Note: The jurisprudential dispute regarding certain women’s rulings that differ from men’s has continued for centuries and has grown even more in recent decades. One of the reasons that, according to some advocates of women’s rights, is influential in deducing women’s distinct jurisprudential rulings compared to men is a masculine understanding of jurisprudence. In their view, because jurists throughout history have consistently been from the group of men, they viewed jurisprudence through a masculine lens, and these rulings are derived from this perspective on jurisprudential science. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mehdi Shajariyan, who has been engaged in research in the field of women’s jurisprudence for years, in this oral note, analyzes the impact of gender on the deduction and understanding of propositions in women’s jurisprudence. The detailed exclusive note of the Assistant Professor at the Research Institute for Islamic Sciences and Culture follows below:

Does feminine understanding exert an influence in the category of deducing a jurisprudential ruling or not? To explain this question, it is necessary to elaborate on its background. This background lies within a broader macro-question. In the feminist view, the question is raised: Does gender exert an influence on understanding or not? Therefore, the query is about a general matter, not merely the discipline of jurisprudence. The query is whether knowledge in absolute terms is influenced by gender or not? Feminists’ response to the question is positive. While proposing feminist epistemology, they heavily emphasize the principle that gender is influential in cognition.

Perhaps feminists can be divided into two distinct groups: One group of feminists believes that this influence is a very macro-level influence, and if feminine understanding enters the human apparatus of comprehension, the entire human epistemic system from top to bottom will be transformed; and fundamentally, existing knowledge and sciences currently in human hands were formulated based on masculine understanding grounded in men’s interests, but if feminine understanding enters this formulation, the formulation will change from top to bottom. This is a macro-viewpoint. A smaller and more modest viewpoint also exists, favored by most feminists, which holds that if feminine understanding enters the epistemological apparatus, it will produce effects, though not in a way that influences human knowledge from top to bottom.

Now we must see whether the claim of gender influencing the category of understanding is a valid or invalid claim? Before examining this matter, we must pay attention to the fact that this viewpoint is influenced by modern Western perspectives. Generally speaking, regarding epistemology, we maintain two major views: One view believes in objectivism and that our understanding is identical to the real world; hence, mediating factors for this cognition are pure pathways (tariq mahd). In other words, according to this view, an identity exists between cognition and the real world. This view, of course, maintains various readings. For instance, a group of proponents of this view believes that characteristics of the knowing subject (fa’il shinasa) influence his understanding of the real world; therefore, it is not the case that his understanding is identical to the real world, but rather his understanding originates from his own existence, and his very being is influential. In this view, one of the characteristics existing in the knowing subject that influences his understanding of the real world is gender.

Now, is it truly so, and does the knowing subject’s gender trait influence his/her understanding of events? In this regard, many researchers have expended great efforts and authored numerous writings. In these writings, feminist views were critiqued, and among other things, the intervention of the gender element in understanding was denied. Two major critiques raised in these books are as follows:

First critique: The principle of gender influencing knowledge is a type of genetic fallacy (mushalatat takwini), also termed in technical vocabulary the genetic fallacy. Genetic fallacy signifies confusing the origin of a knowledge’s emergence with the proof of that knowledge; meaning that instead of critiquing the proofs of a knowledge, one critiques the origin of the knowledge’s emergence. For example, critics of Islamic philosophy who in critiquing Islamic philosophy state: This epistemic system is invalid because its origin of emergence is Greek philosophy, without entering into examining the proofs of this epistemic system. They in truth, instead of presenting proof for critique, raise the origin of emergence as proof for critique. Or certain Western thinkers maintaining an atheistic approach stated that the origin of belief in God is an invalid matter, namely fear. They, instead of offering proof for the invalidity of belief in God, state the origin of this belief as critique. Now, feminists’ notion is likewise such, and they, instead of critiquing and examining the proofs of prevalent human knowledge, turn to the origin of emergence of this knowledge and regard the masculine nature of this knowledge as the factor of its incorrectness.

Second objection: Relativism. This response is in truth a counter-objection (pasakh naqdi). The objection is that if we consider gender influential in knowledge, why should we not consider other factors influential? For instance, power can also be influential in knowledge, desires and emotions can also be influential, and other matters. Under such description, knowledge is always a relative matter, and we shall possess no fixed and stable knowledge.

Therefore, this claim of feminists that gender is influential in all types of knowledge is incorrect; however, in certain matters, such as legal matters, we can accept it—meaning that if prevalent legal teachings among humanity were codified with women’s intervention, a major transformation would form in these teachings.

Consequently, the statement that gender is partially (fi-l-jumlahi) influential in knowledge is acceptable, because in human knowledge we do not advocate raw and pure realism, nor do we consider human knowledge free of error. We believe human knowledge is in the state of becoming, and not every knowledge is identical to reality; rather, the totality of human knowledge strives to bring itself closer to reality.

As an example, feminine understanding will definitely be influential in our jurisprudence and can impact the path of deducing jurisprudential rulings, just as other concrete phenomena can exert influence. Of course, the intention is not that gender is in toto (bi-l-jumlahi) influential in jurisprudential rulings and alters them; however, its partial (fi-l-jumlahi) influence is likewise undeniable.