Note: The principle of innocence occupies a prominent and extensively applied position in judicial fiqh. The question, however, is whether this significance has also permeated Iranian judicial law. In their article titled “The Position of the Principle of Innocence in the Iranian Judicial System with Reliance on Judicial Precedent,” Ehsan Shariati Fard and colleagues have endeavored to investigate this matter. An excerpt from this paper, presented at the Second International Conference on Humanities and Cultural Studies in 1396 SH (2017 CE), follows:
Pursuant to Article 194 of the Civil Procedure Code, evidence is any matter to which the parties to a dispute refer for the purpose of proving or defending their claim. Under this definition, operative principles such as the principle of innocence may be classified as legal presumptions—i.e., a form of evidence—upon which the parties can rely, similar to other legal indications. Since a judicial ruling may rest upon an operative principle such as barāʾah, it must be affirmed that recourse to operative principles constitutes, in principle, one of the duties of the trial judge.
The principle of innocence is enshrined in Article 37 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 1275 of the Civil Code, Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code, and Article 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This entails that whenever attributing a matter to an individual would cause hardship, detriment, deprivation of liberty, or constraint, and such attribution is doubtful, the individual must be exonerated; for absent conclusive proof, the imposition of harm, hardship, loss of freedom, or restriction upon persons is impermissible. This is the essence of the principle of innocence. The central inquiry of the present study is how the principle of innocence may be invoked as evidence in legal claims. The article’s principal aim is to examine this question by drawing upon judicial precedent.
Introduction
The principle of innocence may be considered evidence for establishing a claim. In judicial discourse—concerning courts, prosecution offices, initiation of claims, defense, adjudication, and judicial determinations—it assumes a central role. The prosecution office, upon notification of an offense, pursues the acquisition of evidence; a criminal court may convict solely on the strength of evidence. The chief function of a civil court is to scrutinize the evidences adduced by the litigants. The vindication of a right proceeds with the support of evidence. No court can acknowledge a right absent evidence. Society expects right and justice to be ascertained and manifested through evidence. Evidence must therefore be comprehended in all its dimensions.
The Principle of Innocence as Evidence for Proving a Claim
1-1 The Concept of Evidence
Although evidence is defined in Persian lexicons, it is necessary to ascertain whether its legal definition aligns with its lexical meaning. In Persian language and literature, dalīl (plural: adillah/dalāʾil) denotes “guide,” “indicator,” “path-shower,” “sign,” or “mark.” From these notions, evidence may also be understood as that which “manifests” or “indicates.” For instance, in an expert legal encyclopedia, a certificate serves as evidence that its holder is a law graduate, and an official title deed is evidence of ownership for the named individual.
In jurisprudence, evidence operates in two senses. In the narrower sense, it refers to any statutorily prescribed means which, before a judicial body, manifests a fact and thereby produces conviction in the adjudicator’s conscience concerning the truth of the allegation. Per Article 194 of the Civil Procedure Code: “Evidence is any matter to which the parties refer for proving or defending the claim.” Testimony, for example, constitutes evidence in this sense. In the broader sense, evidence encompasses all means that convince the adjudicator’s conscience. Hence the maxim “the burden of proof rests on the claimant” signifies that the claimant—whether plaintiff or defendant—bears responsibility for assembling and presenting the means that satisfy the judge as to the truth of the asserted fact.
Thus, in law, evidence arises whenever an occurrence directs reason toward reality. Whenever reason infers an unknown from observed signs, those signs constitute evidence—be they external events or statutory provisions. Evidence is occasionally equated with demonstration or syllogism; it has been said that “whatever convinces the soul of the existence of truth is evidence.” The legal and adjudicative concept of proof aligns with this understanding: evidence comprises indications of a disputed reality. Article 194 of the Civil Procedure Code provides: “Evidence is any matter to which the parties refer for proving or defending the claim.” Clearly, evidence operates in contexts of dispute to establish the claim in favor of one party or the other, and it is fundamentally distinct from the evidences that establish a legal ruling.
1-2 The Principle of Innocence and the Evidences for Proving a Claim
The question now is whether operative principles such as barāʾah and istiṣḥāb may be included among the evidences for proving a claim. The Legal Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, in an advisory opinion dated 27 Mordad 1343 SH (18 August 1964 CE), declared: “The property of evidence is its use in proving a claim; operative principles therefore lack probative character and serve merely as directives in cases of doubt, without possessing the quality of evidence.” This opinion, however, predates the Revolution and the former Civil Procedure Code.
A further question concerns, for example, the silence of the Civil Procedure Code on the admissibility of counterclaims at the first appellate hearing: may a judge, relying on operative principles—such as the presumption of validity and the avoidance of precaution—and given statutory silence, accept a counterclaim by the appellee? More generally, may a judge invoke operative principles in other instances where the Civil Procedure Code is silent?
The Civil Procedure Code of 1379 SH (2000 CE) partially addresses this. It enshrines the principle that adjudication of a legal matter requires explicit statutory authorization; in cases of silence, recourse to operative principles or personal interpretation beyond the law’s apparent meaning is impermissible. Article 7 states: “No claim may be examined at a higher instance unless a judgment has been rendered thereon at the first instance, except as provided by law.” The implication is that no interpretive extension is permitted where mandatory procedural rules are silent; every adjudication demands express legal warrant. Nevertheless, operative principles such as barāʾah may be treated as legal presumptions—a species of evidence—upon which litigants may rely, analogous to other legal indications. The principle of innocence is expressly recognized in Article 37 of the Constitution, Article 1275 of the Civil Code, and Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code, which places the onus probandi upon the claimant.
Consequently, the principle of innocence is of utmost importance in the defense of claims and may properly be numbered among the evidences for proving a claim. Article 1285 of the Civil Code lists five categories of proof. The Civil Procedure Code acknowledges operative principles—including istiṣḥāb and barāʾah—within the realm of evidentiary rulings, while adding local investigation, site inspection, and expert opinion to the category of substantive evidences or proofs of claim.
Thus, the principle of innocence may constitute the very basis of a judicial ruling and enjoys wide application as substantive evidence. Its domain is absolute equipoise of doubt: it applies when a matter oscillates between two equally balanced possibilities, with no preponderance of one over the other. Reason then dictates preference for one side. Hence it is termed a rational principle, grounded in rational judgment. It is also designated an operative principle because, in practice, it resolves doubt and uncertainty, serving as a directive that clarifies judicial obligations in application.