a general issue and bears no connection to temporal and spatial requirements; hence it applies in current times as well. Of course, at present, the husband’s status (shu’un) may differ compared to the past, and thus certain instances of conflict between the wife leaving the house and observing the husband’s status may have changed, but the general ruling of the issue remains the same as in the past.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given the religious mindset (irtikaz-e mutasharri’ah) at the time of text issuance conditioning the permissibility of the wife leaving the house on the husband’s permission in absolute terms, can it be restricted to cases where leaving the house conflicts with the husband’s sexual enjoyment (istimta’)?
Ansari Qomi: This is an absolute Sharia ruling, and one cannot say it was specific to the time of text issuance and is no longer so. Imami jurisprudence states: A woman leaving the house must not conflict with the husband’s rights, marital enjoyment, or the husband’s dignity (hurmat). This ruling is not specific to a particular time and place. Of course, as I mentioned, instances of the husband’s status or dignity may have changed, but the primary ruling remains and is rational. Husband and wife must maintain mutual agreement in life; hence, if a man does not favor his wife going somewhere, the woman should accept so that the stability of life is not disrupted.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given the custom (‘urf) of Iran’s major cities which does not consider a wife leaving the house—at least during the day and for customary matters like shopping or visiting kin—as requiring the husband’s permission, can this custom be considered an implicit condition (shart irtikazi) within the contract and ruled that seeking the husband’s permission is not required in customary matters?
Ansari Qomi: When the marriage formula (khutbat al-‘aqd) is recited, the man unintentionally takes into account contemporary requirements, and even if unstated and not mentioned in the contract text, all rational people, custom, and society accept that a woman is not the man’s captive or prisoner; therefore, during life, for matters such as visiting kin, fulfilling household needs, or certain personal tasks like grooming, she needs to go out of the house. Therefore, in these matters, she can leave the house without requiring the husband’s permission, and it can be considered an implicit condition (shart irtikazi) within the contract.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: When a woman is employed or a professional athlete at the time of marriage, can this matter—at least regarding the specific case—be considered an implicit condition (shart irtikazi) within the contract and ruled that seeking the husband’s permission is not required for leaving the house in matters related to her job or professional sport?
Ansari Qomi: When a young man marries an employed woman knowing she is employed, marrying her with knowledge of her job and employment status, this functions like an implicit condition (shart irtikazi); therefore, throughout life, he must accept her job and her leaving the house for her job.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can rulings such as “the requirement of the husband’s permission for the wife to leave the house” be considered as arising from the nature of marriage during the Lawgiver’s era—which consisted of “purchasing the vulva/sexual rights (bud’) in exchange for dower (mahr)”; and thus, with the change in marriage’s nature at present, rule that such rulings have changed?
Ansari Qomi: The nature of marriage throughout history has not differed. Just as during the Lawgiver’s era dower (mahr) was in exchange for sexual rights (bud’), at present it remains so. Of course, it must be noted that marriage is neither a pure commercial transaction nor a purely devotional matter, but a social contract realized between man and woman. To resolve such problems, it is better for the couple at the time of marriage to raise such issues together and, after reaching agreement, marry one another.