Note: Contemporary诞es, as long as they remain confined within the narrow circle of Shia or Islamic countries, will not achieve the possibility of presence in the international arena and influencing contemporary man. However, prior to stating solutions for internationalizing these jurisprudential chapters, one must speak of whether these jurisprudences bring a specific advantage for the international audience to attract them? This question is also raised regarding the jurisprudence of upbringing. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mohammad-Reza Baba’i, Head of the Thought Council at the Islamic Revolution Institute of Iran in Qom, in this exclusive note, analyzes the advantages of Islamic jurisprudence of upbringing for presence in the international arena.

A prevalent and perhaps strategically erroneous notion exists in the minds of many actors in the field of propagation and even some professors of advanced levels in Islamic seminaries, who view jurisprudence as confined to the chapters of worship (‘ibadat) and transactions (mu’amalat), conceiving “upbringing” merely as a moral and sermonizing realm possessing a disjointed relationship with Sharia duty and status. Whereas, if we gaze at Sharia through the lens of “system jurisprudence” (fiqh al-nizam) and a macro-view, we discover that the jurisprudence of upbringing is neither a secondary chapter nor a collection of scattered fatwa inquiries regarding encouragement and punishment, but rather the “legal infrastructure for nurturing the committed human being”—an infrastructure that today, amid the struggles of global upbringing discourses ranging from Western educational liberalism to Far Eastern disciplinary systems, can impose itself upon the international dialogue arena not as a defensive ideology, but as a rational system endowed with revelatory backing and deep roots in natural law. However, the question is: Does this jurisprudence fundamentally possess the capacity for dialogue with modern legal apparatuses and postmodern educational theories, or is it merely a treasure trove of answers to believers’ questions within a limited cultural geography? And to enter this field, what methodological and policy preliminaries must be provided?

1. Competitive Advantages: Why Does Today’s World Need the Logic of the Jurisprudence of Upbringing?

If we wish to summarize the most important competitive advantage of Islamic jurisprudence of upbringing over prevalent human theories in a concise yet profound phrase, we must say: “Overcoming the false duality of absolute release and absolute authoritarianism.” Modern upbringing theories, built mostly on empirical psychology and pragmatism/utilitarianism, have either fallen into the trap of “unconditional child freedom” in Rousseau’s school and his modern commentators—resulting in identity crisis and family destabilization in Western societies—or, in strict, communist-like Eastern systems, view man as a raw material to be carved under state pressure. The jurisprudence of upbringing, however, resting upon the principles of guardianship (wilayah) and trust (amanah), presents a third way before humanity. Shia jurisprudence clearly distinguishes between “legislative guardianship” (wilayat tashri’iyyah), which belongs to God, and “disciplinary guardianship” (wilayat ta’dibiyyah), which by His permission is placed upon the child’s guardian (wali). In this intellectual system, the child is neither absolute owner of his destiny (as extreme humanism conceives) nor slave and subject to the educator’s unlimited desires; rather, he is a divine trust who must be moved toward perfection within the framework of the “No Harm rule” (Qa’idat La Darar) and “Justice rule” (Qa’idat al-‘Adl). This middle paradigm, in an era where the United Nations in Document 2030 explicitly speaks of “learning to live together without religion,” stands as the sole deeply-rooted opposing voice that establishes Sharia and legal proof for the child’s psychological and spiritual sanctuary. The jurisprudence of upbringing, via rules such as “prohibition of assisting in sin” (hurmat al-i’anah ‘ala al-ithm), “obligation of repelling wrong” (wujub daf’ al-munkar), and “obligation of purifying the cradle and environment,” provides precisely a technical translation of the modern concept of Educational Guardianship, which can be regarded by Western policy-makers entangled in the family collapse crisis not as a threat, but as a “normative solution.”

2. Theory or Collection of Fatwas? Discovering a System-Structure from the Core of Jurisprudential Sub-issues

One of the serious questions raised in international academic circles, and perhaps echoing in the minds of some young seminary students as well, is whether Islamic jurisprudence of upbringing is restricted merely to stating the operational ruling of “a teacher’s striking” or “permissibility of a expedient lie to a child,” or fundamentally possesses a “macro-upbringing theory”? The answer is that in the logic of Jawaheri ijtihad and dynamic principles of jurisprudence, viewing jurisprudence as fatwa-based is a methodological error. Prior to confronting particular issues, we face a “legal system regulating human relations.” The jurisprudence of upbringing rests upon sturdy pillars of philosophy of jurisprudence; that man is a multi-layered creature (dhu maratib), and each level of his existence (body, rational soul, heart, and spirit) is subject to rulings. This very “dimensional” perspective on humanity provides a foundation that one-dimensional behaviorist theories (Behaviorism) or psychological materialism are incapable of offering. For example, when jurisprudence rules on the father’s guardianship over a minor daughter’s marriage or the necessity of discipline that is “non-severe” (ghayr mubarrih—not causing severe physical or mental distress), it is in fact designing the family’s responsibility system. The jurist, relying on the four sources (al-adillah al-arba’ah) and employing time and space elements in ijtihad, extracts a theory of “psychological security based on divine rights.” Yes, unfortunately a major portion of this system-structure has thus far remained trapped amidst commentaries on Lum’ah and Makasib and has not been extracted and formulated as an “independent specialized discourse”; however, lack of codification does not mean lack of existence. The jurisprudential theory of upbringing is a living and evolving theory; because unlike definitive psychological theories that collapse with a new experiment, it is based on “divine wisdom” and the “discretionary zone” (mintaqat al-faragh) based on variable interests, capable of prescribing solutions for crises such as “artificial intelligence and personalization of upbringing” or “the right to religious upbringing on global platforms.”

3. Stability of Foundations and Transformation in Method: An Unavoidable Imperative for Transboundary Dialogue

This statement does not mean rigidity (jamud) upon the methodology of predecessors and no need to revise epistemic tools. The third question precisely addresses this sensitivity: Does presence in world jurisprudential and legal disputes require changing our monotheistic foundations and theological presuppositions? The answer is emphatically negative. We cannot abandon the principle of “God’s legislative guardianship” as the master key of the jurisprudence of upbringing to open the door of dialogue to the liking of liberal institutions. However, what definitely requires deep change and transformation is our method of deduction and level of subject-identification (mawdu’-shenasi). Educational jurisprudence seeking to speak in the UN Commission on the Rights of the Child or in European courts to defend Muslim girls’ hijab, if still trapped in individual and micro-jurisprudence, has nothing to say. We must transition from the view that “upbringing is a private relationship between father and son” toward the jurisprudence of the upbringing system—a jurisprudence capable of issuing declaratory rulings (ahkam wad’iyyah) for the “educational institution,” “mass media policy-making,” and “child content production criteria.” Unfortunately at present, our shortfall in precisely understanding concepts like Right to Education in human rights documents or Social Constructionism in philosophy of education causes us at times to present solid jurisprudential rulings with amateurish and reactionary literature, creating rejection rather than attraction. Therefore, transformation, not in text (nass), but in expanding the sphere of subject-identification and utilizing process logic in deduction is a strategic necessity. Today’s jurist of upbringing jurisprudence must be as fluent in Jawahir al-Kalam as he is familiar with John Rawls’s “educational justice” and “multiculturalism” theories to extract answers proportionate to temporal requirements.

4. Policy-Making for a Civilizational Movement: Necessary Actions to Enter the Field

Despite these peerless theoretical capacities, for Islamic jurisprudence of upbringing to solidify its status among Sunni jurisprudential apparatuses (such as Al-Azhar and al-Qarawiyyin) and secular legal apparatuses worldwide, it requires a coherent and scholarly policy package. The first step is a reverse and conceptual translation movement. We thus far translated their books into Arabic and Persian to understand the West; however, in transmitting precise seminary concepts into living world languages, we suffered reductionism and literalism. The word “Wilayah” cannot be translated merely as Custody; this word carries a heavy legal load of “divine trust” and “guardianship” that must be explained for Western legal audiences in formulations like Divine-Trust Guardianship. The second step is creating international scientific authority in upbringing jurisprudence. The Islamic world cannot wait for fatwa inquiries (istifta’) from a general Marja’ of imitation unfamiliar with the social atmosphere of Canada or Sweden regarding complex issues of upbringing Muslim children in the Diaspora. Establishing an “Institute for Comparative Upbringing Jurisprudence” with the presence of jurists specialized in cognitive sciences and sociologists of religion can function as an authority answering doubts and drafting competing legal documents against UNESCO documents. And finally, the most important action is moving beyond passivity and mere critique toward producing proactive high-level documents. Instead of consistently standing in a defensive position regarding “punishment” or “gender segregation” and being accused of violence or discrimination, we must draft a global charter of family rights in religious upbringing based on the jurisprudence of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) and put it to vote in international assemblies—a document in which, instead of vague slogans of “child freedom,” “society’s responsibility toward the spiritual purity of future generations” is spoken of.

In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that Islamic jurisprudence of upbringing is a treasure trove from whose face the dust of neglect has not yet been wiped. This jurisprudence represents the dormant competitive advantage of the Shia world in the soft civilizational battle; provided that we transcend the “text” (nass) and universalize the “method” of presenting it; and provided that instead of parrot-like repetition of rulings for believers within walls, we speak in the language of sound reason and natural rights to people beyond borders. Neglecting this field is not merely surrendering a jurisprudential chapter, but surrendering the field of nurturing tomorrow’s human being into the hands of a movement that reduces man to the level of a consumer or object of pleasure and extracts the divine spirit from the body of upbringing.