Note: Minimalist jurisprudence and maximalist jurisprudence, if prior to the Islamic Revolution was a term spoken of in the discipline of jurisprudence and occasionally theology (kalam), after the victory of the Revolution transformed into an important component in guiding the administration of the country. It is clear that the approach of the two Imams of the Revolution (Imam Khomeini and Imam Khamenei) was a maximalist approach to jurisprudence, and they governed the country based on this very approach. But does accepting minimalist jurisprudence mean the impossibility of governing the country? We conversed regarding the challenges of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence with Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Ahmad Rahdar, who has researched and taught in the field of state jurisprudence (fiqh al-dawlah) for years. The President of Futuh-e Andisheh Institute believes that proponents of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence both secularize/customize religion and prove unable to be effective actors even within the very limited domain where they advocate jurisprudential intervention. The detailed exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this faculty member at Baqir al-Olum University is presented below:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What is meant by the minimalist approach to jurisprudence regarding jurisprudential intervention in which arenas of human life?
Rahdar: Our existing jurisprudence is a minimalist jurisprudence. The reason for this is that it has sufficed with individual domains and fundamentally has not entered governance and social domains. Even in areas where the discipline of jurisprudence entered in these years, it entered as stating the duty of individual duty-bound subjects (mukallafin), without addressing the duties of institutions, the state, the Ummah, government, and organizations. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, it was assumed that one must act based on the jurisprudence reflected in practical manuals (risalah ‘amaliyyah). However, following the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic government, the need for system jurisprudence (fiqh al-nizam) and governance jurisprudence (fiqh hukumati) was felt. At present, it is thoroughly understood that practical manuals are insufficient for Islamizing society; rather, jurisprudence must shift its duty-bound subject (mukallaf) from the individual to society, institutions, and organizations, in which case rulings will likewise change. However, at present, since most of our jurists have not entered jurisprudential discipline in this manner, our jurisprudence is minimalist.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does the minimalist approach to jurisprudence signify a maximalist recourse to reason (‘aql) and rational practice (sirah al-‘uqala’) alongside reduced recourse to texts (nusus)? In that case, given that understanding rational rulings and rational practice is possible for ordinary non-jurist people as well, does any reason remain for people to refer to jurists to understand the Sharia?
Rahdar: We can place governance jurisprudence, macro-jurisprudence, civilizational jurisprudence, system jurisprudence, and the like under the comprehensive title of “maximalist jurisprudence.” In that case it must be said: among the main characteristics of maximalist jurisprudence is increased recourse to reason and custom (‘urf). Minimalist jurisprudence has confined itself within the circle of texts minus reason. Minimalist jurisprudence resembles the Akhbaris, who refer heavily to texts; in contrast to Usulis who, in addition to texts, refer to reason and custom as well. Usuli jurisprudence compared to Akhbari jurisprudence is a maximalist jurisprudence. Of course, maximalist jurisprudence also refers to texts, but because it accepts reason and custom as well, by clinging to reason and custom it offers a broader interpretation of texts; in contrast to minimalist and Akhbari jurisprudence which only refer to texts and pay little attention to reason and custom.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Given that proponents of the minimalist approach to jurisprudence interpret nearly all Sharia issues considering the practice and judgment of rational people, and the general public also has the ability to refer to this judgment and practice, what was fundamentally the philosophy of prophetic mission (bi’thah)?
Rahdar: Incidentally, in maximalist jurisprudence, jurists’ recourse to custom and reason is extensive; in contrast to minimalist jurisprudence which pays less attention to these proofs. However, maximalist jurisprudence jurists’ recourse to reason and custom does not mean they are inattentive to texts. Jurisprudential rationality has one foot in texts and the other foot in society and custom. Reconciling texts, practice, and reason naturally rests upon the jurist, and the jurist strives to issue a fatwa that is not severed from revelation and Sharia texts. In truth, guaranteeing that deductions based on reason and custom are not severed from the spirit of Sharia rests with the jurist who continuously strives to incorporate the spirit of Sharia into his fatwas and thoroughly comprehends the taste of the Lawgiver (madaq al-shari’).
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Does a minimalist approach to religion lead to the secularization/customization (‘urfi-shodan) of religion?
Rahdar: One concern, as I stated above, is that maximalists, due to heavy reliance on custom in their jurisprudential arguments, do not become custom-ridden (‘urf-zadeh); and a concern also exists regarding minimalists: because they regard the scope of jurisprudential intervention as small, they inevitably refer in non-jurisprudential cases to rational practices and customs, and this very matter causes the secularization/customization of religion. In other words, the minimalist approach causes non-religion to enter religion.
This claim is a correct statement, and it must be conceded that a minimalist approach to religion leads to the secularization/customization of religion.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Proponents of a minimalist approach to religion, while regarding answering many issues as outside the duty of jurisprudence, simultaneously assume positions such as Marja’iyyah (religious authority), which requires maximalist responsiveness to people’s questions. How can this contradiction be resolved?
Rahdar: If we define Marja’iyyah and its mission based on a maximalist interpretation of jurisprudence, this contradiction arises; however, if we say that for proponents of minimalist jurisprudence, their Marja’ of imitation must also issue fatwas strictly within the limits of minimalist jurisprudence and not intervene in all affairs of the duty-bound subject’s life. As an example, a Marja’ who favors minimalist jurisprudence should have nothing to do with the nuclear file, the environment, water, military affairs, and the like. In that case, no conflict or contradiction exists between a minimalist approach to jurisprudence and assuming the position of Marja’iyyah.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: How has the experience of a minimalist approach to jurisprudence been in Islamic and Christian countries?
Rahdar: The minimalist approach to jurisprudence in these societies caused, in the long run, the specific domain and realm that minimalist jurists consider exclusively theirs to fall outside the control of the institution of jurisprudence as well; because human life is a network, and if one part of that network is not executed, another part will not be executed either. If an institution assumes responsibility for a part of that network, no other institution can assume the remainder of that network. In the Islamic world, most approaches advocating minimalist jurisprudence have failed to protect the religious existence of Muslim people in Islamic societies; hence, in these societies, merely a name of Islam remains.