Note: Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen Dr. Alizadeh Mousavi has been researching and teaching in the field of Islamic theology (kalam) for years. His extensive international experience has also increased his familiarity with various theological theories in the Islamic world. On the other hand, the minimalist and maximalist approaches to jurisprudence stem from a theological dispute over the extent of human expectation from religion. On this pretext, we conversed with him regarding the imperatives of Contemporary Jurisprudence based on the minimalist approach to jurisprudence. Expressing that what has thus far been prevalent in jurisprudential science was a minimalist approach rather than a maximalist approach, he specified that without a maximalist approach to jurisprudence, one cannot fundamentally speak of applied/applied-branch jurisprudence (fiqh mudaf), system jurisprudence (fiqh al-nizam), and Contemporary Jurisprudence. He also expressed the requirements for reaching maximalist jurisprudence. The detailed exclusive interview of Contemporary Jurisprudence with this faculty member at the University of Religions and Denominations and President of the Ahsan Institute follows below:
Contemporary Jurisprudence: What are the imperatives and characteristics of a minimalist approach to jurisprudence? Is the minimalist approach to jurisprudence a single theory, or does it function as an abstract universal comprising several theories and approaches that share common points in certain cases?
Alizadeh Mousavi: Our first discussion is that minimalist and maximalist approaches to jurisprudence address the perspective regarding religion’s presence in human life; in the sense that if we advocate that religion maintains a minimalist presence in human life and is restricted purely to the individual realm of man without occupying a position in the social realm, practically this matter extends to jurisprudence as well, because jurisprudence expresses religion’s practical frameworks. Hence, expansion and restriction regarding religion’s position in human life leads to expansion and restriction regarding jurisprudence’s role in human life. Therefore, the root of the discussion on whether jurisprudence is minimalist or maximalist traces back to this issue.
The minimalist approach to jurisprudence traces back to secularist thought. If we advocate secularism, our jurisprudence also becomes minimalist; and if we do not advocate it, our jurisprudence becomes maximalist.
Alongside these two terms, two other terms exist named “potential jurisprudence” (fiqh zarfiyyati) and “actualized jurisprudence” (fiqh fa’liyyati). Clarifying this: At times our discussion concerns whether jurisprudence can supply human social needs in addition to individual needs residing in the sphere of worship and individual matters or not? That is one question. Another question is whether jurisprudence has been able to implement these conditions today or not? The first question concerns the capacity of jurisprudence, and the second question concerns the actualization of jurisprudence. In response to the first question, I state that our jurisprudence possesses this capacity. However, in response to the second question, it must be said that this capacity has not yet achieved actualization. This very matter has caused us in the realm of society to be unable to resolve societal problems and offer efficient answers to them. For example, in the domain of economics, if jurisprudence states content in the arena of economic ethics, that again represents minimalist jurisprudence. Maximalist jurisprudence in economics means being able to comment on macro-economic issues—as an example, commenting on banking, usance, finance, bills of exchange, speculation, and the like. When we are unacquainted with these subjects, naturally we cannot issue jurisprudential rulings proportionate to them.
In my view, the issue of minimalist jurisprudence and maximalist jurisprudence is not the issue of our jurisprudential community today, nor should it be. The important issue to which jurists today must pay attention is the issue of actualizing the various capacities of jurisprudential science. This matter of course possesses requirements that must be attended to. One of these requirements is attention to the objectives of Sharia (maqasid al-shari’ah), or in other words, teleological jurisprudence (fiqh maqasidi). Without considering the goals of Sharia, one cannot offer correct answers to macro-issues facing jurisprudence. Another requirement is attention to temporal and spatial conditions (shara’it-e zaman wa makan). As Shahid Motahhari raised in the book Islam and the Requirements of Time, without attention to temporal and spatial conditions, one cannot correctly deduce jurisprudential rulings. Another requirement is moving toward compound jurisprudence (fiqh murakkab). Today jurists alone cannot understand the emerging issues of today’s world to issue fatwas regarding them. Understanding these subjects and issues requires assistance from experts in those specific matters.
Therefore, that we today realistically are caught in minimalist jurisprudence is due to lack of attention to the noted points: ranging from lack of attention to the objectives of Sharia, to lack of intervening time and space in deducing jurisprudential rulings, and lack of employing experts to understand jurisprudential subjects.
When we fall into minimalist jurisprudence, its first requirement is that jurisprudence will be influential solely in the sphere of worship and individual human affairs and will maintain no entry into the social sphere; therefore, since in the social sphere a “discretionary zone” (mintaqat al-faragh) will occur, society will be driven toward excessive leniency and laxity. When in a society the role of jurisprudence fades, unconsciously the role of religion also fades, and society moves toward modern rationality, becoming the raiding ground of modern rationality—a rationality arising from self-grounded reason rather than reason connected to revelation, which is our benchmark and criterion.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Based on a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, what imperatives and characteristics does Contemporary Jurisprudence assume?
Alizadeh Mousavi: When we accept a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, practically jurisprudence will express opinions solely in individual matters, and we will no longer have anything named social jurisprudence, system jurisprudence, and applied-branch theoretical jurisprudences (fiqh-ha-ye mudaf).
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Based on a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, is creating jurisprudential systems such as an economic jurisprudential system, political jurisprudential system, etc., possible?
Alizadeh Mousavi: No, when we advocate minimalist jurisprudence, discussing jurisprudential systems no longer holds meaning and practically exits the domain of jurisprudential discussion.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Based on a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, is “establishing an Islamic government” a desirable and possible matter?
Alizadeh Mousavi: No, such a thing is impossible. If we advocate a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, jurisprudence will no longer maintain any ruling in the social arena, and since government is also a social issue, therefore jurisprudence will also have no idea in the arena of government. Sultanic rulings (ahkam sultaniyyah) mean political rulings; when jurisprudence becomes minimalist, we will no longer have anything named political jurisprudence and sultanic rulings.
Contemporary Jurisprudence: Based on a minimalist approach to jurisprudence, does the method of deducing issues and the weight assigned to certain proofs in deduction operations become different?
Alizadeh Mousavi: It seems this question is incorrect; because what we have faced since the beginning of jurisprudential science’s formation has been minimalist jurisprudence, and hence our proofs and methods of jurisprudential deductions took shape on this very basis. Therefore, the correct question is: “Based on a maximalist approach to jurisprudence, does the method of deducing issues and the weight assigned to certain proofs in deduction operations become different?”
One cannot, by clinging to a single fatwa like the tobacco prohibition fatwa, label jurisprudence as maximalist jurisprudence; because this fatwa did not originate from a supporting intellectual apparatus, but was merely a jurist’s fatwa on a single issue. Maximalist jurisprudence means creating a supporting intellectual system that casts its shadow over the science of jurisprudence and dominates it, whereby all deductions, proofs, and methods are organized accordingly. Such a thing has not existed thus far, but must certainly be created; otherwise, the capacities of jurisprudence will not achieve actualization.