Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi can be regarded as one of the pioneers in transforming the right to dignity into a jurisprudential rule. His authorship of the book “The Principle of Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule,” alongside other articles, lectures, and interviews he has conducted on this right and its jurisprudential implications, has positioned him as one of the foremost figures in consolidating this right within the Shi‘i jurisprudential system. On this occasion, we engaged in a dialogue with him regarding the nature and dimensions of this right. He carefully distinguishes between this right and other rights such as the right to justice and kindness, considering the former exclusive to humans and the latter encompassing all beings. He insists, however, that this right is not limited to believers but extends to all humans, including opponents, unbelievers, and even enemies. The full text of the exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this professor and researcher at the Qom Seminary is as follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the right to dignity, and what are its dimensions? Is this right specific to humans, or can it be conceived for animals as well?
Ayazi: Dignity can have two foundations and roots: the first is religious, based on textual evidence in the Noble Quran and narrations, as well as what has been rationally discussed over time; the second is what has been raised since the fourteenth century, influenced by the culture of religions, regarding the status of human personality. All of this stems from the teachings presented in the Noble Quran. In the Noble Quran, dignity is presented in a general manner as “We have indeed honored the Children of Adam.” This has not been explicitly stated regarding other beings. For instance, concerning animals, justice and kindness are mentioned elsewhere. Even regarding the slaughter of animals, it states that you should perform the slaughter in a good and proper manner. Thus, two issues are raised in the Noble Quran: one is the right to human dignity, and you know that this right, in many places where it is mentioned in the Quran, has been transformed into a principle by our jurists. Our view is that the right to dignity is specific to humans, and the level of this right to dignity differs from that of other beings. The other point is justice and kindness, which is not exclusive to humans.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is the right to dignity among human rights or citizenship rights? Furthermore, is the right to dignity a natural right or a conventional one? Thirdly, what differences arise from choosing each of these responses?
Ayazi: The principle of dignity is a human and humanistic right. In the Noble Quran, this principle is not expressed with the term “human” but rather “Children of Adam.” Allamah Tabataba’i states that this right is inherent, meaning it pertains to the nature and essence of humanity. A point worthy of attention in this matter is that it does not say: “We have indeed honored the believers” or “the monotheists”; it does not even use the word “human” but says “Children of Adam,” which indicates the establishment of this right for anyone upon whom the designation “Adam” applies. This expression demonstrates the inherent nature of this right and provides its rationale; for when humanity is God’s vicegerent on earth, when it is the object of prostration by the angels: “Prostrate to Adam,” and when the right to life is affirmed for it, as in the verse “Whoever kills a soul… it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one—it is as if he had saved mankind entirely,” where saving one human is likened to saving all humanity, and when in other verses, with the expression “the best of creators,” it is called a being unlike any other created; these matters show that this right pertains to the essence of humanity and is not conventional. This right is an inherent one; it is even said to include criminals and murderers. Shahid Mutahhari cites the story of Imam Ali’s (peace be upon him) treatment of Ibn Muljam while on his deathbed after being struck in the Kufa Mosque, noting that despite Ibn Muljam being a prisoner, murderer, and criminal, Amir al-Mu’minin nevertheless granted him his inherent human right. Dignity has other implications as well; for example, due to human dignity, one cannot damage a person’s reputation, slander them, lie to them, torture them, or mutilate them—just as the Noble Prophet (PBUH) commanded in wars not to mutilate individuals.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: By what evidences can the human right to dignity be proven, and do the implications of each evidence differ from others?
Ayazi: Our jurists, in their jurisprudential inferences, employ a method whereby they utilize the Book, Sunnah, conduct (sirah), and reason to infer rulings, aggregating indications and evidences to derive the jurisprudential ruling. However, here, proving the right to dignity through the noble verse has clear differences from proving it through other evidences. For instance, this verse establishes the right to dignity for all humans, even those of differing views. Certain other rights also derive from this right; for example, the prohibition of insulting enemies in the verse “And do not insult those they invoke other than Allah, lest they insult Allah in enmity without knowledge” stems from this very right to dignity, which exists even for the enemies of Islam. Imam Ali (peace be upon him) also, upon witnessing his troops insulting enemies, stated: “I dislike for you to be insulters.” When the Quran raises this point, it seeks to resolve the matter from a divine and sacred perspective. Interestingly, the Quran speaks of dignity in two ways: once with the phrase “We have indeed honored…,” and elsewhere with “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.” This indicates that the believer holds a higher and superior status, but it does not mean that the Children of Adam are deprived of the right to dignity. One of the ramifications of the right to dignity is citizenship rights. These rights apply not only to believers but also to opponents, unbelievers, and even enemies. The verse “And let not the hatred of a people prevent you from being just” pertains to this; meaning that even toward enemies, one must not transgress the bounds of justice. Regarding opponents and those of differing views, it is stated that if they do not fight you, treat them kindly: “being righteous toward them and acting justly.” These are the implications that the right to dignity, when proven through Quranic evidence, entails.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is dignity a matter subject to divine designation (tawqifi), requiring expression by the Lawgiver, or is it a customary matter whose instances are determined by convention?
Ayazi: That the right to dignity is mentioned in the Sharia is undisputed; but does this mean it is tawqifi, or is it a guidance toward its conventional meaning? What is inferred from the apparent evidences is that the verse informs of a dignity recognized among people; therefore, it is not a purely devotional or tawqifi matter. Regarding the verse “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger,” it has also been said that the command therein is guiding (irshadi) rather than prescriptive (mawlawi); meaning that people should obey their guardian is something comprehensible by people even if the Lawgiver had not stated it. The right to dignity is likewise; even if God Almighty had not stated it, we would still recognize it—thus, it is a guidance toward a ruling comprehended by reason.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the difference between the right to dignity as a citizenship right and the right to dignity as a jurisprudential rule?
Ayazi: When we speak of a right, naturally there is someone demanding it. If you go somewhere to park your car, it is your right, and you can prevent another from parking in your place and demand your parking spot. However, often what we have inferred as a right can also be regarded as a rule; for example, the rule of possession (yad) states that what is in my hand belongs to me, and jurists have transformed this principle into a rule. The principle of dignity is likewise a right, yet simultaneously understood as a principle and rule. In this way, dignity is raised as a rule and can influence five areas in jurisprudence. If you refer to my book, you will find these matters well elucidated.
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Final Edited Version:
Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi, in an Exclusive Interview with Contemporary Jurisprudence:
The Right to Dignity Extends to All Humans—Whether Believers, Unbelievers, or Opponents
In the Noble Quran, dignity is articulated in a universal sense as “We have indeed honored the Children of Adam.” This has not been explicitly affirmed for other creatures. For animals, justice and benevolence are addressed elsewhere. Even concerning their slaughter, it enjoins performing it in a proper and excellent manner. Thus, the Noble Quran raises two matters: one is the right to human dignity—and you are aware that this right, in numerous Quranic contexts, has been elevated to a principle by our jurists. In our view, the right to dignity is exclusive to humans, with its level differing from that of other beings. The second matter is justice and benevolence, which is not confined to humans.
Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi may be considered among the pioneers in elevating the right to dignity to a jurisprudential rule. His authorship of the book The Principle of Dignity as a Jurisprudential Rule, complemented by numerous articles, lectures, and interviews on this right and its jurisprudential ramifications, has established him as one of the leading figures in embedding this right within the Shi‘i jurisprudential framework. Accordingly, we conversed with him on the essence and dimensions of this right. He meticulously differentiates it from other rights, such as justice and benevolence—deeming the former specific to humans and the latter applicable to all beings. He emphatically maintains that this right is not restricted to believers but encompasses all humans, including opponents, unbelievers, and even enemies. The complete transcript of Contemporary Jurisprudence’s exclusive interview with this professor and researcher at the Qom Seminary follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the right to dignity, and what are its dimensions? Is this right exclusive to humans, or can it be envisaged for animals as well?
Ayazi: Dignity may rest on two foundations: the first religious, grounded in Quranic texts and narrations, alongside rational discussions across eras; the second emerges from the fourteenth century onward, influenced by religious cultures, concerning the status accorded to human personality. All derive from teachings expounded in the Noble Quran. Therein, dignity is presented universally as “We have indeed honored the Children of Adam.” This is not explicitly stated for other beings. Regarding animals, justice and benevolence are mentioned elsewhere. Even for slaughter, it prescribes executing it properly and excellently. Thus, the Noble Quran addresses two issues: one is the right to human dignity—and you know that this right, wherever mentioned in the Quran, has been transformed into a principle by our jurists. Our position is that the right to dignity pertains exclusively to humans, with its degree distinct from other creatures. The second is justice and benevolence, not limited to humans.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the right to dignity fall under human rights or citizenship rights? Furthermore, is it a natural right or conventional? Thirdly, what distinctions arise from selecting either response?
Ayazi: The principle of dignity constitutes a human right. In the Noble Quran, it employs “Children of Adam” rather than “human.” Allamah Tabataba’i asserts its inherence—tied to human nature and essence. Notably, it does not state “We have honored the believers” or “monotheists”; eschewing even “human,” it uses “Children of Adam,” signifying this right’s fixation for anyone bearing that designation. This phrasing underscores its inherence and rationale: humanity as God’s vicegerent on earth; object of angelic prostration (“Prostrate to Adam”); bearer of the right to life, as in “Whoever kills a soul… it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one—it is as if he had saved mankind entirely,” equating one life to all; described elsewhere as uniquely created (“the best of creators”). These affirm its essential tie to humanity, not convention. It is inherent—even extending to criminals and murderers. Shahid Mutahhari references Imam Ali’s (peace be upon him) treatment of Ibn Muljam on his deathbed post-assassination attempt in Kufa Mosque: despite Ibn Muljam’s imprisonment as murderer and criminal, Amir al-Mu’minin upheld his inherent human right. Dignity yields further implications: prohibiting reputational harm, slander, falsehood, torture, or mutilation—as the Noble Prophet (PBUH) enjoined against mutilation in battles.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: By what evidences is the human right to dignity provable, and do implications vary across evidences?
Ayazi: Our jurists employ a methodology drawing from the Book, Sunnah, conduct, and reason—aggregating indications to infer rulings. Here, however, Quranic proof via the noble verse markedly differs from others. For example, it establishes dignity for all humans, including heterodox. Derivative rights emerge: prohibiting insults to enemies (“And do not insult those they invoke other than Allah, lest they insult Allah in enmity without knowledge”) stems from this dignity, extant even for Islam’s foes. Imam Ali (peace be upon him), observing troops insulting enemies, declared: “I dislike for you to be insulters.” The Quran addresses this divinely and sacredly. Notably, it discusses dignity dually: “We have indeed honored…” and “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous.” Believers hold superior station, yet Children of Adam retain dignity. Citizenship rights branch therefrom—applying to believers, opponents, unbelievers, and enemies alike. “And let not the hatred of a people prevent you from being just” mandates justice even toward enemies. For non-belligerent opponents and heterodox: “being righteous toward them and acting justly.” Such are implications of Quranic-proven dignity.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Is dignity tawqifi—requiring Lawgiver designation—or customary, with instances convention-determined?
Ayazi: Its Sharia mention is undisputed; yet does this imply tawqifi, or guidance to conventional meaning? Evidences suggest the verse reports recognized dignity—thus neither purely devotional nor tawqifi. Regarding “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger,” the command is deemed guiding (irshadi), not prescriptive (mawlawi): obedience to guardians is rationally comprehensible absent divine statement. Dignity mirrors this: recognizable rationally even unspoken—hence guidance to reason-perceived ruling.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What distinguishes the right to dignity as citizenship right versus jurisprudential rule?
Ayazi: Rights imply a claimant. Parking your car grants you claim against others. Yet inferred rights often double as rules: possession rule (“what is in my hand is mine”) became jurisprudential. Dignity is a right yet construed as principle/rule. Thus elevated, it impacts five jurisprudential domains—as detailed in my book.