Note: Dr. Sayyid Ahmad Shafi’i Darabi, in addition to holding the deputy position at the Qom Environmental Protection Organization, is considered an environmental theorist. Given the referral of jurisprudential and seminary environmental issues to the Environmental Protection Department of Qom Province, this department has for a long time entered the realm of common points between Islamic sciences and the environment. On this occasion, as an individual familiar with the seminary and expert in the field of environment, we conversed with him regarding the jurisprudential challenges of preserving natural resources. Expressing that natural resources constitute part of the environment, he deemed it better to explain the challenges of environmental jurisprudence. The detailed and insightful exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this environmental researcher is presented below:

Contemporary Jurisprudence: The topic of conversation is the jurisprudential challenges of preserving natural resources.

Shafi’i: First, please replace the term “natural resources” with the newer term “environment,” which is a far broader phrase. The environment encompasses natural ecosystems (natural resources) and human ecosystems (cities, industrial parks, agricultural, and livestock areas) as well as the realm beyond Earth. However, natural resources are firstly a part of the environment; secondly, in addition to a limited expansion range, in terms of the range of interactions within the ecosystem, they possess narrower concepts compared to the environment. For example, the environment includes all species from bacteria to humans, all domains from kilometers deep in soil to the edge of the atmosphere, as well as all complex interactions and relationships among them, a deep structural concept not present in the term “natural resources.”

Contemporary Jurisprudence: You are correct. The concept of the environment is broader than natural resources; however, the subject of this interview specifically concerns the jurisprudential challenges of preserving natural resources. Of course, if you feel it is better to explain these challenges regarding the environment, there is no problem. Now, the first question is: Given the non-acceptance of intergenerational ownership of natural resources in jurisprudential science, can the necessity of preserving natural resources for future generations be established/approximated?

Shafi’i: What do you mean by this question? Does it mean enumerating sources including jurisprudential and interpretive rules or textual evidence in the Quran and Hadith regarding intergenerational ownership in the environmental domain? Has the non-acceptance of intergenerational ownership of natural resources in jurisprudential science been proven?! It seems not; rather, through further examination of sources, it is necessary to establish and prove even intergenerational ownership in a way within jurisprudence.

Therefore, it is better to pose this question as follows: Assuming that the concept of “absolute private intergenerational ownership” in jurisprudence for common natural resources (such as water, air, forests) is not explicitly stated, how can one rely on other rich jurisprudential and Islamic foundations to provide a well-reasoned jurisprudential explanation for “the rights of future generations” to benefit from a healthy environment and “the duty of the present generation” to protect it?

In response to this question, it must be said:

1. Quranic and Hadith Foundations:

• The concept of Trust (Amanah, “Indeed We offered the Trust”): Can a healthy environment be considered a divine “trust” in the hands of the present generation for future generations? This view transforms absolute ownership into a “right of responsible disposal.”

• The concept of reforming the earth and prohibiting corruption (“And cause not corruption upon the earth after its reformation”): Is environmental destruction that destroys the heritage of future generations not a clear instance of “corruption on earth” (ifsad fi al-ard)?

• The concept of vicegerency/development (“He produced you from the earth and settled you therein”): Is “settlement/development” (isti’mar) in the sense of prosperity not a continuous, intergenerational project whose frustration occurs via environmental destruction?

2. Macro-Jurisprudential Rules:

• The No Harm Rule (La darara wa la dirara): Can the harm inflicted by the present generation through environmental destruction upon future generations be included under the scope of this broadest jurisprudential rule?

• The Rule of Justice and Fairness: Is justice as a foundational principle in Islam restricted only to contemporary relations, or does it encompass intergenerational relations as well?

• Realizing Interest and Repelling Corruption: Does “preserving the system” (hifz al-nizam) as one of the goals of Sharia include preserving the ecological system for future generations as well?

3. Rereading Concepts of Ownership and Usufruct:

• Can one advocate a definitive and non-forfeitable “right of usufruct” (haqq al-intifa’) for future generations from common natural resources, even if “corporeal ownership” (malikiyyah ‘ayniyyah) is not transferred to them?

• Can one separate the concept of “ownership” from “governance and guardianship”? Meaning that the present generation is merely the “custodian” and “manager” of the environment for present and future generations, not its “owner.”

Conclusion: The objective of this question is not accepting “non-intergenerational ownership,” but discovering and deducing sturdier foundations within Islamic tradition that determine the duty of the present generation toward future generations as a binding Sharia obligation. This perspective moves jurisprudence beyond the narrow circle of individual ownership toward a concept of “collective responsibility” and “intergenerational public rights.”

Contemporary Jurisprudence: To what extent has the primary approach of jurisprudential science—which is “otherworldly binding and excusing” (tanjiz wa ta’dhir ukhrawi)—caused jurists to focus on the Hereafter and fail to address seriously topics such as preserving natural resources that organize people’s worldly lives?

Shafi’i: The question needs re-examination and further analysis. The environment, natural ecosystems, or natural resources are by no means restricted to worldly life; rather, from noble verses, Hadiths, and even certain jurisprudential sources it is gathered that nature directly impacts human destiny in both this world and the Hereafter, and therefore alongside other human deeds in this world, it will be questioned on Judgment Day. Now, considering that the “otherworldly binding and excusing” approach in jurisprudential science regards action in this world as the preamble and cause of forming man’s otherworldly destiny, how can “environmental destruction” as a “sin” and “cause of otherworldly punishment” and conversely “its protection” as an “act of worship” and “cause of otherworldly salvation” not be considered worthy of jurisprudential explanation?

I shall explain these titles sequentially:

1. Environment as “Sign” (Ayah, Preamble to Faith): Is destroying a forest, a rare species, or polluting a river—which are all “signs of Allah” (Ayat Allah, “Indeed in the creation of the heavens and the earth… are signs for a people who reason”)—not a form of destroying divine signs, and consequently an anti-religious act incurring accountability?

2. Environment as “Blessing” (Ni’mah, Preamble to Gratitude): Natural blessings such as clean air, pleasant water, and biodiversity are among the greatest divine blessings. Is wasting and squandering these blessings (“and do not squander wastefully”) and polluting them not a clear instance of “ingratitude for blessings” (kufran al-ni’mah) incurring otherworldly punishment? (“And Allah presents an example: a city that was safe and secure, its provision coming to it in abundance from every location, but it denied the favors of Allah…”)

3. Environment as “Public Trust and Honor” (Amanah, Preamble to Justice): A healthy environment is “honor” (‘ard) and common property of all humans (present and future generations) and a trust in the hands of the present generation. Is its destruction—which is oppression against all stakeholders of this trust—not an instance of “transgressing people’s rights” (ta’addi ‘ala huquq al-nas) and “oppression” (zulm), whose forgiveness is possible only with the consent of right-holders (of whom future generations are a part)?

4. Environmental Destruction as “Corruption on Earth” (Ifsad fi al-Ard, Cause of Punishment Descent): Many verses consider “corruption on earth” a reason for the descent of worldly and otherworldly punishments. Are activities such as widespread pollution, destruction of agriculture and wildlife, and disrupting climatic balance (“Have they not seen that We set upon the land, reducing it from its borders?”) not clear instances of “corruption”?

With this perspective, jurisprudence’s focus on the Hereafter is not a barrier to addressing the environment, but creates the strongest religious motivation and requirement for protecting it. Because:

Environmental Destruction = Ingratitude for Blessings + Corruption on Earth + Transgressing People’s Rights + Destruction of Divine Signs.
Environmental Protection = Gratitude for Blessings + Developing the Earth + Fulfilling Trust + Honoring God’s Public Mosque.

Therefore, the main question is redefined not from the position of “jurisprudence’s indifference to the world,” but from the position of “how to prove the sinfulness of destruction and the worshipfulness of environmental protection within the otherworldly system of jurisprudence.” This shift in perspective brings jurisprudence from the margins into the text of the environmental crisis.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: What factors do you attribute to jurists’ lack of serious engagement with natural resources, one sign of which is dedicating no jurisprudential or Hadith chapter to it?

Shafi’i: These factors and elements comprise:

1. Epistemological and Historical Factors (Paradigm Governing Traditional Jurisprudence):

• A: Dominance of individual-centered perspective: The traditional structure of jurisprudence (especially in practical manuals) was designed to answer the needs of the individual Muslim in personal worship and transactions. The environment as a “collective and trans-individual issue” did not easily fit into this framework.

• B: Lack of severity of the crisis in the past: In pre-industrial societies, environmental destruction rarely possessed today’s irreversible, widespread, and accelerated dimensions; therefore, it was not raised as a “jurisprudential-social priority.”

• C: Lack of development of the “subject” of the environment in past jurists’ minds: Past jurists dealt with scattered instances like “hunting/fishing,” “reviving dead land,” or “toilet etiquette” separately, but “environment” as a “macro-subject” with interconnected parts (air, water, soil, living organisms) was not defined in their intellectual system.

2. Structural and Institutional Factors (System of Jurisprudential Deduction):

• A: Absence of a legitimate governance structure throughout Shia history: Many rulings related to the environment (such as determining natural resource boundaries, levying pollution fees, territorial management) are among governance rulings (ahkam hukumiyyah) within the jurisdiction of the “Sharia ruler” (hakim al-shar’) and “guardianship of affairs” (wilayat al-amr). With the absence of such a structure, the main platform for execution and theorizing in this field was weakened.

• B: Dispersion of discussions across various chapters of jurisprudence: Environmental discussions in traditional jurisprudence are dispersed. “Preserving the sea” is raised in the chapter on hunting/fishing (sayd), “preserving trees” in the chapter on reviving dead lands (ihya’ al-mawat) or prohibition of cutting trees in the Sanctuary (Haram), “water pollution” in the chapter on purity (taharah), and “wastefulness” (israf) in the chapter on economic ethics. This dispersion has prevented the formation of a systemic and integrated view.

• C: Deficiency in “Social Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Ijtima’) and “System Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Nizam): Traditional jurisprudence mostly regulated individual-to-individual or individual-to-God relations, whereas the environment requires “System Jurisprudence”—that is, a jurisprudence capable of regulating complex relations of institutions, industries, state, and society regarding a “system” (ecosystem). This theoretical gap historically existed.

3. Cultural-Ijtihad Factors:

• A: Prioritization of issues: Issues related to worship, family, personal economics, and judicial matters were consistently prioritized in questions to the mujtahid and consequently in his deduction priority.

• B: Deficiency in modern “subject-identification” (mawdu’-shenasi): For precise ruling deduction, “precise understanding of the subject” by the mujtahid is necessary. Scientific complexities of environmental crises (such as climate change, species extinction, chemical pollutions) require collaboration with empirical science experts, a connection not systematically established in the past.

To resolve the above challenges, establishing an Islamic government (providing the platform for “governance rulings”), intensification of ecological crises (necessitating the issue), and expansion of “System Jurisprudence” and “Social Jurisprudence” (developing theoretical tools) appear to be essential matters where, although the first has occurred, we still have a long way to go until realizing the second. Of course, today we witness the formation of environmental jurisprudence as an “interdisciplinary study area” and independent field in seminary scientific assemblies whose goal is collecting, structuring, and developing those very dispersed discussions into a comprehensive “jurisprudential code” for protecting the environment; however, completing and precisely organizing this code requires the collective effort of jurists.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given explicit religious texts regarding the ownership of mines by natural persons, how can they be considered part of public/divine resources (Anfal) and the Islamic government deemed responsible for preserving them?

Shafi’i: Regarding mines, management may differ from ownership. A person might be an owner, but this does not negate others’ responsibility to supervise exploitation; just as responsibility or management does not yield ownership. For example, just as the head of an office or organization is not its owner, ownership likewise does not negate others’ responsibility. For instance, if a person owns a mine, the government can supervise against destructive exploitation beyond the land’s capacity. On the other hand, another theory holds that no one is a true and ultimate owner, and the ultimate owner is God, with these assets held as a deposit in human hands to utilize in the best manner; hence if not utilized in the best manner, the Islamic ruler can dispose of it and reform it. For example, regarding a monopolistic mine—where only one exists in the country or region and all industries and activities depend on it—can the owner restrict it such that all downstream industrial activities are disrupted or halted, inflicting damage on Islamic society? Hence, managing resources with common interests rests with the Islamic ruler even if private ownership exists.

Many examples exist in this regard. For example, a market seller owns his property and goods, yet is not permitted to sell his owned goods at any price he deems fit. Here ownership enters certain aspects and dimensions of a commodity, not all of it. Even the Islamic ruler might restrict the right to buy, sell, or gift a commodity to specific private individuals for the good and interest of society.

Conclusion: Major mines, even oil reservoirs in the country, initially are not considered part of Anfal and can be owned by individuals; just as in the 1920s these mines were privately exploited by certain major foreign companies. In the subsequent stage, the Islamic ruler, observing public interests and benefit, can remove mines from private ownership and assume disposal over them, or apply restrictions upon part of their disposal or ownership. In my view, in the initial state, mines should not enter the category of Anfal unless an expediency is considered in this regard and “preserving the system” (hifz al-nizam) takes precedence over ownership.

Contemporary Jurisprudence: To what extent can the individual and non-governance approach of jurisprudential science—owing to the historical lack of Shia jurisprudential governance prior to the Islamic Revolution—be proposed as one of the reasons for jurists’ lack of serious engagement with natural resource preservation?

Shafi’i: One can expand and analyze this idea across several axes:

1. Historical Grounding: Jurisprudence on the Margins of Power

For centuries, Imami jurisprudence grew under conditions of non-governance and, in the best case, limited interaction with oppressive governments. In such a context:

• People’s reference to jurists was mainly for personal issues: devotional rulings, family, individual transactions, inheritance, etc. These needs formed the main stream of jurisprudential endeavor.

• Questions regarding “government” and “politics” were raised abstractly: topics like jihad, enjoining good and forbidding wrong, and conditions of the ruler remained mostly at the theoretical level and for “the time of government formation.” In the absence of an operational Islamic state, jurisprudence inevitably remained “individualistic” and “communal,” without pursuing macro-governance issues.

2. Jurisprudential Consequences of This Approach

This historical context directly impacted the content of jurisprudence:

• Absence of “system expediency” (maslahat-e nizam) and “public interest” as an independent category: In traditional jurisprudence, concepts like “system expediency,” “national security,” or “preserving resources for future generations” as independent elements possessing jurisprudential frameworks rarely found opportunity to emerge. These concepts were raised under secondary titles and in emergency cases, not as primary principles of governance.

• Concentration on “individual rights” versus “public duties”: In the mine discussion, the main question was: “Can an individual own this mine?” (an individual right). But the governance question is: “What responsibility does the government bear toward this national resource?” (a public duty). The absence of an Islamic state caused this second question to receive less serious jurisprudential analysis.

• Non-development of “Environmental Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Bi’ah): Modern concepts like “environmental degradation,” “resource sustainability,” or “transboundary pollution” were absent in traditional jurisprudential literature, since these issues at a macro scale are products of the Industrial Revolution and modern governance, and in the past showed themselves mostly as local and limited problems.

• Lack of practical necessity to explain “the limits of ruler authority”: When no government is in place, there is no need to answer questions like “How far can the Islamic ruler intervene in private ownership for the benefit of the environment?” or “Can he confiscate individuals’ lands to preserve a forest?”

3. Other Concrete Examples (Beyond the Environment)

• Banking: Traditional jurisprudence viewed “usury” (riba) as an individual sin and a void transaction. But designing an interest-free economic system capable of answering a country’s needs—like liquidity supply, macro-investment, and international trade—is a purely governance challenge that severely challenged jurisprudence following the Revolution.

• Insurance: The concept of insurance as a social institution for risk management had no precedent in traditional jurisprudence, and jurists upon confronting it initially engaged in individual analysis of the insurance contract, rather than designing a social security system based on Islamic concepts.

The conclusion is: The individual and non-governance approach of Shia jurisprudence throughout history was the main factor in the non-formation of “Governance Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Hukumah) or “State Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Dawlah) in its full sense. This jurisprudence was mostly a “Nation Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Millah—jurisprudence of the Ummah under scattered conditions) rather than a “State Jurisprudence” (Fiqh al-Dawlah—jurisprudence of government under conditions of sovereignty).

The Islamic Revolution of Iran created a massive paradigm shift in Shia jurisprudence. For the first time, jurisprudence not only had to answer individual questions, but had to offer solutions to the governance riddles of a vast country in the modern world. It was here that concepts such as Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat-e Mutlaqah-ye Faqih, as backing for ruler authority), system expediency (as a criterion for decision-making in macro-issues), and governance rulings (ahkam hukumiyyah) gained unprecedented vigor and prominence.

Therefore, it can be said that traditional jurisprudence due to its historical conditions naturally could not address a category like “preserving natural resources” as a governance responsibility. This duty rests upon the shoulders of contemporary jurists who, using the same dynamic tools of ijtihad but within the framework of a new governance paradigm, deduce and formulate the necessary rulings for this realm.