Note: With humanity’s entrance into the modern era, many new rights among human beings were recognized. One of these rights is the right to human equality. On the other hand, certain Sharia rulings, at first glance, conflict with this right. Ruling differences between men and women, Sayyids and non-Sayyids, Muslims and non-Muslims, Shi’is and Sunnis, and the like are examples of this matter. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Mehdi Mehrizi, who has researched women’s jurisprudence and ruling differences between men and women for over three decades, believes three currents exist in encountering these inequalities. He considers the best method to be re-reading jurisprudential proofs; a re-reading that, of course, does not always lead to altering the Sharia ruling. The detailed text of Contemporary Jurisprudence‘s exclusive interview with this professor and researcher of the Qom Seminary follows:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is the right to human equality, and what dimensions does it entail?
Mehrizi: I understand human equality to mean that human beings, irrespective of these 5 items: gender, race and lineage, geography, beliefs and convictions, and social standing; that is, human beings should be equal in enjoying life’s advantages, beliefs, and regulations. Conversely, anything that differentiates human beings by virtue of these 5 items constitutes inequality.
I shall elaborate on these 5 items: Gender means being male or female; race and lineage means being Arab or Persian, belonging to this tribe or that tribe; geography of land, such as someone being from Mecca and another from Medina; beliefs and convictions, such as non-Muslim and Muslim; social standing, such as this person being a teacher, this one a worker, this one a superior, this one a subordinate.
Regarding these 5 items, if distinction is made among individuals in the domain of life’s advantages, entitlements, and laws, it becomes inequality. The general concept of the right to human equality was as I stated.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: In general, which Sharia rulings are considered contrary to the right to human equality and ought to be set aside?
Mehrizi: Which Sharia rulings you set aside is currently the subject of discussion. For now, we are stating what things might be considered inequality; that is, which rulings in jurisprudence serve as instances of inequality, so that we may subsequently decide whether to set them aside or not. In jurisprudence, we have rulings that conflict with some of these divisions; such as rulings differentiating between men and women in gender; rulings differentiating between non-Muslim and Muslim or Shi’i and Sunni in beliefs and convictions; and rulings differentiating between Sayyids and non-Sayyids in lineage.
For example, when we state that the share of Sayyids in Khums belongs to Sayyids and does not reach non-Sayyids, this ruling reflects a difference based on lineage. Or when we state that backbiting a Sunni is permissible while it is not permissible regarding a Shi’i, or that the rulings of blood money (diyah) and retaliation (qisas) for a Muslim and a non-Muslim are not identical, we have in reality created a distinction among individuals based on their beliefs and convictions. Differences between men and women based on their gender are also abundant.
Therefore, in brief, in jurisprudence we encounter rulings that serve as instances of some of these items of inequality; however, what we must do regarding these rulings and how we should encounter them is another discussion that we will address as the conversation continues.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Can differences in rulings between men and women in matters such as blood money (diyah), inheritance, and testimony be considered contrary to the right to human equality?
Mehrizi: This question of yours is not exclusive to men and women, but applies equally regarding non-Muslims and Muslims; hence my explanations from here onward pertain to both cases.
The reality is that these instances, in general and rational perception, are considered a form of inequality. At least in today’s world, it is unacceptable to people that distinctions be made between men and women or non-Muslims and Muslims in their rulings. Perhaps in the past, due to general culture, this perception did not exist, but today it exists.
Religious scholars, both jurists and non-jurists, facing this sense of inequality existing among human beings, traversed several paths. One is the general and prevalent current that we can term the traditional current. This current’s response is that these differences are worldly differences, but God in the Hereafter and in devotional acts makes no distinction between men and women or Sayyids and non-Sayyids. This current also at times resorts to justification; such as: if there is a difference between men and women, it is because certain expenses and maintenance rest upon the man that do not rest upon the woman, or for example regarding Sayyids, some consider certain ruling differences as being for preserving the sanctuary and reverence of the Prophet (s).
Among this group constituting the first current, some also believe that we do not know the philosophy of rulings; rather, God who created human beings and is acquainted with the inner reality of affairs knows it. But human beings, because they have not yet reached complete awareness regarding the philosophy of rulings, comprehend certain instances while failing to comprehend others. In any case, one must accept the principle of these rulings, and if someone disputes them, their religiosity is impaired, demonstrating that they are not submitted before Almighty God. In general, however, this group accepts these differences.
The second current is the current pursued by religious intellectuals (roshenfekran-e dini). Using a general and extra-jurisprudential analysis, they state that all these rulings conflict with the right to equality and must be set aside; because we have discovered certain principles and foundations from religion that human beings are equal, and therefore anything that appears unequal, for example, was specific to that era or jurists erred in understanding it, hence it must be discarded entirely. This is also a current whose members are generally not seminary-trained and possess non-seminary origins. Individuals such as Dr. Soroush fall into this category.
The third current is a current that is both seminary-based and jurisprudential, which we describe as the current of “religious reformists” (nowandishan-e dini). This current possesses a seminary and religious base, believing that we understood human equality from the Quran and authoritative Sunnah; therefore, every type of inequality among human beings must undergo re-reading; since an error may have occurred in understanding a verse, or a narration may be inaccurate in terms of chain of transmission, indication, or matters such as conflicting with the Quran; therefore, given that these issues are questioned by people in today’s world, they must be examined anew. For example, in the past, the difference in the age of puberty (bulugh) between girls and boys was agreed upon and no one objected; but today people cannot comprehend a 6-year difference between these two ages of puberty; hence the proofs of the issue must be re-read.
For example, regarding retaliation (qisas) for men and women, Verse 178 of Surah Al-Baqarah states: “The free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female” (Al-hurru bi-al-hurri wa-al-‘abdu bi-al-‘abdi wa-al-untha bi-al-untha). This verse must be considered alongside Verse 45 of Surah Al-Ma’idah, which states: “Life for life, eye for eye” (Al-nafsa bi-al-nafsi wa-al-‘ayna bi-al-‘ayni). Almighty God in this verse does not state: slave for slave; rather He states: life for life, eye for eye. Some state that requiring free for free and female for female is a Quranic principle. This is while the story is something else. Mr. Javad Ali, in his book Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-‘Arab, states that in pre-Islamic Arab society, there was a rule where tribes ranked classes among themselves; for example, a tribe stated: Our women are like their men, our slaves are like their free persons, because we are the superior class. In this context, Verse 178 of Al-Baqarah was revealed, seeking to destroy this aristocracy. Therefore, the verse does not address at all that in retaliation, a woman’s value is half that of a man; rather it states that you thought you were a higher class, hence considering your lower people equal to their higher people, and because you thought women were lower and men were higher, you considered your tribe’s woman equal to their man and your tribe’s slave equal to their free person; whereas it is not so and you are mistaken; a slave is a slave, a woman is a woman, and a man is a man. In reality, God seeks to invalidate their understanding of classes and self-superiority over other tribes. In interpreting this verse, both jurists and commentators erred; because they paid no attention whatsoever to the context of issuance (faza-ye sudur) of this verse. When the context of issuance of this verse becomes clear, it becomes obvious that no difference exists between retaliation for men and women, and female is for female, and male is for male.
On the other hand, we have a general verse in Surah Al-Ma’idah. Surah Al-Ma’idah is the last surah revealed, and it is recorded in Ahl al-Bayt traditions that “it abrogates between two abrogated ones” (nasikhatun bayna al-mansukhatayn); meaning nothing from it has been abrogated. Therefore, when we consider the year of revelation of Surah Al-Baqarah alongside the year of revelation of Surah Al-Ma’idah—which is the last surah revealed in the Quran—we realize that the verse in Surah Al-Ma’idah must serve as the basis for action, and no difference exists between men and women in the ruling of retaliation. This is the meaning of re-reading proofs; meaning examining the issue once more, this time with new concerns, examining the context of issuance of proofs, as well as other proofs.
Through re-reading proofs, many inequalities in rulings disappear, and of course a number may remain that we accept and entrust their comprehension to God.
Regarding the issue of girls’ puberty as well, it is the same, and through re-reading proofs we reach the conclusion that the criterion for puberty is that very ontological and natural state of girls and boys where ontological signs are realized, and age possesses no intervention in it. Perhaps the aspect of severe disagreement regarding the age of puberty in Islamic schools of thought—where some stated it as 14 to 16 years—is this very matter that age fundamentally is not the criterion.
It is also narrated from the Prophet (s) stating: “Many a bearer of jurisprudence carries it to one who is more knowledgeable than him” (Rubba hamili fiqhin ila man huwa afqahu minh); how many times do people narrate material that subsequent generations understand better, of which we have many similar instances in jurisprudence. Well water until the time of Muhaqqiq [al-Hilli] was said to be small water (ma’-e qalil); they narrated its tradition as well, but failed to realize it; but from that time onward they stated: No, because well water is connected to underground waters, its volume is not the criterion, but its connection is the criterion: “Well water is vast; nothing corrupts it unless it is altered by it” (Ma’u al-bi’ri wasi’un la yufsiduhu shay’un illa an yataghayyara bih); well water is vast and nothing corrupts it. Early jurists prior to Muhaqqiq possessed this very tradition, but failed to understand this point from it; hence re-reading proofs is a necessary and indispensable matter.