Note: According to the report of Contemporary Jurisprudence, citing the Center for Future Studies of the Islamic World, on Monday, July 17, 2017, the conference entitled “Unity and Convergence in the Islamic World: From Thought to Practice” was convened in collaboration with the Office of Political and International Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Future Studies of the Islamic World at the latter institute. In this conference, Dr. Jalal Derakhsheh, faculty member of Imam Sadiq University (peace be upon him), Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Sadatinezhad, Head of the Study Group on Islam and International Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Mohsen Pakayin, former Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Azerbaijan, delivered addresses.
Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Sadatinezhad presented a lecture titled “The Unity of the Islamic World from the Perspective of Shi‘i Jurisprudence of International Relations” at this conference. Dr. Sadatinezhad alluded to the jurisprudential dichotomy of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr in Shi‘i jurisprudence of international relations and remarked: In the jurisprudence of international relations, jurists’ outlook on international relations and the international system has historically been articulated through the division of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr, within which framework the regulation of Muslims’ relations with non-Muslims was addressed.
As long as the Islamic caliphate system prevailed over Islamic territories, no challenge confronted this jurisprudential perspective on international relations, for the entirety of the Islamic world was envisioned within the caliphate framework, with Dar al-Islam encompassing all Islamic lands under a unified, coordinated sovereignty via the caliphate, in opposition to Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Harb.
During the Safavid period, with the emergence of dual Shi‘i and Sunni systems (manifested in the Ottoman caliphate dominating the Sunni Islamic world), a challenge arose concerning the integrity of Dar al-Islam. Nevertheless, owing to the insistence of leading figures on both sides upon the imperative of Shi‘i-Sunni unity and the paucity of states, this challenge was not deemed grave, and the concepts of Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Kufr, and Dar al-Harb persisted within the jurisprudence of international relations.
From the modern epoch—namely, the inception of the nation-state system in the seventeenth century, and especially following the Ottoman caliphate’s dissolution and the formation of diverse Islamic nations predicated on varying nationalities and borders—a challenge materialized vis-à-vis the notion of Dar al-Islam in the jurisprudence of international relations. Particularly with the influx of novel Western concepts in politics and international relations—such as state, international organizations, self-help, the principle of survival, national interests, power aspiration, balance of power, and analogous notions—the antiquated concepts of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr receded from the political and international relations vocabulary employed by Muslim intellectuals in Islamic lands. Certain thinkers contended that these concepts had forfeited their efficacy; in the contemporary era, either a novel dar ought to be delineated, or these concepts could no longer be utilized.
Yet jurisprudential scrutiny discloses that throughout the Constitutional period and subsequently, jurists’ stance has persistently endorsed the concept of Dar al-Islam and the unity of the Islamic world as a cohesive identity. Jurists of this era and beyond, alongside affirming the nation-state paradigm, have likewise propounded and ratified Dar al-Islam and the solidarity of Islamic states.
For instance, Akhund Khorasani—one of the foremost jurists of the Constitutional era who played a pivotal role in leading the Constitutional movement—harbors an encompassing vision of the Islamic world grounded in the jurisprudential construct of Dar al-Islam, while concurrently invoking terms like nation, the realm of Iran, and the exigency of Iran’s sovereignty. In his fatwa on jihad against Russian invaders, Akhund Khorasani declares: “Jihad is obligatory upon all Muslims so long as the enemies of the faith assail the frontiers and Islamic domains.” Though the issue pertains to Iran’s occupation, Akhund’s address encompasses all Muslims. Indeed, from Akhund’s viewpoint, Iran’s occupation equates to the encroachment upon the boundaries of all Islamic realms, emblematic of his ummah-centric, solidarity-oriented, and Dar al-Islam outlook.
Regarding Italy’s assault on Libya, Akhund states: “Now Italy has invaded Tripoli, one of the greatest Islamic lands. What has befallen you that you hear the Muslims’ pleas for aid yet offer no reply? Are you awaiting the enemies’ onslaught on Mecca and the Prophet’s (PBUH) sanctuary, eradicating Islam from east to west? Then hasten to divine imperatives—jihad in God’s path and defense of Islam and your homeland.” Akhund deems Libya’s defense the homeland defense for all Muslims; though the incursion targets Libya, his exhortation spans all Islamic nations.
Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, another eminent jurist of this epoch, likewise underscores the imperative of Shi‘i-Sunni unity. In Tazkirat al-Ghafil, Sheikh castigates those fomenting discord and schism between Shi‘is and Sunnis.
Imam Khomeini, a preeminent jurist and architect of revolutionary-era jurisprudence, in his politico-divine testament, enjoins the foreign policy establishment to endeavor toward ameliorating ties with Islamic nations and fostering unity and alliance. He counseled Islamic countries’ scholars to summon governments and peoples to unity, to proffer fraternal hands to fellow believers irrespective of nation or race, and held that realizing such faith-based brotherhood would render Muslims the world’s paramount power. Imam Khomeini further, in the grand ayatollahs’ joint declaration commemorating the June 5 uprising anniversary, affirmed: “Our agenda is Muslim verbal unity, Islamic lands’ union, fraternity with all Muslim denominations worldwide, and covenant with all Islamic states globally.” Imam Khomeini’s stance on Israel, Palestine’s occupation, and the mandate for its liberation as Islamic territory corroborates his unity-focused and Dar al-Islam vista of the Islamic world. In essence, modern jurists retaining the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr paradigm in their jurisprudence—amid evolving circumstances—have, in political rhetoric, substituted terms like Islamic territories, Islamic ummah, Islamic world unity, Islamic countries, and equivalents for Dar al-Islam; yet their jurisprudential deployment of these notions attests to a continued reliance on Dar al-Islam’s persistence in the modern age.
Ayatollah Khamenei has perpetuated Imam Khomeini’s approach in his jurisprudence of international relations. He deems fomenting discord among Muslims impermissible, stressing Muslim solidarity and fraternal expansion, pursuing identical policy on Palestine. His earnest engagement with approximation discourses and directives to institute or bolster approximation bodies—such as the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, the University of Religions and Denominations—likewise validates this ummah-oriented and Dar al-Islam regard for Islamic nations collectively.
The paramount query is why this unity and solidarity fails to coalesce contemporarily, amid pervasive division among Islamic states? Diverse answers abound, but I propose responding from the jurisprudence of international relations lens. Jurisprudential inquiry reveals jurists have enunciated principles governing Dar al-Islam’s ties with Dar al-Kufr; analyses indicate contemporary Islamic societies’ leaders, for sundry reasons, have overlooked these, contributing to Islamic world disarray and Dar al-Islam’s unrealized actuality. Herein, certain pertinent principles for calibrating Islamic lands’ relations with non-Islamic states are surveyed.
Sheikh Tusi, a pivotal pre-Constitutional jurist, invokes the rule of denial of domination (nafy al-sabil) and unbelievers’ non-dominance over Muslims. He deems Muslims’ financial partnership or borrowing from Jews, Christians, and unbelievers reprehensible. He conditions unbeliever aid in wars against polytheists on Muslims’ numerical inferiority and helpers’ bona fides toward Muslims. Sheikh Tusi permits purchases from unbelievers, however. He further addresses preserving Islam’s exaltation, the Islamic entity, and Muslims’ sanctity. Yet how assiduously do Islamic states adhere to these in relations with non-Islamic counterparts?
Muhaqqiq Hilli prohibits affection and compassion toward unbelievers, deeming condolence for dhimmis non-Sunnah. He reprehends financial partnership with dhimmis and unbelievers, prohibiting arms sales to unbelievers in war or peace. Muhaqqiq reprehends non-weapon military equipment sales in peacetime but prohibits them in wartime. He likewise propounds denial of domination and preserving Islam’s exaltation and entity.
Akhund Khorasani, Constitutional-era jurist, responding to Astarabad scholars’ query, prohibits mutual affection, amity, and familiarity with unbelievers, citing Surah al-Mujadilah verse 22: “You will not find a people who believe in Allah and the Last Day having affection for those who oppose Allah and His Messenger…” He mandates defensive force preparation, rationally obligatory upon all Muslims collectively. Prohibiting transactions/associations bolstering unbelievers, denial of domination, preserving Islamic exaltation and entity rank among his principles for international relations and Islamic-non-Islamic state ties.
Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, another key Constitutional jurist, enunciates denial of domination, Islam’s exaltation, and preserving Islam’s egg (baydat al-Islam), stressing unbeliever endearment’s impermissibility and Muslim sanctity’s preservation.
Imam Khomeini, Islamic Republic founder and revolutionary jurisprudence progenitor, addresses preserving Muslim sanctity, denial of domination and subjugation, Islam’s exaltation, and Islam’s egg preservation; he rejects unbeliever allegiance—entrusting affairs to or appointing unbelievers. He spurns unbeliever relations, cooperation, or trade risking Muslim market harm, stressing Islamic state’s defensive readiness.
Ayatollah Khamenei references identical principles: denial of domination, Islam’s exaltation, safeguarding Islam’s lion’s den, Muslim sanctity preservation. He permits unbeliever cooperation absent Muslim detriment, unbeliever trade absent enmity toward Islam/Muslims. He underscores defensive/military deterrence necessity.
Naturally, in Islamic society/state governance, additional international relations principles—like winning hearts (ta’lif qulub) and especially expediency (maslahah)—aid the Islamic ruler in acting per societal interests. Imam Khomeini elevates expediency in Islamic governance to a prerogative thereof; Ayatollah Khamenei, accordingly, posits dignity, wisdom, and expediency as Islamic government foreign policy bedrock.
The concept of Islamic countries’ and world’s unity harbors internal Islamic world adversaries. Even Shi‘i thinkers include opponents decrying Islamic world unity as Pan-Islamism. They brand Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi—exerting prodigious unity efforts—an Ottoman proxy, citing jurisprudential giants like Aqabozorg Tehrani to assail him. Notwithstanding, Islamic world unity discourse enjoys jurisprudential endorsement in international relations jurisprudence, constituting Dar al-Islam’s converse. Both Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei, throughout governance, stressed this tenet; the Islamic Republic of Iran, since inception, has pursued Islamic world unity. This manifests in the Constitution—a codified jurisprudence form—is underscored in the Vision Document, and endures as an Islamic Republic foreign policy pillar. Stressing shared jurisprudential principles concordant between Shi‘i and Sunni schools in international relations, with endeavors toward application, can fortify unity among Islamic nations.